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Date: 20000113


Docket: IMM-87-99


     OTTAWA, ONTARIO, THURSDAY, THIS 13TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2000

     BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE TEITELBAUM


ENTRE :


     Kajendran VELUPPILAI,

     DEMANDEUR;

     C.

     LE MINISTRE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L"IMMIGRATION,

     DÉFENDEUR.


     REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

TEITELBAUM, J:

[1]      On December 14, 1999, I issued an Order whereby I dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of W.A. Sheppit, a delegate of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration dated October 22, 1998 wherein it was decided that the applicant constitutes a danger to the public in Canada in accordance with the terms of paragraph 53(1)(d) and subsection 70(5) of the Immigration Act.

[2]      It was agreed by counsel that I should disallow the constitutional submissions of the applicant but in order to protect the constitutional issue of the applicant I would certify a question similar or the same as the question certified in the case of Suresh v. Canada [1999] F.C.J. No. 865.

[3]      As a result of the above, I asked counsel for the applicant to submit a question or questions that counsel thought should be certified. Counsel for the applicant suggests four questions for certification.

[4]      Counsel for the respondent forwarded the respondent"s submissions relating to the four questions submitted by the applicant.

[5]      In the decision of Baker v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.), at page 207 Justice L"Heureux-Dubé states in paragraph 12:

The Court of Appeal held, in accordance with its decision in Liyanagamage v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 176 N.R. 4 (F.C.A.), that the requirement, in s. 83(1), that a serious question of general importance be certified for an appeal to be permitted restricts an appeal court to addressing the issues raised by the certified question. However, in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193, at para. 25, this Court held that s. 83(1) does not require that the Court of Appeal address only the stated question and issues related to it:
The certification of a "question of general importance" is the trigger by which an appeal is justified. The object of the appeal is still the judgment itself, not the certified question.
Rothstein J. noted in Ramoutar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 F.C. 370 (T.D.), that once a question has been certified, all aspects of the appeal may be considered by the Court of Appeal, within its jurisdiction. I agree. The wording of s. 83(1) suggests, and Pushpanathan confirms, that if a question of general importance has been certified, this allows for an appeal from the judgment of the Trial Division which would otherwise not be permitted, but does not confine the Court of Appeal or this Court to answering the stated question or issues directly related to it. All issues raised by the appeal may therefore be considered here.

[6]      Therefore, it appears that if a single question is certified for the Court of Appeal to decide, the Court of Appeal may consider all aspects of the appeal within its jurisdiction.

[7]      I have read the submissions of both parties and I am satisfied that the two questions submitted by the respondent, although only one is necessary, should be certified.

[8]      The questions are:

Does paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Immigration Act infringe section 7 of the Charter, and if it does, is it a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter? Are the principles of fairness at common law and the principles of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter met by the present administrative process for the determination by the Minister, under paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Immigration Act, as to whether in the Minister"s opinion a person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada?
Does the duty of procedural fairness require the provision of written reasons for a Minister"s opinion under paragraph 53(1)(d) of the Immigration Act ? If so, is this requirement satisfied by the provision to the Applicant of the "Request for Minister"s Opinion"?

[9]      Questions 3 and 4 submitted by the applicant are not determinative of the issues before the Court.

                                 "Max M. Teitelbaum"

                            

                                     J.F.C.C.

Ottawa, Ontario     

January 13, 2000

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