Ottawa, Ontario, November 9, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
and
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
[1] In an intensely competitive business environment, the information and documents described would be of tremendous value to any competitors. Its disclosure to employees or to other competitors would seriously damage their commercial interest and competitive position.
[2] “Attorneys Eyes Only” provisions will not be lightly ordered and such provisions will not be ordered based on “bald” assertions of the need for such protection. Such an order will be made, however, where the evidence demonstrates that a party’s commercial interests could be harmed without such an order. In fact, the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 (Rules) specifically provide that, where the Court orders that information be treated confidentially, only the solicitors of record shall have access to the information unless the Court orders otherwise. (Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Industries Ltd. (2002), 18 C.P.R. (4th) 334 (F.C.T.D.); Rule 152(2)(a).)
JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
[3] The Plaintiff, Rivard Instruments Inc. (Rivard), appeals a pre-trial Protective Order granted by Madam Prothonotary Tabib. The Defendant, Ideal Instruments Inc. (Ideal), asks that the appeal be dismissed.
[4] The Protective Order is a discretionary order that does not determine any question vital to the final issue of this case. Accordingly, to succeed in this appeal, Rivard must establish that the Protective Order is clearly wrong, in the sense that the Prothonotary’s exercise of discretion was based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts.
[5] In deciding to grant the Protective Order, the Prothonotary considered the fact that a Protective Order had been issued in a corresponding United States proceeding. This was a relevant fact weighing in favour of the making of the Protective Order in this action. Reliance on this fact was not an error of law or an error in principle.
[6] In deciding to provide for “Counsel’s Eyes Only” protection, the Prothonotary considered the highly confidential nature of the documents and the significant risk to Ideal if the information were disclosed to persons involved in the day-to-day business of Rivard. There was uncontradicted evidence before the Prothonotary to establish these facts. In contrast, Rivard filed no evidence to show that it was necessary, for the prosecution of this action, that any particular “Counsel’s Eyes Only” documents be disclosed to employees of Rivard.
[7] The decision of the Prothonotary is consistent with Canadian Precedent on the granting of Protective Orders, and there was uncontradicted evidence before the Prothonotary to support the terms of the Protective Order. In contrast, Rivard filed no evidence to support any of its objectives to the Protective Order. Accordingly, there is no ground for this Court to interfere with the Prothonotary’s exercise of discretion, and Rivard’s appeal should fail.
FACTS
[8] Rivard is the holder of Canadian Patent No. 2,298,277 (Rivard Patent), which relates to a detectable hypodermic needle device.
[9] Rivard brings this action against Ideal based upon an alleged infringement of the Rivard Patent. Specifically, Rivard alleges that Ideal has infringed the Rivard Patent by making and selling in Canada a product known as Ideal’s “D3 Needle”. Ideal has denied any infringement in its Statement of Defence.
[10] Ideal owns two United States Patents in respect of the D3 Needle. These include United States Patent No. 6,960,196 for a detectable hypodermic needle device (D3 Patent).
[11] Ideal has commenced an action against Rivard in the United States District Court in the State of Iowa (US Action). In the US Action, Ideal alleges that Rivard has infringed the D3 Patent through the sale of Rivard’s detectable hypodermic needle in the United States.
[12] This Action and the US Action involve similar issues and facts. Pursuant to the discovery rules that apply in the US Action, Ideal is obliged to produce to Rivard in the US Action many of the same documents that Ideal is obliged to produce to Rivard in this Action. As found by the Prothonotary, documents produced in one jurisdiction are likely to also be produced in the other jurisdiction.
[13] Some of the documents and evidence produced (and to be produced) by Ideal in the US Action and in this Action contain highly sensitive and confidential commercial, scientific and proprietary information.
[14] US counsel for Ideal and Rivard have agreed upon and entered a Protective Order in connection with the US Action (US Order). The US Order is substantially the same as the Protective Order granted by the Prothonotary.
[15] Rivard refused to consent to any Protective Order in this Canadian Action. Ideal was justifiably concerned that, without a Protective Order from this Court, Ideal’s production of documents to Rivard, in this case, would destroy any and all protection afforded by the Protective Order entered by the US Court.
[16] Prior to the hearing of the motion before the Prothonotary, Ideal delivered to Rivard’s Canadian counsel, Mr. Terry McManus, copies of those documents listed in Schedule 1 of Ideal’s Affidavit of Documents. Those Schedule 1 documents that are confidential were marked accordingly. They were delivered to Mr. McManus pursuant to a formal undertaking of confidentiality that prohibited the disclosure of the marked documents pending the Court’s ruling on the original motion.
[17] The great majority of the documents that Ideal delivered to Mr. McManus were not marked confidential and, therefore, are not subject to the Protective Order. The documents that have been marked confidential were described in detail in evidence filed before the Prothonotary. They include the following documents.
(a) Ideal’s strategic and business plans which contain very sensitive strategic and competitive information;
(b) Documents related to Ideal’s manufacturing and supply arrangements in China including references to suppliers, prices, volumes, customers, forecasts, product specifications, strategic opportunities and budgets;
(c) Information related to Ideal’s relationships with distributors including prices, market analysis, profit margin information and contractual distribution arrangements;
(d) Scientific test results related to the performance (in sharpness and strength) of the D3 needle;
(e) Technical information related to the design and construction of Ideal’s D3 needle including technical drawings;
(f) Detailed notes of marketing contacts in Canada including names of contact persons at Ideal customers and potential customers that include items discussed with those persons that reveal Ideal’s business strategy and tactics; and,
(g) Detailed reports of field visits and contacts with Canadian customers and prospects that reveal business opportunities related to those customers, market intelligence, and information related to competitive advantage as between D3 and Rivard’s product.
[18] Ideal has consistently treated this information as confidential in nature. Among other things, Ideal and its affiliates have consistently sought and obtained Protective Orders when such documents must be produced in US litigation. Ideal makes every effort to guard, protect and prevent disclosure of such information to third parties. Such information is generally not made available to anyone who is not employed by Ideal and is accessible only on a need-to-know basis to those employees who need access to such information as part of their responsibilities at Ideal. The highly sensitive and confidential nature of these documents was described in detail in evidence filed before the Prothonotary.
[19] Ideal operates in an intensely competitive business environment. The information and documents described above would be of tremendous value to any of Ideal’s competitors, including Rivard itself. Its disclosure to employees of Rivard or to other competitors would seriously damage Ideal’s commercial interest and its competitive position.
[20] The disclosure of these documents to employees of Rivard is of particular concern to Ideal’s management. Rivard and Ideal are vigorous competitors in the business of supplying needles used in the vaccination and treatment of livestock, in both Canada and the United States. If employees of Rivard have access to this information, it could undoubtedly influence their business decisions, either consciously or unconsciously, to the competitive disadvantage of Ideal. Among other things, Rivard or other competitors could use this information to identify Ideal’s strategic vulnerabilities or weaknesses, to pursue Ideal’s client contacts, and to adopt strategies and tactics specifically designed to counter those adopted by Ideal.
ISSUE
[21] The issue on this motion is whether the Prothonotary’s decision to grant the Protective Order is clearly wrong.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review on Appeal
[22] Rule 151 provides a Prothonotary with discretionary power to make the Protective Order in order to protect a party’s legitimate interest in the protection of confidential information. (Teale v. Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 176 F.T.R. 234, [1999] F.C.J. No. 2018 (QL).)
[23] Rule 51 governs an appeal from a decision of Prothonotary. The Federal Court has held that a Prothonotary’s discretionary order ought not to be disturbed on appeal unless:
(a) The questions raised in the motion are vital to the final issue of the case, or
(b) The orders are clearly wrong, in the sense that the exercise of discretion by the Prothonotary was based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts.
(Netbored Inc. v. Avery Holdings Inc. et al (2005), 42 C.P.R. (4th) 321 (F.C.T.D.), at paras. 15-16; Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2005), 46 C.P.R. (4th) 25, at para. 4.)
[24] The motion before the Prothonotary did not raise issues vital to the final issue of this case. Accordingly, this Court should not interfere with the Protective Order unless Rivard shows it to be “clearly wrong”.
[25] There is no basis to suggest that the Prothonotary’s decision is clearly wrong. Her discretion was not based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts. On the contrary, her decision is consistent with the principles established by precedent and is supported by the evidence filed on the motion.
Test for Granting a Protective Order
[26] A party seeking a Confidentiality Order must establish only that it subjectively believes its interests would be harmed by disclosure and that the information is confidential from an objective perspective. (AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1998), 81 C.P.R. (3d) 121 (F.C.T.D.), at para. 11; Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. (1993), 51 C.P.R. (3d) 305 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 311.)
[27] While considerations related to the importance of open courts and public access to Court proceedings may dictate a different result at trial, those considerations should not weigh against the granting of a Protective Order that does not specifically prohibit the disclosure of documents filed with the Court. (Apotex, above; Foster-Miller, above.)
[28] The evidence before the Prothonotary satisfied the test set out in AB Hassle, above, for the granting of a Protective Order. The record contained ample evidence to establish the confidential nature of the information, and also to establish Ideal’s subjective belief that its interests would be harmed by the disclosure of that information. The evidence was contained in the Affidavit of Mr. Richard Current, Ideal’s Secretary-Treasurer, and the Affidavit of Mr. Lon Bohannon, one of Ideal’s Directors and the President of Ideal’s parent company.
[29] The evidence of Mr. Richard Current and Mr. Lon Bohannon was very specific as to the confidential nature of the information and the damage to Ideal if the information were disclosed to the public or to Ideal’s competitor, Rivard. In paragraphs 11 through 25 of his Affidavit, Mr. Bohannon described in detail the nature of the confidential information. He also described precisely how and why disclosure to Rivard would be damaging to Ideal. None of this evidence was contradicted by any evidence from Rivard. It was not “clearly wrong” for the Prothonotary to accept this evidence and to conclude that Ideal had met the test for the granting of a Protective Order. In fact, it was clearly right for her to do so.
The Relevance of the US Order
[30] Rivard argues that the Prothonotary erred in considering the US Order because that order was not granted “on consent”. There are two flaws in this argument. First, the form of the US Order was in fact agreed to by Rivard. Second, regardless of whether the US Order was on consent, the principle underlying the relevance of the US Order remains the same: where there is corresponding litigation in the United States, there is merit in having reasonably comparable Protective Orders. Accordingly, it was not “clearly wrong” for the Prothonotary to have regard to the form of the US Order. (Apotex, above)
[31] There was uncontradicted evidence before the Prothonotary that Rivard had actually agreed to the form of the US Order. This evidence was set out in detail in the Affidavit of Ms. Lilly Iannacito and the Affidavit of Mr. Bohannon. Ms. Iannacito testified that, following a hearing in the US Action, Justice Paul A. Zoss of the U.S. Federal Court decided that a Protective Order would be granted, subject to the specific terms being agreed (or “stipulated”) by the parties. Mr. Bohannon testified that counsel for both parties subsequently agreed to the form of the US Protective Order and that the actual form of the US Order was submitted on consent. There was no evidence to contradict any of this.
[32] In any event, the desirability of comparable protective orders, as established in Apotex, above, is not restricted to those circumstances where the foreign Protective Order is entirely on consent. Nothing in the Apotex decision supports such a restriction. The Prothonotary was correct to conclude that it is important to avoid the possibility that the protection afforded by the US Order might be defeated if a comparable order were not granted in this action. This recognition and support of the US Protective Order is consistent with the principle of judicial comity, a fundamental principle recognized and endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. (Morguard Investments Ltd. V. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, at p. 1096; Judgment of the Prothonotary, p. 4.)
[33] Rivard also argues that the US Order is not relevant because the US Action is different from this action. Rivard’s own conduct shows that this argument is without merit. The evidence before the Prothonotary included a letter written by Rivard’s counsel in the US Action, in response to Ideal’s request for a Protective Order in the US Action. In that letter, Rivard’s counsel stated: “…we are now informed by [Rivard] that they are unwilling to discuss the terms of any proposed protective order in the above action until a decision is made by the Canadian court in the corresponding proceeding in Canada regarding the scope of a protective order, if any, that might be approved in that action.” It is clear that Rivard itself considered the US Action to be directly related to this action, certainly as far as the matter of a Protective Order is concerned. Having taken that position in the US Action, it is not credible for Rivard to argue that the US Action is so materially different that the US Order should have had no bearing on the decision of the Prothonotary.
[34] There was also evidence before the Prothonotary that the documents produced by Ideal in this action are subsumed within the documents that Rivard has sought from Ideal in the US Action. The Prothonotary had before her the massive document production request made by Rivard in the US Action, as evidence of this fact.
[35] There was also other evidence before the Prothonotary to show that the US Order might be undermined if a corresponding order were not made in this action. Specifically, Mr. Current testified that the US Action and this Action involve similar issues and facts. He testified that, pursuant to the discovery rules in the US Action, Ideal is obliged to produce to Rivard in the US Action many of the same documents that Ideal is obliged to produce in this action. Mr. Current also testified that, without a corresponding Protective Order in this Action, Ideal’s production of documents to Rivard in this action would destroy any and all protection afforded by the US Protective Order. Rivard filed no evidence to contradict Mr. Current on these points. Given the evidence before the Prothonotary, it was not “clearly wrong” for the Prothonotary to have regard to the terms of the US Protective Order in deciding the motion.
Paragraph 9 – “Attorneys Eyes Only”
[36] Rivard argues that the Prothonotary improperly ordered that certain confidential information may be designated as “Attorneys Eyes Only”. There was evidence before the Prothonotary to justify this order, however, and the order is not “clearly wrong”.
[37] Ideal acknowledges that “Attorneys Eyes Only” provisions will not be lightly ordered and that such provisions will not be ordered based on “bald” assertions of the need for such protection. Such an order will be made, however, where the evidence demonstrates that a party’s commercial interests could be harmed without such an order. In fact, the Rules specifically provide that, where the Court orders that information be treated confidentially, only the solicitors of record shall have access to the information unless the Court orders otherwise. (Foster-Miller, above; Rule 152(2)(a).)
[38] There was substantial evidence before the Prothonotary to show that Ideal’s interest could be harmed without “Attorneys Eyes Only” protection for some documents. Specifically, Mr. Bohannon identified a number of categories of documents that required this level of protection, which he defined as the “AO Documents”. Mr. Bohannon testified that Rivard and Ideal are vigorous competitors in the business of supplying needles used in the vaccination and treatment of livestock, and he provided details of Rivard’s aggressive competition with Ideal. Mr. Bohannon also described in detail how the various AO Documents could be used by employees of Rivard to damage Ideal. Mr. Current gave similar evidence in his affidavit. Rivard filed no evidence whatsoever to contradict Mr. Bohannon or Mr. Current. Given this uncontradicted evidence, it was not “clearly wrong” for the Prothonotary to conclude that “Attorneys Eyes Only” protection was appropriate.
[39] Rivard insists Mr. Meril Rivard and Ms. Susan Cepanec (in-house counsel to Rivard’s parent company) have access to all documents produced by Ideal. Mr. Rivard and Ms. Cepanec are actively involved in the day-to-day business of Rivard. Mr. Bohannon testified that disclosure of the AO Documents to employees of Rivard, and specifically to Mr. Rivard and Ms. Cepanec, is of particular concern to Ideal’s management. If employees of Rivard, or anyone else involved in its day-to-day operations like Mr. Rivard and Ms. Cepanec, have access to the AO Documents, it can undoubtedly influence their business decisions, either consciously or unconsciously, to the competitive disadvantage of Ideal. Among other things, Rivard or other competitors could use this information to identify Ideal’s strategic vulnerabilities or weaknesses, to pursue Ideal’s client contacts, and to adopt strategies and tactics specifically designed to counter those adopted by Ideal. As stated by Mr. Current in his Affidavit, once employees of Rivard have had access to such sensitive and proprietary information, they cannot be expected to have an “empty head” as to such information as they make business decisions relating to their competing products.
[40] Rivard argues that the Prothonotary acted on a wrong principle in providing for “Attorneys Eyes Only” protection because the purpose of a Protective Order is only to protect confidential information from disclosure to non-parties, and not to prevent its disclosure to a party. This is an incomplete statement of the purpose of a Protective Order. In many cases, the only purpose of an order may be to prevent disclosure to non-parties. Where the parties themselves are competitors, however, preventing disclosure to the opposing party is a perfectly legitimate purpose of a Protective Order, particularly where the evidence shows that the disclosure to the opposing party could injure the other party’s interests. (Foster-Miller, above, at paras. 10-14.)
[41] Rivard argues that the “Attorneys Eyes Only” provisions represent an improper interference with the solicitor client relationship, and suggests the provisions will hamper Rivard’s ability to conduct its case. This argument lacks credibility. At the time of the motion, Rivard’s counsel had in its possession all of the documents for which Ideal was seeking “Attorneys Eyes Only” protection. Prior to the motion, Ideal repeatedly requested that Rivard’s counsel identify any such documents that he believed it necessary to disclose to Rivard. As Mr. Bohannon testified, Rivard’s counsel repeatedly refused to identify any such documents. In any event, should Rivard’s counsel ever identify an “Attorneys Eyes Only” document that he must show to his client, the Protective Order permits him to seek an appropriate variation from the Court if Ideal will not consent to disclosure.
[42] Rivard’s objection to the “Attorneys Eyes Only” provisions is also inconsistent with its own conduct in the US Action. There was evidence before the Prothonotary that Rivard has taken full advantage of “Attorneys Eyes Only” provisions in the US Order. Specifically, Mr. Bohannon testified that in answering interrogatories in the US Action, Rivard had designated all of its answers as “Attorneys Eyes Only”, including its answers to very basic questions. Thus, while Rivard asserts the need to have its management see highly sensitive commercial information from Ideal in this action, it refuses to let Ideal’s management see even the most basic information in the US Action.
[43] The “Attorneys Eyes Only” provisions in the Protective Order mirror those contained in the US Protective Order. It was reasonable for the Prothonotary to conclude that any deviation from the terms of the US Protective Order might remove the protection afforded by that order.
Paragraphs 10-11 – Disclosure and Approval of Experts
[44] Rivard argues that the Prothonotary erred in law in providing in the Protective Order for the disclosure of experts who will receive confidential information (Expert Provision).
[45] The Prothonotary’s decision to include the Expert Provision is consistent with this Court’s Decision in Apotex, above, where a similar provision was included in the Protective Order granted in that case. The Expert Provision is also consistent with the form of US Order agreed to by Rivard.
[46] There was uncontradicted evidence before the Prothonotary to support the Expert Provision. Mr. Bohannon testified that, without this protection, the US Protective Order could be circumvented or seriously undermined, and its benefit completely lost. He testified that many people who might be retained as “experts” in this case, may work with or be associated with a competitor of Ideal, or even with Rivard itself. The “experts” may also themselves be competitors or potential competitors of Ideal.
[47] It is important to note that the Expert Provision is not overly restrictive. It permits the disclosure of confidential information to experts assisting counsel provided certain protective steps are taken. If Ideal objects to the disclosure to any particular expert, it is Ideal’s burden to bring that issue before the Court. All that Ideal asks is an opportunity to be notified so that it can come to Court if in fact the disclosure to a particular “expert” unfairly or improperly threatens Ideal’s commercial interests. It would be up to the Court to determine at that time whether Ideal had any proper ground for prohibiting the disclosure, and ideal will face cost sanctions for any unreasonable objection to an expert. Ideal has no desire to unreasonably interfere with Rivard in the conduct of its case, but the information in these documents is highly valuable information and the Expert Provision is a very reasonable measure. It will impose very little burden on Rivard in relation to the immense damage that may be done to Ideal in the absence of this form of protection. The Prothonotary correctly concluded that Rivard had not established any good reason to depart from the US Order in this respect.
Paragraph 13 – Storage of Attorneys Eyes Only Documents
[48] Rivard argues that it was an error in principle for the Prothonotary to provide that “Attorneys Eyes Only” documents be stored at the offices of counsel unless the producing party consents to their removal or the Court orders otherwise. There is no authority to show this was an error in principle. The provisions with respect to the storage of “Attorneys Eyes Only” documents mirror the provisions in the US Order. Rivard submitted no evidence on the motion to show why the Canadian Protective Order should depart in this respect from the form of order that it agreed to in the US Action. The Prothonotary correctly concluded that the omission of this provision from the Canadian Protective Order had the potential of undermining the effectiveness of the US Order. The Prothonotary also noted that Rivard had failed to articulate any prejudice that Rivard would suffer if the documents were treated in a manner consistent with the US Order. The Prothonotary’s decision to include the storage provisions was not “clearly wrong”.
[49] Rivard claims that soliciting consent to the transfer of “Attorneys Eyes Only” documents will “alert the opponent” to confidential activity, but this is not a reasonable objection. In reality, the request will only alert Ideal’s counsel to the movement of highly confidential and sensitive material, which is a reasonable limitation given the sensitive nature of the material. The information within the documents could seriously jeopardize the commercial position of Ideal if it were to fall into the wrong hands. Ideal has a strong interest in knowing who is viewing the documents and where they are being stored to ensure the security and protection of the confidential information.
Paragraph 16 – Onus of Justifying Classification of Documents
[50] Rivard argues that the Prothonotary acted on a wrong principle in placing the onus on the receiving party to challenge the designation of a document as confidential. In fact, the Protective Order does not place any particular onus on the receiving party, except that the receiving party must bring the matter to Court. Even if the Protective Order does place an onus on the receiving party, that is not an error in principle. Such an onus would be purely a matter of discretion and would be consistent with the decision in Apotex, above, where the Court expressly placed the onus on the receiving party to show that a document is not confidential.
Paragraph 4 – Subject Matter Excluded from Attorneys Eyes Only
[51] Rivard argues that paragraph 4 of the Protective Order reflects an error in principle because it is not reciprocal. There is no strict requirement that a Protective Order be perfectly reciprocal as between the parties in every respect. The decision in Merck, above (relied upon by Rivard), shows that the Court may make an order reciprocal but it does not establish that it must do so. As found by the Prothonotary, paragraph 4 quite properly ensures that access to documents of a technical nature, which form the essence of the claim for infringement, cannot be unduly restricted. Paragraph 4 also mirrors a provision in the form of US Order agreed to by Rivard in the US Action, where the roles of plaintiff and defendant are reversed. In that sense, the Protective Order actually achieves reciprocity.
CONCLUSION
[52] Ideal’s motion for the Protective Order did not rest on “bald assertions” as to the sensitivity of the document in question. Ideal filed detailed affidavit evidence as to the nature of the documents, the highly sensitive and confidential material that the documents contain, the steps that have been taken to preserve the confidentiality of the documents, and the potential harm that Ideal could face if the information was released into the hands of a competitor. All of this evidence was uncontradicted and it was not “clearly wrong” for the Prothonotary to act on this evidence in issuing the Protective Order.
[53] The Protective Order was carefully drafted so that it would not substantially interfere with Rivard’s ability to prosecute this Action and would not compromise the public interest in access to Court proceedings. The Protective Order imposes only those restrictions that are reasonably necessary to protect the important interest that Ideal has in maintaining the confidentiality of its information. The burden imposed upon Rivard in the circumstances is minimal and it is far outweighed by the harm that would be done to Ideal if the Protective Order were reversed or varied.
[54] The Protective Order will not unduly interfere with Rivard’s ability to conduct its claim against Ideal. In particular:
(a) The Protective Order does not restrict access to all documents but only those designated as confidential;
(b) Ideal must act reasonably in making such a designation of confidentiality;
(c) The Protective Order provides a means for Rivard’s consultants and experts to have access to all confidential documents;
(d) Rivard may at any time challenge the designation of any document as confidential if Rivard believes it is necessary to disclose that document to any person in order to properly conduct its case; and,
(e) Abuse of the Protective Order by Ideal could rightfully be sanctioned with cost consequences.
[55] For all of the above reasons, Rivard’s appeal of Prothonotary Tabib’s pre-trial Protective Order is dismissed with costs.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that Rivard Instruments Inc.’s appeal of Prothonotary Tabib’s pre-trial Protective Order be dismissed with costs.
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1113-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: RIVARD INSTRUMENTS, INC.
v. IDEAL INSTRUMENTS INC.
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: November 2, 2006
APPEARANCES:
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Mr. Terrance J. McManus
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Mr. Scott Maidment
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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MILTON, GELLER LLP Ottawa, Ontario
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McMILLAN BINCH MENDELSOHN LLP Toronto, Ontario
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