Date: 19990908
Docket: IMM-6048-98
BETWEEN:
REHANA NASREEN
Applicant
-and-
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
CULLEN J.
[1] The applicant challenges by way of judicial review the decision, dated 27 October 1998, of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Convention Refugee Determination Division ("CRDD"), in which it was determined that the applicant is not a Convention refugee within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 (the "Act"). Leave to commence this application for judicial review was granted by Mr. Justice Pelletier on 9 June 1999.
Background
[2] The applicant, Rehana Nasreen, is a 46-year-old citizen of Pakistan. She arrived in Canada at Pearson International Airport on 16 November 1996, whereupon she made a claim for Convention refugee status. The applicant is a Shia Muslim and she fears persecution at the hands of extremist Sunnis, who are the majority in Pakistan, based on her political opinion and membership in a particular social group.
[3] The applicant signed and submitted a chronology of events, or personal information form ("PIF") on 2 March 1997. She submitted a second, amended version on 17 October 1997, just four days before the hearing was set to commence before the CRDD.
[4] The applicant claims her husband was a prime target for terrorists, given his work as a member of the Provincial Peace Committee during 1992. His work involved seeking to unite Muslims of all sects. On 30 May 1992, he witnessed the murder of his colleague and friend. The applicant identified the murderer, Riaz Basra, who was incarcerated until he escaped custody, on 30 April 1994.
[5] After Basra"s escape, the applicant claims he made threatening phone calls and attacked the family"s home with gunfire. This prompted the applicant, her husband, and their two daughters to leave Pakistan for London, arriving there on 6 September 1994. The applicant returned to Pakistan on 26 February 1995 for the funeral of her brother.
[6] The applicant claims that after her return to Pakistan, the terrorists attacked her house again. Her calls to the police went unanswered. She claims that Basra phoned her and threatened her family for what her husband did in testifying against him.
[7] The applicant left her house and stayed with a friend for several months. At the end of April 1995, she moved to her mother"s village for one month. She then returned to work, where she was informed that terrorists had been making inquiries about her. Shortly thereafter, she was threatened. The next day, she applied for leave from work, and returned to her mother"s village. After a month, she lived with another relative for three months, until August 1995. She returned yet again to her mother"s village, and moved around from various relatives" houses.
[8] She claims to have attempted to obtain another visa from the British Consulate, but was informed that would be difficult because she had earlier obtained a visa for England. She applied for an Australian visa, as a ruse, and then obtained a Canadian visa.
CRDD"s Decision
[9] The CRDD found the applicant"s testimony to be deficient as certain critical aspects were not trustworthy. The panel relied on various inconsistencies between her two PIFs, and termed the second PIF as a "significantly revised narrative." The panel noted that the second narrative was provided only after the RCO informed the applicant that the Minister"s Office was conducting an investigation into the status of her family in England.
[10] In terms of inconsistencies, the panel noted that in the first PIF, the applicant claimed to have stayed behind in Pakistan to tend to her ailing father when her husband and children fled to England. In the second version, she indicates that she did, in fact, accompany her family to England, and thus she was not in Pakistan to witness the 8 September 1994 attack on her house.
[11] The PIFs contain different versions of the amount of time the applicant spent at her mother"s house, which she claims to have gone to after the terrorist attack. In the first PIF, she claimed to have stayed four months, while in the second PIF, this is changed to four weeks. The PIFs also contain different versions of the amount of time she stayed at a relative"s house after she left her mother"s. In the first PIF she states that she stayed five to six months; in the second PIF she says that she stayed three months.
[12] The PIFs also contain different accounts of how she spent the time at her mother"s house: in the first PIF she claims to have stayed indoors at all times, while in the second version, she states that she moved about and spent time with family members.
[13] Finally, the first PIF contains no mention of the first visa she obtained for the United Kingdom.
[14] The panel concluded that the applicant"s misrepresentation of herself led to serious doubt as to her credibility in terms of her entire testimony.
[15] The panel also noted two problems it had with the applicant"s oral testimony. During direct examination, the applicant testified that it was at the beginning of October 1995 that she was threatened and harassed by the terrorists; and she reiterated this statement. However, when being questioned by her counsel, she changed the date to May 1995. The panel concluded that the applicant was confused because she had concocted so many events.
[16] The second problem with the applicant"s oral testimony concerned a story of two attacks by Basra"s henchmen on her husband"s car, which included the car"s doors being blown out. This story was not mentioned in either narrative, and the panel concluded that the applicant was attempting to embellish her story.
[17] The panel noted that the applicant had returned to Pakistan after she had applied for Convention refugee status in England. It took this to be an indication of a lack of credibility to her claim that her life was threatened by terrorists.
[18] Finally, with regard to state protection, the panel noted that the police were pursuing the applicant"s alleged persecutors. It also noted, further to the applicant"s testimony, that her husband was rather popular with the police, having received several commendations. The panel concluded that this special relationship should serve only to enhance the applicant"s ability to avail herself of state protection.
Applicant"s Position
[19] The applicant submits that the CRDD erred in that it did not assess her claim in respect of her status as a Shia Muslim vis-à-vis the general situation in Pakistan for Shia Muslims. The applicant contends that substantial documentary evidence before the panel detailed the persecution of Shia Muslims in Pakistan.
[20] The applicant also takes issue with the panel"s finding in regard to the availability of state protection. This argument is based on the overall situation of Shia Muslims in Pakistan, and whether the applicant, as a Shia Muslim, could ever receive adequate state protection.
[21] The applicant also submits that the panel made a perverse finding when it engaged in selective quoting of the applicant"s testimony. In its reasons, the panel found that state protection was illustrated by the fact that Basra had been arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. It did not, however, continue on to note that he had escaped custody, and indeed, it was the applicant"s husband"s testimony, which put Basra in prison, that led to the family"s persecution.
Respondent"s Position
[22] The respondent submits that the panel"s credibility findings were well within its purview and are supported by the numerous internal inconsistencies in her oral testimony and narratives.
[23] The respondent maintains that the panel could properly take into account the applicant"s return to Pakistan in its assessment of her credibility and the well-foundedness of her fear.
[24] Finally, the respondent submits that the applicant had the onus to provide clear and convincing evidence of the state"s inability to protect her. Moreover, the respondent argues that the panel took into account the applicant"s status as a Shia Muslim as it formed the very basis of her claim.
Issues
[25] The issues to be decided in this application for judicial review are the following: whether the CRDD erred in its credibility assessment; whether the CRDD erred in assessing the well-foundedness of the applicant"s fear, with regard to her return to Pakistan and the availability of state protection.
Discussion
[26] A reviewing court may interfere with credibility findings only if they are determined to be perverse, capricious, or made without regard to the evidence before the panel. The CRDD is, of course, ideally situated to make findings regarding the applicant"s credibility and trustworthiness and, accordingly, considerable curial deference is granted on judicial review.
[27] If the CRDD had before it evidence which would support its negative assessment of credibility, the panel"s findings are reasonable in light of the evidence before it, and reasonable inferences were drawn from that evidence, then the reviewing Court should not interfere with the panel"s decision, even if the Court might not have reached the same conclusion: Aguebor v. Canada (MEI) (1994), 160 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.), Muhammed v. Canada (MEI) (1993), 67 F.T.R. 152 (F.C.T.D.), Ankrah v. Canada (MEI) (IMM-1986-92, 16 March 1993).
[28] Thus, credibility findings are completely within the CRDD"s purview, and must be given considerable deference on judicial review. Such findings cannot be interfered with if they are reasonable and supported by the record.
[29] In the instant case, the panel noted several discrepancies between the applicant"s two PIFs, as well as within her oral testimony. The overall effect of such discrepancies was to cast a large cloud of doubt over the applicant"s entire testimony. The record supports the panel"s finding as to the applicant"s lack of credibility.
[30] The panel"s conclusion that the applicant"s return to Pakistan undermined the well-foundedness of her fear is also reasonable and supported by the jurisprudence: Huerta v. Canada (MEI) (1993), 157 N.R. 225 (F.C.A.) and Bogus v. Canada (MCI) (1993), 71 F.T.R. 260 (F.C.T.D.).
[31] With regard to the availability of state protection for the applicant, the CRDD"s conclusion that such is available does not warrant judicial interference. In particular, the CRDD noted that the applicant testified that her husband is popular with the police and had received several commendations. Indeed, the onus rested on the applicant to show that the police could not protect her, and she failed to satisfy the panel as to this point.
[32] Counsel for the Applicant took issue with the fact that the Board, having determined that the applicant was not credible, had only dealt with the specific of not being credible, but had not dealt with the "general" considerations. In my view the applicant"s exaggeration, errors and lapses left no real foundation to make her case on the second issue; and the Board would be hard-pressed to accept any evidence from the applicant who so thoroughly destroyed any possibility that the Board could accept any evidence advanced by the applicant. I cannot accept that it was feasible for the Board, in light of the loss of credibility, to be required to "tackle" the second issue.
[33] In the result, nothing in the panel"s decision warrants this Court"s intervention. The application for judicial review is dismissed.
Ottawa, Ontario
September 8, 1999
B.Cullen
J.F.C.C.