Date: 20030131
Docket: T-1510-99
Neutral citation: 2003 FCT 114
BETWEEN:
SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND
MUSIC PUBLISHERS OF CANADA
Plaintiff
- and -
BARRYMORE'S INC., c.o.b. as BARRYMORE'S MUSIC HALL,
EUGENE HASLAM and JOHN RANDAL LANCTOT
Defendants
[1] This is a hearing of a motion by the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (the "plaintiff") for summary judgment against Barrymore's Inc., Eugene Haslam and John Randal Lanctot (the "defendants") for copyright infringement.
[2] The plaintiff seeks:
1. An order granting to the plaintiff summary judgment against the defendants for copyright infringement as follows:
(a) that the defendants have infringed the plaintiff's copyright in musical works in which the plaintiff owns the rights to perform in public at all concerts at Barrymore's Music Hall during the following periods:
(i) Barrymore's Inc., 1995 through 1999 inclusive;
(ii) for John Randal Lanctot, 1995 through October 31, 1998 and April 1999 through December 31, 1999, inclusive; and
(iii) for Eugene Haslam, 1995 through May 14, 1999, inclusive.
(b) that the defendants do pay to the plaintiff damages, arising from their infringement by the defendants of the plaintiff"s copyrights fixed at this hearing or at a reference to determine the amounts of such damages to the date of the reference, including such exemplary damages if any as may seem appropriate;
(c) that the defendants do pay to the plaintiff the profits made by the defendants arising from the infringement by the defendants of the plaintiff"s copyrights, such profits to be fixed at this hearing or determined on a reference to the date of the reference;
(d) that any reference to determine the amounts referred to in paragraphs (b) and/or (c) be before a Prothonotary or other person appointed by the Court at a place, date and time to be fixed by the referee on written application of the plaintiff, subject to paragraph (h), below;
(e) that, in preparation for the reference, the plaintiff file and serve a Statement of Issues on the reference upon the defendants together with a copy of this judgment;
(f) that the defendants:
(i) within twenty-one (21) days of the date of service of the plaintiff's Statement of Issues, file and serve on the plaintiff, the defendants' Statement of Issues; and
(ii) within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of service of the plaintiff's Statement of Issues, serve on the plaintiff, their Affidavit of Documents listing all documents relevant to the issues on this reference, including but not limited to financial statements, general ledgers, performer and agency contracts, cash receipt journals, cash disbursement journals, cheque stubs, general journals and cancelled cheques, for all years in issue in these proceedings; and thereunder produce such documents on request by the plaintiff;
(g) that the plaintiff will deliver its Affidavit of Documents within twenty-one (21) days of being served with the defendant's Statement of Issues and thereafter produce such documents on request by the defendants;
(h) that if the defendants are in default of paragraph (f) above, the plaintiff will be entitled upon application, which may be made ex parte, to a reference hearing in Toronto which may be held without notice to the defendants before a referee appointed by the court on an ex parte basis, at which hearing the referee will determine the amounts referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) herein by way of affidavit evidence filed by the plaintiff;
(i) should the defendants fail to appear on a reference although duly served with notice of the appointment, that the referee may determine the amounts referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) herein by way of affidavit evidence filed by the plaintiff;
(j) that upon the taking of the said accounts, the amount found to be payable by the defendants to the plaintiff shall be paid forthwith after confirmation of the report of the referee;
(k) that the defendants, themselves or through their officers, servants, agents, workmen or otherwise, either directly or indirectly, be restrained from performing, authorizing or causing to be performed on premises under their control musical works in which the plaintiff owns the performing rights unless the defendants have first obtained from the plaintiff a performing rights licence authorizing such acts;
(l) that the defendants, themselves or through their officers, servants, agents, workmen or otherwise, either directly or indirectly, be restrained from permitting, for their private profit, a place of entertainment to be used for the performance of musical works in which the plaintiff owns the performing rights unless the defendants have first obtained from the plaintiff a performing rights licence authorizing such acts;
(m) that the defendants pay to the plaintiff pre-judgment interest on the amounts found due and owing to the plaintiff, excluding profits;
(n) that the defendants pay to the plaintiff its costs of this action and the aforementioned reference to be taxed at said reference; and
(o) that the defendants pay to the plaintiff post-judgment interest on all amounts set out above.
2. An order requiring the defendants to pay the plaintiff costs of this motion on such a scale that this Honourable Court may seem just; and
3. In addition or in the alternative, an order pursuant to Rule 218 limiting the nature and scope of the examination for discovery and granting other relief;
4. Such further and other relief as counsel may advise and to this Honourable Court may seem just.
[3] The defendants, Barrymore's Inc. and John Randal Lanctot, seek:
1. An order dismissing the motion, with costs on a substantial indemnity basis, as against the defendants Barrymore's Inc. and John Randal Lanctot; and
2. Such further and other relief as counsel may advise and to that this Honourable Court seems just.
Background
[4] The plaintiff, the Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN), is the Canadian copyright collective for the public performance of musical works. The plaintiff is the owner and proprietor in Canada of the exclusive right of public performance, the right to collect Tariff royalties and the cause of action for copyright infringement by public performance in virtually all popular musical works in current use in Canada. The plaintiff owns the performing rights of musical works at issue in this action.
[5] The defendant, Barrymore's Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of the Province of Ontario. Its principal place of business is 323 Bank Street, Ottawa, Ontario, where, under the name and style of "Barrymore's Music Hall", it carries on the business of a concert hall or similar establishment. At these premises, Barrymore's Inc. presents to the public, performances of musical works by means of live performances.
[6] The defendant, John Randal Lanctot, is an individual who was a director and officer of Barrymore's Inc. from April 1995 through to October or November 1998. In March or April 1999, Lanctot purchased the shares of defendant, Eugene Haslam, the other major shareholder of the company. On September 15, 1997, Lanctot applied for a SOCAN licence for a similar club he was operating.
[7] The defendant, Eugene Haslam, is an individual who was a director and officer of Barrymore's Inc. until on or about May 14, 1999. Haslam was a shareholder of Barrymore's Inc., until March or April 1999, when he sold his shares to Lanctot. Haslam's responsibilities included obtaining entertainment for Barrymore's Music Hall.
[8] When Haslam's interest in Barrymore's Inc. was sold to Lanctot, an indemnification agreement was signed in which Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot agreed to fully compensate Haslam for any monies which he may be called on to pay in regard to any of the debts or obligations of Barrymore's Inc.
Plaintiff's Submissions
[9] The plaintiff submits that summary judgment should be granted as there is no genuine issue for trial.
[10] The plaintiff submits that each of the defendants admits, or is deemed to admit, the majority of the elements of copyright infringement in respect of musical works performed at Barrymore's Music Hall. Where there has not been an admission, the plaintiff submits that it has filed relevant supporting affidavit evidence.
[11] The plaintiff submits that it owns the performing rights of the works at issue in this action and that such musical works were publicly performed at Barrymore's Music Hall.
[12] The plaintiff submits that the defendants caused or authorized these performances and that they did not obtain permission or consent for the public performance of these musical works.
[13] The plaintiff submits that the defendants permitted Barrymore's Music Hall to be used for public performances for profit. In the case of the individual defendants, the plaintiff submits that Lanctot and Haslam were officers and directors of the corporate defendant, who were in a position to control or prevent the infringing performances, but knowingly failed to do so.
Defendants' Submissions
[14] The defendants, Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot, submit that there is conflicting evidence and an issue of credibility which cannot be determined without a trial. The defendants submit that Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot have demonstrated, by way of sworn evidence, that royalties for many of the performances at issue in this action have been paid. The plaintiff claims that these royalties have not been paid.
[15] The defendants, Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot, submit that there are also issues of responsibility and credibility between all of the defendants and that the determination of these issues will require a trial.
[16] The defendants, Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot, submit that summary judgment should not be granted if facts are needed to determine the degree of control exercised when musical works are performed at various events and where discoveries have not been held in matters of complexity. The defendants submit that because of the large number of performances over a number of years involving various persons and businesses, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the parties to determine what, if any, liability for copyright infringement may exist.
[17] The defendants submit that there is a genuine issue for trial with respect to the liability of Lanctot personally. It is submitted that Lanctot has demonstrated that he was not involved in the entertainment aspect of Barrymore's Music Hall and was not responsible for remitting any payments to SOCAN. As such, it is submitted that Lanctot had no knowledge of the alleged infringement and that he had no reason to suspect that any alleged copyright infringement existed.
[18] The defendants, Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot, submit that there is also a genuine issue for trial as to whether or not the limitation period in subsection 41(1) of the Copyright Act, supra limits the plaintiff's claim to damages incurred subsequent to August 25, 1996. The defendants submit that the plaintiff knew of the alleged infringement as of May 10, 1995, when they wrote to Haslam, introducing SOCAN. As the plaintiff's statement of claim was only issued on August 25, 1999, the defendants submit that the plaintiff is barred from claiming any royalties for performances dating before August 25, 1996.
[19] The defendant Haslam has consented to judgment against him.
[20] Issue
Is the test for summary judgment met in that there is no genuine issue for trial?
Relevant Statutory Provisions and Regulations
[21] The relevant sections of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, S.O.R./98-106 state:
| 213. (1) A plaintiff may, after the defendant has filed a defence, or earlier with leave of the Court, and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for summary judgment on all or part of the claim set out in the statement of claim. 214. (1) A party may bring a motion for summary judgment in an action by serving and filing a notice of motion and motion record at least 20 days before the day set out in the notice for the hearing of the motion. (2) A party served with a motion for summary judgment shall serve and file a respondent's motion record not later than 10 days before the day set out in the notice of motion for the hearing of the motion. 215. A response to a motion for summary judgment shall not rest merely on allegations or denials of the pleadings of the moving party, but must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 216. (1) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly. (2) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is |
213. (1) Le demandeur peut, après le dépôt de la défense du défendeur - ou avant si la Cour l'autorise - et avant que l'heure, la date et le lieu de l'instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire sur tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la déclaration. 214. (1) Toute partie peut présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire dans une action en signifiant et en déposant un avis de requête et un dossier de requête au moins 20 jours avant la date de l'audition de la requête indiquée dans l'avis. (2) La partie qui reçoit signification d'une requête en jugement sommaire signifie et dépose un dossier de réponse au moins 10 jours avant la date de l'audition de la requête indiquée dans l'avis de requête. 215. La réponse à une requête en jugement sommaire ne peut être fondée uniquement sur les allégations ou les dénégations contenues dans les actes de procédure déposés par le requérant. Elle doit plutôt énoncer les faits précis démontrant l'existence d'une véritable question litigieuse. 216. (1) Lorsque, par suite d'une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue qu'il n'existe pas de véritable question litigieuse quant à une déclaration ou à une défense, elle rend un jugement sommaire en conséquence. (2) Lorsque, par suite d'une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue que la seule véritable question litigieuse est: |
| (a) the amount to which the moving party is entitled, the Court may order a trial of that issue or grant summary judgment with a reference under rule 153 to determine the amount; or (b) a question of law, the Court may determine the question and grant summary judgment accordingly. (3) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court decides that there is a genuine issue with respect to a claim or defence, the Court may nevertheless grant summary judgment in favour of any party, either on an issue or generally, if the Court is able on the whole of the evidence to find the facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and law. (4) Where a motion for summary judgment is dismissed in whole or in part, the Court may order the action, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary judgment, to proceed to trial in the usual way or order that the action be conducted as a specially managed proceeding. 217. A plaintiff who obtains summary judgment under these Rules may proceed against the same defendant for any other relief and against any other defendant for the same or any other relief. 218. Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only in part, the Court may make an order specifying which material facts are not in dispute and defining the issues to be tried, including an order |
a) le montant auquel le requérant a droit, elle peut ordonner l'instruction de la question ou rendre un jugement sommaire assorti d'un renvoi pour détermination du montant conformément à la règle 153; b) un point de droit, elle peut statuer sur celui-ci et rendre un jugement sommaire en conséquence. (3) Lorsque, par suite d'une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour conclut qu'il existe une véritable question litigieuse à l'égard d'une déclaration ou d'une défense, elle peut néanmoins rendre un jugement sommaire en faveur d'une partie, soit sur une question particulière, soit de façon générale, si elle parvient à partir de l'ensemble de la preuve à dégager les faits nécessaires pour trancher les questions de fait et de droit. (4) Lorsque la requête en jugement sommaire est rejetée en tout ou en partie, la Cour peut ordonner que l'action ou les questions litigieuses qui ne sont pas tranchées par le jugement sommaire soient instruites de la manière habituelle ou elle peut ordonner la tenue d'une instance à gestion spéciale. 217. Le demandeur qui obtient un jugement sommaire aux termes des présentes règles peut poursuivre le même défendeur pour une autre réparation ou poursuivre tout autre défendeur pour la même ou une autre réparation. 218. Lorsqu'un jugement sommaire est refusé ou n'est accordé qu'en partie, la Cour peut, par ordonnance, préciser les faits substantiels qui ne sont pas en litige et déterminer les questions qui doivent être instruites, ainsi que: |
| (a) for payment into court of all or part of the claim; (b) for security for costs; or (c) limiting the nature and scope of the examination for discovery to matters not covered by the affidavits filed on the motion for summary judgment or by any cross-examination on them and providing for their use at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery. 219. In making an order for summary judgment, the Court may order that enforcement of the summary judgment be stayed pending the determination of any other issue in the action or in a counterclaim or third party claim. |
a) ordonner la consignation à la Cour d'une somme d'argent représentant la totalité ou une partie de la réclamation; b) ordonner la remise d'un cautionnement pour dépens; c) limiter la nature et l'étendue de l'interrogatoire préalable aux questions non visées par les affidavits déposés à l'appui de la requête en jugement sommaire, ou limiter la nature et l'étendue de tout contre-interrogatoire s'y rapportant, et permettre l'utilisation de ces affidavits lors de l'interrogatoire à l'instruction de la même manière qu'à l'interrogatoire préalable. 219. Lorsqu'elle rend un jugement sommaire, la Cour peut surseoir à l'exécution forcée de ce jugement jusqu'à la détermination d'une autre question soulevée dans l'action ou dans une demande reconventionnelle ou une mise en cause. |
[22] The relevant sections of the Copyright Act, supra state:
| 3. (1) For the purposes of this Act, "copyright", in relation to a work, means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatever, to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public or, if the work is unpublished, to publish the work or any substantial part thereof, . . . and to authorize any such acts. |
3. (1) Le droit d'auteur sur l'oeuvre comporte le droit exclusif de produire ou reproduire la totalité ou une partie importante de l'oeuvre, sous une forme matérielle quelconque, d'en exécuter ou d'en représenter la totalité ou une partie importante en public et, si l'oeuvre n'est pas publiée, d'en publier la totalité ou une partie importante; ce droit comporte, en outre, . . . Est inclus dans la présente définition le droit exclusif d'autoriser ces actes. |
| 27. (1) It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do. (5) It is an infringement of copyright for any person, for profit, to permit a theatre or other place of entertainment to be used for the performance in public of a work or other subject-matter without the consent of the owner of the copyright unless that person was not aware, and had no reasonable ground for suspecting, that the performance would be an infringement of copyright. 34. (1) Where copyright has been infringed, the owner of the copyright is, subject to this Act, entitled to all remedies by way of injunction, damages, accounts, delivery up and otherwise that are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of a right. 35. (1) Where a person infringes copyright, the person is liable to pay such damages to the owner of the copyright as the owner has suffered due to the infringement and, in addition to those damages, such part of the profits that the infringer has made from the infringement and that were not taken into account in calculating the damages as the court considers just. 41. (1) Subject to subsection (2), a court may not award a remedy in relation to an infringement unless |
27. (1) Constitue une violation du droit d'auteur l'accomplissement, sans le consentement du titulaire de ce droit, d'un acte qu'en vertu de la présente loi seul ce titulaire a la faculté d'accomplir. (5) Constitue une violation du droit d'auteur le fait, dans un but de profit, de permettre l'utilisation d'un théâtre ou d'un autre lieu de divertissement pour l'exécution en public d'une oeuvre ou de tout autre objet du droit d'auteur sans le consentement du titulaire du droit d'auteur, à moins que la personne qui permet cette utilisation n'ait ignoré et n'ait eu aucun motif raisonnable de soupçonner que l'exécution constituerait une violation du droit d'auteur. 34. (1) En cas de violation d'un droit d'auteur, le titulaire du droit est admis, sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, à exercer tous les recours - en vue notamment d'une injonction, de dommages-intérêts, d'une reddition de compte ou d'une remise - que la loi accorde ou peut accorder pour la violation d'un droit. 35.(1) Quiconque viole le droit d'auteur est passible de payer, au titulaire du droit qui a été violé, des dommages-intérêts et, en sus, la proportion, que le tribunal peut juger équitable, des profits qu'il a réalisés en commettant cette violation et qui n'ont pas été pris en compte pour la fixation des dommages-intérêts. 41.(1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le tribunal saisi d'un recours en violation ne peut accorder de réparations que si: |
| (a) in the case where the plaintiff knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know, of the infringement at the time it occurred, the proceedings for infringement are commenced within three years after the infringement occurred; or (b) in the case where the plaintiff did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, of the infringement at the time it occurred, the proceedings for infringement are commenced within three years after the time when the plaintiff first knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know, of the infringement. (2) The court shall apply the limitation period set out in paragraph (1)(a) or (b) only in respect of a party who pleads a limitation period. |
a) le demandeur engage des procédures dans les trois ans qui suivent le moment où la violation a eu lieu, s'il avait connaissance de la violation au moment où elle a eu lieu ou s'il est raisonnable de s'attendre à ce qu'il en ait eu connaissance à ce moment; b) le demandeur engage des procédures dans les trois ans qui suivent le moment où il a pris connaissance de la violation ou le moment où il est raisonnable de s'attendre à ce qu'il en ait pris connaissance, s'il n'en avait pas connaissance au moment où elle a eu lieu ou s'il n'est pas raisonnable de s'attendre à ce qu'il en ait eu connaissance à ce moment. (2) Le tribunal ne fait jouer la prescription visée aux alinéas (1)a) ou b) qu'à l'égard de la partie qui l'a invoquée. |
Analysis and Decision
[23] Issue
Is the test for summary judgment met in that there is no genuine issue for trial?
Rule 216 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 deals with summary judgment. This Court in Granville Shipping Co. v. Pegasus Lines Ltd. [1996] 2 F.C. 853 (T.D.) at paragraph 8 set out the following general principles with respect to summary judgment:
1. the purpose of the provisions is to allow the Court to summarily dispense with cases which ought not proceed to trial because there is no genuine issue to be tried (Old Fish Market Restaurants Ltd. v. 1000357 Ontario Inc. et al),
2. there is no determinative test (Feoso Oil Ltd. v. Sarla (The)) but Stone J.A. seems to have adopted the reasons of Henry J. in Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie. It is not whether a party cannot possibly succeed at trial, it is whether the case is so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the trier of fact at a future trial;
3. each case should be interpreted in reference to its own contextual framework (Blyth and Feoso);
4. provincial practice rules (especially Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, [R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194]) can aid in interpretation (Feoso and Collie);
5. this Court may determine questions of fact and law on the motion for summary judgment if this can be done on the material before the Court (this is broader than Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure) (Patrick);
6. on the whole of the evidence, summary judgment cannot be granted if the necessary facts cannot be found or if it would be unjust to do so (Pallman and Sears);
7. in the case of a serious issue with respect to credibility, the case should go to trial because the parties should be cross-examined before the trial judge (Forde and Sears). The mere existence of apparent conflict in the evidence does not preclude summary judgment; the court should take a "hard look" at the merits and decide if there are issues of credibility to be resolved (Stokes).
[24] With respect to summary judgment, I stated in Inhesion Industrial Co. v. Anglo Canadian Mercantile Co., [2000] F.C.J. No. 491 (QL) (T.D.) at paragraph 19:
Upon a motion for summary judgment, both parties must file their best evidence. The moving party must of course lead evidence which it believes will convince the Court that it is appropriate to grant summary judgment in its favour. The responding party must however also put its best evidence forward. This issue was discussed by Justice Evans in F. von Langsdorff Licensing Limited v. S.F. Concrete Technology, Inc., [1999] F.C.J. No. 526, (8 April 1999), Court File No. T-335-97 (F.C.T.D.):
Accordingly, the respondent has an evidential burden to discharge in showing that there is a genuine issue for trial: Feoso Oil Ltd. v. Sarla (The), [1995] 3 F.C. 68, 81-82 (F.C.A.). However, this does not detract from the principle that the moving party has the legal onus of establishing the facts necessary to obtain summary judgment: Ruhl Estate v. Mannesmann Kienzle GmbH (1997), 80 C.P.R. (3d) 190, 200 (F.C.T.D.); Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [1998] F.C.J. No. 912, (F.C.T.D.; T-2799-96; June 23, 1998). Thus, both parties are required to "put their best foot forward" so that the motions judge can determine whether there is an issue that should go to trial: Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie (1990), 33 C.P.R. (3d) 515, 529-530 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)).
With the guidance of the general principles and the above noted remarks, I will now determine whether summary judgment should be granted to the plaintiff in this case.
[25] The defendant, Barrymore's Inc. operated a music hall in Ottawa and the defendants, Lanctot and Haslam were directors of Barrymore's Inc.
[26] Barrymore's Music Hall presented four types of performances. In general terms, they were:
1. Shows where the bar arranged the performance and paid the performers either a fixed amount or a portion of the money collected at the door (a "Barrymore's show").
2. Shows where an outside promoter arranged the performance of the music, collected all the money taken at the door and paid the performer (an "outside promoter show").
3. Shows where an individual performer arranged with the bar their performance, collected all the money taken at the door and kept that money (a "band show").
4. Shows where "Eugene's Party Central", a promoter company that was run and operated entirely by Eugene Haslam independent from the bar, arranged the performance of the music, collected all of the money taken at the door, and paid the performer either a fixed amount or a portion of the performance charges paid by the attendees (a "Eugene's Party Central show").
[27] When Lanctot was cross-examined on his affidavit, he classified the performances in question according to the above classifications.
[28] Subject to any limitation defence, the defendants Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot admit liability for the royalties for performances indicated as a Barrymore's show.
[29] The Eugene's Party Central shows have been included in the outside promoter show category as the defendant, Haslam has consented to a judgment against him.
[30] Haslam admitted that he caused Barrymore's Inc. to promise to pay performing rights fees for each concert set out in paragraph 18 of the statement of claim.
[31] There were, however, at least two outside promoters who stated that they paid the royalty fees to the plaintiff.
[32] The plaintiff claimed royalties for 17 performances for which royalties had already been paid.
[33] As part of the transaction by which Haslam ceased to be involved with Barrymore's Inc., Lanctot and Barrymore's Inc. gave an agreement to indemnify Haslam for any monies he was called upon to pay in regard to the debts of Barrymore's Inc.
[34] It is admitted by the defendants, Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot that some of the performances were caused or authorized by Barrymore's Inc. The defendant Haslam admits that his responsibilities included obtaining performers at Barrymore's Music Hall. However, the degree of control exercised by the defendants over the performances still in question cannot be determined from the evidence before me. As this is a genuine issue for trial, I am not prepared to grant summary judgment in relation to the contested performances.
[35] In addition, the exact relationship between the defendants, Barrymore's Inc., Haslam and Lanctot must be determined in order to decide who, if anyone, is liable to the plaintiff. This determination cannot be made from the evidence available on this motion. This is a genuine issue for trial.
[36] There are two further issues that will need to be determined after all of the evidence is submitted:
1. The personal liability, if any, of the defendant, Lanctot;
2. Whether any royalties have been submitted by the performers to the plaintiff for any of the other performances for which royalties are being claimed in this action.
These issues will have to be determined at the trial by the trial judge after hearing the evidence. These are genuine issues to be tried.
[37] The defendant, Barrymore's Inc. has admitted responsibility for the fees for the shows designated as Barrymore's shows, subject to the limitation defence for some of these shows. I am prepared to grant an order to the effect that the defendant, Barrymore's Inc., carrying on business as Barrymore's Music Hall, is responsible for the payment of the royalty fees for these Barrymore's shows.
[38] Any reference with respect to the quantum of the royalty fees shall take place after a decision is delivered in the trial of this matter.
[39] The application for summary judgment is otherwise dismissed.
[40] Costs shall be costs in the cause.
[41] The plaintiff shall prepare an order, consented to by the defendants, Barrymore's Inc. and Lanctot and submit the order to the Court within two weeks of the date of this decision. If no agreement can be reached on the form of the order, counsel may make motion to me to settle the form of the order.
"John A. O'Keefe"
J.F.C.C.
Ottawa, Ontario
January 31, 2003
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1510-00
STYLE OF CAUSE: SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND
MUSIC PUBLISHERS
- and -
BARRYMORE'S INC., c.o.b. BARRYMORE'S
MUSIC HALL, EUGENE HASLAM and
JOHN RANDAL LANCTOT
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: Monday, September 23, 2002
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER OF O'KEEFE J.
DATED: Friday, January 31, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Mr. A. Kelly Gill
Ms. Colleen Stanley
FOR PLAINTIFF
Mr. J. Christopher Arnold
FOR DEFENDANTS
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
SOCAN
41 Valleybrook Drive
Toronto, Ontario
M3B 2S6
FOR PLAINTIFF
Dickie & Arnold
Suite 440, Manulife Place
55 Metcalfe Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 6L5
FOR DEFENDANTS