Ottawa, Ontario, August 10, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
INTRODCUTION
[1] On Thursday, August 3, 2006, the Applicant, a citizen of China, served to the Respondent a Motion for a stay of removal. The Applicant’s removal is scheduled for Friday, August 11, 2006.
[2] By letter, the Respondent also received on August 3, 2006, the Applicant’s request that the hearing should be held by teleconference on Monday, August 7, 2006. Since the Court did not schedule any hearing on August 7, 2006, the Applicant asked the Court to be heard as soon as possible.
[3] By letter, the Respondent made representations to the Court on August 4, 2006, arguing that the Motion for a stay of removal should not be heard since it was a last minute motion. The Respondent also asked the Court for an extension of delay to make its written representations should the Court decide to hear the motion.
[4] On August 8, 2006, the Court scheduled the hearing by teleconference for August 9, 2006 and gave the Respondent the possibility to respond to the motion.
[5] On August 3, 2006, the Applicant filed an application for leave and for judicial review which was served on the Respondent on August 3, 2006.
[6] The application for leave challenges the decision of the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) Officer, rendered on April 25, 2006, that denied the Applicant’s application for protection.
[7] As it appears from Exhibit “A” of Mr. Eric Lefrenière’s Affidavit, the Applicant acquired knowledge of this negative decision on May 2, 2006.
[8] The Applicant argues that the PRRA process with an analysis of risk of return does not respect the rules of fairness. (Applicant’s Observations, paras. 28-35, Applicant’s Record, pp. 104-106.)
[9] The Applicant failed to demonstrate that the tri-partite test established by the Federal Court of Appeal to deal with motions to stay the execution of removal orders was met.
[10] There is no serious issue to be argued in the application for leave. By the allegations contained in her motion, the Applicant does not show a patently unreasonable finding of fact or an error of law in the PRRA decision which is the subject of her application for judicial review. The Applicant essentially attempts to substitute her own assessment of the documentary evidence for the assessment made by the PRRA Officer.
[11] As to the irreparable harm, the Applicant’s return to China was properly evaluated by both the Immigration and Refugee Board and the PRRA Officer and the assessment was a negative one.
[12] Furthermore, the balance of convenience favours the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.
ISSUES
[13] Was the tri-partite test established by this Court to decide on a motion to stay the execution of a removal order met?
[14] The Applicant must demonstrate that she meets all three criteria of the tri-partite test established by the Federal Court of Appeal in Toth v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 86 N.R. 302 (F.C.A.) and that (1) the motion is based on a serious issue; (2) the Applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the removal order is executed, and (3) the balance of convenience favours the Applicant. (R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311; Wang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 148 (T.D.), [2001] 3 F.C. 682)
A. Serious Issue
i) Delay
[15] The Applicant knew since May 2, 2006 that a negative decision was rendered by the PRRA Officer and that departure was scheduled for May 17, 2006. The Applicant waited until August 3, 2006 to file a Motion for a stay of removal. (Mr. Lafrenière’s affidavit, Exhibit “A”)
[16] As stated by Justice Danièle Tremblay-Lamer in Katalin Ilbolya Bedene Mesznikow et al v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, IMM-7047-03, September 30, 2003:
Vu le retard des demandeurs à présenter leur demande alors qu'ils savaient depuis au moins 21 jours qu'ils doivent quitter le 1er octobre, date qui leur a été confirmée depuis 13 jours, il n'est pas dans l'intérêt de la justice d'entendre cette requête de dernière minute.
[17] The Applicant was informed of the negative PRRA decision of May 2, 2006 which was postponed from May 17, 2006 to August 11, 2006:
a. tel qu’il appert de mes notes d’entrevues déposés en liasse au soutien de mon affidavit comme pièce « A », j’ai rencontré la demanderesse le 2 mai 2006 pour préparer son départ;
b. la décision ERAR négative lui a été remise à cette date;
c. une autre rencontre a eu lieu le 8 mai 2006. La date du départ a été fixée pour le 17 mai 2006, date fournie par la demanderesse qui attendait la confirmation de son billet d’avion avec Air Canada;
d. ayant pris connaissance que la demanderesse prévoyait un délai de trois mois pour vendre son dépanneur, j’ai tenté d’obtenir une extension de délai de trois mois auprès de l’Ambassade de Chine à Ottawa;
e. le 9 mai 2006, j’ai appris que je ne pouvais pas l’obtenir;
f. le 10 mai 2006, la demanderesse a fait elle-même les démarches auprès de l’Ambassade de Chine à Ottawa afin que son permis d’entrée soit prolongé de trois mois;
g. le 11 mai 2006, nous avons à nouveau communiqué avec la demanderesse. Cette dernière nous a avisé que l’Ambassade de Chine à Ottawa lui accorderait une extension de délai de trois mois. Nous avons convenu qu’on se rencontrerait à nouveau le 15 mai 2006;
h. le 15 mai 2006, nous avons reçu la confirmation de l’Ambassade de Chine à Ottawa que le permis d’entrée de la demanderesse vers la Chine serait prolongé de trois mois;
i. le 15 mai 2006, le départ a été annulé et une nouvelle rencontre a été fixée au 5 juin 2006. Il a été entendu qu’un nouveau délai de trois mois serait accordé à la demanderesse afin qu’elle puisse vendre son dépanneur;
j. j’estime avoir été très coopératif et attentif aux besoins de la demanderesse en remettant son départ de trois mois afin qu’elle vende son dépanneur. De plus, bien que ce fait n’apparaisse pas à mes notes, son amie, Madame Yan Yan Wang, qui l’accompagnait souvent à titre de traductrice lors de nos rencontres, m’a confirmé qu’elle achèterait elle-même le dépanneur si la demanderesse ne parvenait pas à le vendre;
k. le 5 juin 2006, il a été convenu que la demanderesse quitterait le Canada le 11 août 2006;
l. elle a également déclaré qu’elle pensait bien avoir vendu son dépanneur avant la date de départ;
m. conséquemment, la demanderesse savait depuis le 2 mai 2006 que son départ était imminent. De plus, j’ai collaboré dans les limites de ma juridiction pour remettre le départ de la demanderesse de trois mois afin qu’elle puisse vendre son dépanneur avant son départ;
n. je tiens également à souligner que l’extension de trois mois pour le permis d’entrée alloué par l’Ambassade de Chine à Ottawa se termine le ou vers le 18 août 2006.
ii) The well-foundedness of the PRRA Officer’s decision
[18] As it appears from the notes in support of the PRRA decision, the officer reviewed the evidence submitted by the Applicant in support of her PRRA application, examined the personal situation of the Applicant, assessed the country conditions, and based the risk assessment on the available documentary evidence.
[19] The Applicant does not demonstrate by her allegations that the PRRA Officer’s conclusions were rendered in a perverse or capricious manner, or without regard to the material before him as provided at paragraph 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7.
[20] The Applicant has not demonstrated to this Court that the conclusion of the PRRA Officer, based on findings of fact, was patently unreasonable and consequently no serious issue exists.
B. Irreparable harm
[21] As specified in Akyol v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 931, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1182 (QL), rendered by Justice Luc Martineau, no irreparable harm is demonstrated:
Third, the Court notes that the risk to the applicants upon their return to Turkey has been assessed twice - once by the Refugee Division, and a second time by the PRRA officer. Both administrative tribunals made findings of fact that the applicants would not be at risk. In the case at bar, the Refugee Division clearly called into question the applicants' credibility as it found, based on the applicants' behaviour over a prolonged period, that they lacked the subjective fear of persecution that was the very basis of their claim. This Court has held that where an applicant's account was found not to be credible by the Refugee Division, this account cannot serve as a basis for an argument supporting irreparable harm in a stay application: Saibu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. No. 151, 2002 FCT 103 at para. 11; Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 751 at para. 12; and Ahmed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 1 F.C. 483 at 492-93 (T.D.).
[22] Considering all those facts, the PRRA Officer was not satisfied that the Applicant would be at risk should she return to China.
[23] With respect to the argument raised by the Applicant concerning the correct test to be applied regarding s. 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA), reference is made to the French version in Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.A.), [2005] 3 F.C.R. 239, 2005 FCA 1, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1 (QL):
Finalement, il n'est pas facile de comprendre pourquoi un critère relatif au degré de danger "plus probable que le contraire" contreviendrait à la Convention contre la torture. Le Comité même des Nations Unies contre la torture a adopté un critère aux fins de l'article 3 de la Convention contre la torture qui, pour les motifs susmentionnés, et à tous égards, est le critère "plus probable que le contraire".
En fin de compte, la réponse à la deuxième question est:
Le degré de risque de torture requis, selon l'expression "motifs sérieux de croire" est que le risque doit être plus probable que le contraire.
[24] Considering the above, the PRRA Officer applied the correct test under s. 97(1) of IRPA.
[25] Consequently, the Applicant did not show that the conclusions of the PRRA Officer are patently unreasonable.
C. Balance of convenience favours the Minister
[26] The public interest is to be taken into consideration in determining the balance of convenience, and assessed together with the interests of private litigants.
[27] The Applicant does not meet the third and final aspect of the tri-partite test with respect to the balance of convenience.
[28] On this matter, in cases where no serious issue had been disclosed and no evidence of irreparable harm had been provided, such as the case at bar, the balance of convenience automatically favours the Respondent. (Naseem v. Canada (Solicitor General), (1993) 68 F.T.R. 230, [1993] F.C.J. No. 971 (QL).)
[29] The Applicant has not demonstrated that the balance of convenience is in her favour.
CONCLUSION
[30] For the reasons listed above, the Applicant’s Motion to stay the execution of the removal order should be denied.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Motion for the execution of the removal order is dismissed.
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-4286-06
STYLE OF CAUSE: YUEMAI FANG v.
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION AND
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: August 9, 2006 by telephone conference
APPEARANCES:
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Me Jean-François Bertrand
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Me Diane Lemery
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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BERTRAND, DESLAURIERS Montreal (Quebec)
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JOHN H. SIMS, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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