Federal Court Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content





Date: 20000531


Docket: IMM-3651-99



BETWEEN:

     VLADIMIR PROKOPENKP

     Applicant


     - and -


     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent



     REASONS FOR ORDER


DUBÉ J.:


[1]      This application is for the judicial review of the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board ("the Board") dated July 7, 1999, wherein the Board declared that the applicant is not a convention refugee.

1. Facts

[2]      The applicant is a Russian citizen who refused to serve in the Russian army "because of the conditions which exist and which would lead to my death". As a computer specialist, he was recalled in October 1998 and deserted because he feared to be sent either to Tchetchenia or Tajiistan where Russian soldiers are not allowed to be armed at the military camp, therefore would be easy targets for the enemy. The Board did not accept that explanation, noted that the applicant was not a conscientious objector, and concluded that "refusal to serve in your country's armed forces was not a valid ground for claiming persecution".

[3]      I cannot find fault with that decision as it follows the jurisprudence in the matter. For instance, in Lishchenko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)1, Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer, following Talman v. Canada (M.E.I.)2, held as follows:

...that the punishment for failing to complete compulsory military service in Israel did not constitute persecution, but rather prosecution for failing to comply with a law of general application. The Applicant has the burden to demonstrate that such law of general application is inherently persecutory. If the punishment is not found to constitute persecution, it is difficult to conclude that it creates an objectively identifiable risk of extreme sanction or inhumane treatment.

[4]      In Zuevich v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)3, Teitelbaum J. dealt with an applicant who did not establish he had conscientious objections to military service. He referred to a judgment delivered by Madame Justice Reed in Popov v. Canada (M.E.I.)4 who held as follows:

With respect to the obligations to serve in the military, I start from the position that it is not persecution to have compulsory military service. Clearly, that alone cannot be a ground for Convention Refugee status.

[5]      In the case at bar, the applicant completed his military service for two years from 1976 to 1978 but did not claim to be a conscientious objector. He merely feared to serve in the Russian army which is admittedly operating under extremely difficult conditions.

[6]      At the opening of this hearing, Me Styliani Markaki who had filed a memorandum of arguments as attorney for the applicant, informed the Court that the applicant had not contacted her for this hearing. She said she would not be acting for him at the instant hearing. Unfortunately, she had not informed the Court Registry of that situation previous to the hearing. In any event, I had previously familiarized myself with the file, including her memorandum of arguments, and informed her that I found nothing therein which would establish a ground for persecution. Thus, the Board's decision should stand.

[7]      Consequently, this application is dismissed.


OTTAWA, Ontario

May 31, 2000

    

     Judge





Date: 20000531


Docket: IMM-3651-99



OTTAWA, ONTARIO, THIS 31st DAY OF MAY 2000

PRESENT:      THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J.E. DUBÉ


BETWEEN:

     VLADIMIR PROKOPENKP

     Applicant


     - and -


     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent





     ORDER


     The application for judicial review is dismissed.

    

     Judge

__________________

     1      [1996] F.C.J. No. 21, IMM-803-95.

     2      (1995), 93 F.T.R. 266 at pp. 273-4.

     3      [1999] F.C.J. No. 453, IMM-2476-98.

     4      Trial Division, IMM-2567-93, March 22, 1994.

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.