Date: 20050225
Docket: IMM-4312-03
Citation: 2005 FC 304
Ottawa, Ontario, this 25th day of February, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN A. O'KEEFE
BETWEEN:
GUILFO ELMER VIVIANO ROCHA,
MILAGROS DEL CARMEN MATZZA RODRIGUEZ,
MARIA FERNANDA VIVIANO MATZZA and
GIANMARCO GIOVANNI VIVIANO MATZZA
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
O'KEEFE J.
[1] This is an application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 ("IRPA"), of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board"), dated April 29, 2003, wherein it was determined that the applicants were not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.
[2] The applicants seek an order reviewing and setting aside the tribunal's decision dated April 29,2003, wherein it declared that the applicants were not Convention refugees and not persons in need of protection.
Background
[3] The applicants, Guilfo Elmer Viviano Rocha ("the principal applicant") and Milagros Del Carmen Mattza Rodriguez ("the female applicant") and their children, Maria Fernanda Viviano Matzza and Gianmarco Giovanni Matzza, are citizens of Peru. The principal applicant claims a well-founded fear of persecution based upon his perceived political opinion and knowledge of police corruption. The female applicant was the designated representative of the two minor children.
[4] The principal applicant joined the Peruvian armed forces in 1983. He attended the military academy in Chorilaa until December 1986. He stated that his training consisted of academic and military courses. He joined the military to obtain a degree and "to serve the Fatherland". In December 1986, the principal applicant was stationed at Battalion #3, Rimac Division, 2nd military region, in Lima. He was a 2nd lieutenant, commanding a section of 23 men. He stated that his duties were limited to providing training exercises for the men. On one occasion, his unit was sent to Huacho to engage in military surveillance.
[5] In January 1989, the principal applicant joined what was shortly thereafter to become anti-subversive Battalion #28 in Pucallpa City. He was acting as captain and in command of 60 men in March 1989. They were responsible for preventing terrorism and drug-trafficking. He stated that they would patrol nearby towns to ensure the safety of civilians in the emergency zone.
[6] In October 1989, he lead a successful raid against a cocaine manufacturing enterprise in the town of Aguaylia.
[7] In December 1989, he was transferred to Lima Army headquarters. He was an assistant supply and logistics officer. In January 1990, he was promoted to 1st lieutenant. He stated that shortly after his transfer, he started to receive threatening phone calls and was followed by strangers. He understood this was related to "the drug trafficking system in Peru". The threatening calls continued after 1990.
[8] In May 1990, the principal applicant was transferred to anti-subversive Battalion #9 in Huacho where he was Chief of Supply. He stated he supported Battalion #9 by ensuring all troops were properly provisioned. He would travel with the Battalion and deliver provisions when they went to a town to effect a military presence.
[9] In 1993, the principal applicant was transferred to No.7 Battalion in the 1st Military Region as Logistics Chief. He was the administrator of the Battalion and directly responsible for 65 people. In January 1994, he was promoted to Infantry Captain.
[10] In December 1995, the principal applicant was transferred to Army Headquarters in Lima and then relocated to Choisa where he managed an officer's club. The principal applicant believed he was being punished for opening a confidential letter from Vladimir Montessinos to his commander.
[11] In June 1996, the principal applicant and his father-in-law were shot at while standing outside the principal applicant's home. His father-in-law was seriously injured but the principal applicant was not. His home was broken into shortly thereafter and ransacked. He reported the incidents to his superiors but they did nothing.
[12] The principal applicant resigned from the military in 1997 with the rank of captain. He stated that he continued to receive death threats after he resigned from the military. He went into hiding and moved from place to place.
[13] The principal applicant left Peru in 1999, after discovering that the police were looking for him. He stated he feared being harmed by corrupt police in Peru who wish to punish him for his anti-drug trafficking activities and because of his humanitarian work on behalf of the peasants.
[14] The principal applicant stated that at no time, from when he entered the military to when he retired (and even to the date of the hearing), was he aware of, or take any part in, human rights abuses by the Peruvian army.
[15] The principal applicant notified the Canadian authorities of his intention to claim refugee status via mail in March 2000.
[16] The female applicant and children claim that their relationship with the principal applicant has put them in jeopardy. The female applicant stated in her Personal Information Form ("PIF") narrative that after her husband left Peru, she continued to have problems. She received threatening anonymous calls. The callers would say that her husband would pay for what he had done, that he would pay for all the money that they had lost.
[17] The female applicant claimed that in January 2001, three officers from DINCOTE, the national security agency, came to her residence and demanded she tell them where her husband was. She was also questioned about his associates and about his past activities. She told them that she and her husband were separated.
[18] In March 2001, the female applicant was grabbed off the street by DINCOTE officers and driven to a DINCOTE office. She was shown photographs of her husband and former associates and told that her husband had joined a terrorist organization in 1997 upon resigning from the army, and that he was providing confidential military information to this organization.
[19] In July 2001, she received a call asking for her husband's whereabouts. The man hinted that her children might be harmed if she refused to cooperate. She then went to live with a friend. In August 2001, DINCOTE officials went to her parents' home looking for her.
[20] The female applicant and the minor children left Peru on November 27, 2001. The female applicant stated in her PIF narrative that she and the children fear persecution in Peru because of the principal applicant's knowledge of criminal activity and of corruption by police and military authorities. They also fear harm because the principal applicant has been falsely accused of being associated with guerilla organizations.
The Board's Reasons
[21] The Board dealt first with the question of exclusion of the principal applicant under Article 1F(a) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Convention"), July 28, 1951, [1969] Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6. Article 1F of the Convention states:
|
Article 1
. . .
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisions in respect of such crimes;
. . . |
Article 1
. . .
F. Les dispositions de cette Convention ne seront pas applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de penser:
a) Qu'elles ont commis un crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre ou un rime contre l'humanité, au sens des instruments internationaux élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions relatives à ces crimes;
. . . |
[22] In Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994), 84 F.T.R. 227 at 234, the Court outlined the test for the application of Article 1F(a) as follows:
. . . three prerequisites must be established in order to provide complicity in the commission of an international offence: (1) membership in an organization which committed international offenses as a continuous and regular part of its operation, (2) personal and knowing participation, and (3) failure to disassociate from the organization at the earliest safe opportunity.
[23] As to the first prerequisite, the Board held that the Peruvian army was an organization which, during the time of the principal applicant's association with it, committed international offences or crimes against humanity as a continuous and regular part of its operation.
[24] In making that finding, the Board cited numerous examples from the documentary materials, including:
1. From 1982 onwards, in the quest to rid the country of the Sendero Luminoso by any means possible, the Peruvian military increasingly began to lose sight of the distinction between civilians and combatants. The military began to regard all Indian peasants within a declared emergency zone as guerillas, whether they were or not. The policy adopted was one of terror, the inevitable means a "systematic use of execution, disappearances and torture".
2. In 1989, Amnesty International wrote:
In the past year human rights violations in Peru have remained at a consistently high level, especially in areas under state of emergency and military control. . . . Torture, including rape, by the security forces continues to be frequently reported, and many prisoners are held on charges of "terrorism" said to be based on statements extracted under torture.
3. At least 3,000 people had disappeared and there were killings of large groups of prisoners or peasant communities by the military and security forces, often as reprisals for the actions of the Shining Path.
4. The military enjoyed virtual impunity to engage in acts including murder at will without fear of persecution. It also led to a disintegration of the rule of law in the area in question. Abusive officers were frequently promoted to higher levels of the armed forces.
5. As part of the plan to rid the country of guerillas, peasants were often forced to wear army uniforms or hoods and to accompany army patrols to villages to identify possible guerilla sympathizers. Many such guides were never heard from again.
6. Crimes against humanity are the inevitable result of a strategy that blurs the
distinction between civilians and combatants. The Peruvian Army must take full responsibility for these crimes in the period under examination. In December 1992, Jane's Intelligence wrote that the Peruvian Army had earned the unenviable distinction of being branded as the world's worst with regard to human rights abuses during the previous three years. The evidence presented there indicated that "distinction" was fully deserved.
[25] As to the second prerequisite, the Board held that the principal applicant did have a personal and knowing participation in the commission of an international offence. The Board stated the following:
The claimant, of course, denies this. If one were to accept the claimant's story at face value, not only has he not committed a crime against humanity, he has never fought the guerillas, despite being located in a conflict zone, never heard fellow-officers talk of confrontations with the guerillas, despite having been part of an anti-subversive battalion. The following factors make me disbelieve him.
Firstly, his military college transcript states that his top marks by far (95%) were in the field of intelligence. As a young soldier eager to make his mark, and with a talent for intelligence work, the claimant would be naturally inclined to keep his eyes and ears open, more so than a normal officer would. The spate of killings and human rights abuses could not possibly escape his attention.
Secondly, the claimant assumed command of a company of the anti-subversive Battalion #28 in Pucallpa, Ucallai Department. He went there in January 1989 and remained there until December 1990. The following statement then, found in Americas watch and dealing with the year 1989 is most relevant:
In Pucallpa (the capital of Ucayali) it is already customary to find, almost everyday, the bodies of people who have been cruelly assassinated. As well, from time to time people disappear who have been kidnapped by uniformed, hooded individuals who only act at night.
The claimant would almost certainly have seen these bodies and he would have known who caused these bodies to be there. The section where this excerpt is from deals with the army's culpability in disappearances in the emergency zone.
[26] As to the third prerequisite, the Board found that the principal applicant did not disassociate himself at the earliest possible opportunity. The Board noted the applicant's long history of association with the army:
. . . From his early training while a teenager to his graduation from the military academy to his active role in guerilla-infested regions, the claimant displayed every evidence of pride of association with the military. There was no hint of compunction at the atrocities that the army had participated in and that he had reasonably heard of. He left the Army not because of any internal battles with his conscience but because of other factors. There is absolutely no indication that he ever desired to leave sooner than he did. If knowledge of the army's brutalities and disrespect for the rule of law could have moved the claimant to separate himself from what the army was doing, he would have done this at the first available opportunity. For example, when the Metsinos [sic] letter revealed to him the warped minds of the higher command, he should have resigned from the army. He did not do so. Instead he gave every indication that he gloried in what the army did and that the anti-government forces, civilian or guerilla, deserved all they got.
[27] The Board therefore held:
. . . The principal claimant, Guilfo Elmeer Viviano Rocha falls within the parameter of Section F(a) of Article 1 of the Convention. There are serious reasons for considering that he has committed crimes against humanity. As he is a person referred to in Section F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, he is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, in terms of Section 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
[28] The Board then considered the female applicant's claim and found her not to be credible.
[29] The Board determined that the female applicant had made up the story of the DINCOTE harassing her. The Board noted numerous discrepancies between the female applicant's testimony and her PIF narrative including:
1. She made no mention of the DINCOTE accusing her husband of being a part of a terrorist organization.
2. She said that in January 2001, one person from DINCOTE called on her, but her PIF mentioned 3 DINCOTE officers going to her house.
3. Her PIF narrative referred to an assault in a DINCOTE office in March 2001, but her oral testimony made no mention of an assault.
4. There was no reference whatsoever to DINCOTE in her port of entry interview with the immigration officer.
[30] Furthermore, there was nothing in the principal applicant's past that suggested any association with or sympathy for the terrorists. There is thus no reason for the DINCOTE to be looking for him.
[31] As to the calls the female applicant claimed to have received after her husband left, the principal applicant stated in his testimony that the drug traffickers stopped calling in 1995, four years after they first began. The principal applicant feared Vladimir Montessinos, yet the female applicant did not even once refer to any possibility of harm from the former intelligence chief. The female applicant stated her main fear was from the DINCOTE.
Issue
[32] Did the Board err in law by basing its decision on erroneous findings of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner, and without proper regard to the evidence before it?
Applicants' Submissions
[33] The applicants submitted that the Board erred in determining that the principal applicant is excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1F(a), on the basis of the principal applicant's alleged commission of "crimes against humanity" during his service as an army officer in Peru.
[34] The applicants submitted that the Board based this exclusion decision on the principal applicant's alleged knowing and personal participation in crimes against humanity, and his alleged failure to disassociate himself from the Peruvian army at the earliest opportunity.
[35] The applicants submitted that the reasons provided by the Board are highly speculative, and that such speculation is not reasonably supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing. The Board's decision is based largely on several erroneous findings of fact as follows:
i) The principal applicant's studies at military college included special training in "intelligence", and that he had a special talent for such intelligence work.
The principal applicant submitted that his military college transcripts indicate that he had a high mark in a course described as "intelligence" in the English translation filed at the Board hearing. The interpreter at the hearing however, stated that the correct English translation would be "special operations" rather than "intelligence".
The principal applicant submitted in light of what the course actually entailed, there was no evidence to support the member's finding that he was especially ambitious or observant, or that he had a special talent for intelligence work.
ii) The principal applicant was more likely than other soldiers to know of the human rights abuses by the military.
The principal applicant submitted that his company was never involved in any military battles within the military zone, or came in contact with suspected guerillas or terrorists. The guerillas had moved out of the area before the military moved in. The principal applicant submitted that he received no information from members of the other three companies about any engagements with guerillas. The battalion was more concerned with "narco-traffickers" than with guerillas.
iii) The principal applicant served in the Pucallpa military zone for two years.
The principal applicant submitted that in fact he served with Battalion 23 in Pucallpa for only one year, from January 1989 to December 1989. Further, the battalion was not assigned to any "anti-subversive" duties until after he was initially posted to that location. The principal applicant submitted that his main responsibility was to instruct the men in physical fitness and drill practice. After Pucallpa was designated a military zone, he assumed some additional duties, including the delivery of humanitarian aid, including medical and dental services and medical and other supplies.
iv) The principal applicant had discovered a letter from national security chief Vladimir Montessinos in 1993.
The principal applicant submitted that he actually received the letter in December 1995 when he was stationed in Lima and working as a supply officer and mail clerk. The letter urged his commander to use all necessary means, including extortion, to ensure the re-election of President Fujimori.
v) The principal applicant had not expressed any concern with the wrong-doing urged by Montessinos in his letter to the principal applicant's battalion commander. The principal applicant submitted that the Board further erred when it held that "not once did he state that the contents of the letter bothered him".
The principal applicant submitted that he did testify that he"felt pretty bad" about the letter, and that Montessinos' request was not an appropriate request to make of a military officer. Further, he had no information indicating that his commander had actually done anything improper. The principal applicant submitted that while the letter was disturbing, it did not prove that Peruvian army officials were actually involved in human rights abuses.
The principal applicant submitted that at the time he intercepted the letter in December 1995, until he resigned from the military in 1997, neither he nor the other people he worked directly with had any involvement with civilians. He had no knowledge of and did not participate in any matters related to civilians and guerilla activity.
[36] The Board's determination that the principal applicant had "knowing and personal participation" in crimes against humanity is completely without evidentiary basis. The Board erred in law by basing its decision in erroneous findings of fact that are based on mere speculation and conjecture.
[37] The applicants made no written submissions on the Board's finding that the female applicant was not credible so neither she nor the minor applicants were Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.
The Respondent's Submissions
[38] The respondent submitted that the Board found that the principal applicant was complicit in crimes against humanity due to his involvement with the Peruvian army, and was therefore excluded from protected status.
[39] The respondent submitted that in keeping with the requirements set down by the Courts in Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 135 N.R. 390 and Gutierrez, supra, personal and knowing participation is required to establish complicity. The respondent submitted that the evidence in this case satisfies the requirements of complicity in crimes against humanity as established in the jurisprudence. The Board drew reasonable inferences that the principal applicant was sufficiently aware of his organization's involvement in such crimes to have been found complicit in their commission.
[40] On the record and testimony before it, it was open to the Board to find that, in spite of the principal applicant's protestations, he was involved in atrocities committed by the army.
[41] The respondent submitted that documentary evidence as to the role of the organization involved in the commission of crimes against humanity as part of government policy can be given more weight than the testimony of the claimant in exclusion cases. It was open to the Refugee Division to prefer the documentary evidence that indicated that the Peruvian army was responsible for the commission of human rights abuses, given that it did not believe the principal applicant's testimony minimizing his involvement.
[42] The respondent submitted that this Court should not interfere with the Board's assessment of credibility unless the Court is satisfied that the Board based its conclusion on irrelevant considerations or that it ignored evidence. Furthermore, where any of the Refugee Division's inferences and conclusions are reasonably open to it on the record, this Court should not interfere, whether or not it agrees with the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division.
Analysis and Decision
Standard of Review
[43] The determination that an applicant should be excluded pursuant to Article 1F(a) of the Convention is a question of mixed fact and law. The applicable standard of review is reasonableness simpliciter.
[44] MacKay J. of this Court in Gutierrez, supra, stated the test for the application of Article 1F(a) of the Convention at page 234:
Essentially then, three prerequisites must be established in order to provide complicity in the commission of an international offence: (1) membership in an organization which committed international offenses as a continuous and regular part of its operation, (2) personal and knowing participation, and (3) failure to disassociate from the organization at the earliest safe opportunity.
[45] The principal applicant did not contest the Board's finding under factor one, that he was a member of the Peruvian army, an organization which has, during the time of his association with it, committed international offences or crimes against humanity as a continuous and regular part of its operations. Based on the documentary evidence, I would agree with the Board's conclusion on this point.
[46] Personal and Knowing Participation
The Federal Court of Appeal stated in Ramirez, supra, that mere membership in an organization that commits international offences or crimes against humanity is not sufficient for exclusion from refugee status, presence coupled with being an associate of the principal offenders amounts to personal and knowing participation and the existence of a shared common purpose and the knowledge that all parties have of it is sufficient evidence of complicity. The principal applicant referred to specific errors he alleged the Board made when it decided not to believe him. I will deal with each in turn.
[47] The Board stated at page 10 of its decision:
The claimant, of course, denies this. If one were to accept the claimant's story at face value, not only has he not committed a crime against humanity, he has never fought the guerrillas, despite being located in a conflict zone, never heard fellow-officers talk of confrontations with the guerrillas, despite being part of an anti-subversive battalion. The following factors make me disbelieve him.
And further, at page 10:
Firstly, his military college transcript states that his top marks by far (95%) were in the field of intelligence. As a young soldier eager to make his mark, and with a talent for intelligence work, the claimant would be naturally inclined to keep his eyes and ears open, more so than a normal officer would. The spate of killings and human rights abuses could not possibly escape his attention.
[48] The principal applicant submitted that the correct translation of his evidence was that the subject matter was "special operations" rather than "intelligence". A review of the transcript shows (at page 719) that the interpreter actually said:
Yes, this what he said. There are abbreviations used here, but this is my own observation, and what could be construed the abbreviations to mean Special Operations Section, not Intelligence [emphasis added].
[49] As well, just prior to this exchange, the principal applicant stated the course was not only intelligence work, but other work. I am of the view that the Board was entitled to draw the conclusions it did. The principal applicant was an officer in the army and was in charge of a unit and this combined with his course work and/or special operations could well cause him to be observant of his surroundings and what was happening in the area he was posted.
[50] The Principal Applicant Served in the Pucallpa Military Zone for Two Years
The Board stated at pages 10 to 11 of its decision:
Secondly, the claimant assumed command of a company of the anti-subversive Battalion #28 in Pucallpa, Ucallai Department. He went there in January 1989 and remained there until December 1990. The following statement then, found in Americas watch and dealing with the year 1989 is most relevant:
In Pucallpa (the capital of Ucayali) it is already customary to find, almost everyday, the bodies of people who have been cruelly assassinated. As well, from time to time people disappear who have been kidnapped by uniformed, hooded individuals who only act at night.
The claimant would almost certainly have seen these bodies and he would have known who caused these bodies to be there. The section where this excerpt is from deals with the army's culpability in disappearances in the emergency zone.
The Board made an error in saying that the principal applicant was in Pucallpa from January 1989 and remained there until December 1990. The principal applicant was only there in 1989. This is not an error which would result in the Board's decision being overturned. Whether he was there one or two years does not assist as he was there in the time period when the evidence referred to by the Board stated that the atrocities committed by the army took place.
[51] The Opening of the Top Secret Letter
The Board stated at page 11 of its decision:
Thirdly, the claimant admitted that in 1993, he inadvertently opened a top-secret letter from Vladimir Montesinos, the National Intelligence Chief, to General Gambata, the battalion commander in Chicalyo, to use all means, including assassination to ensure the Fujimori re-election. This admission is important in three ways. One, that information is important enough in itself insofar as it is a directive from the highest level to commit crimes against humanity. Two, it is confirmation that the claimant knew that crimes of humanity might possibly take place in the near future. Three, it was something that the claimant took in stride, as if such crimes no longer shocked his conscience. Not for once, in his testimony, did he admit that the letter's contents bothered him. He was only concerned about how the inadvertent opening of the letter would affect his future in the army.
[52] The principal applicant's testimony was that the letter was discovered in 1993 not 1995. The Board was in error on the date the principal applicant received the letter, but this does not in any way affect the inferences that the Board drew from the letter.
[53] The principal applicant had not expressed any concern with the wrong-doing urged by Montessinos in his letter to the principal applicant's battalion commander. The principal applicant submitted that the Board further erred when it held that "not once did he state that the contents of the letter bothered him".
[54] The Board erred in making that statement as the principal applicant's testimony was that the principal applicant "felt bad" about it. While the Board did err, the relevant aspect of the letter was the Board's determination that it showed a directive from the highest level to commit crimes against humanity, and provided confirmation that the principal applicant knew that crimes against humanity might possibly take place in the near future. Accordingly, the error is not relevant to the determination of whether the principal applicant should be excluded under Article 1F(a) of the Convention.
[55] The third element of the test for the application of Article 1F(a) is that there must be a failure of the applicant to disassociate himself from the organization at the earliest safe opportunity. In the present case, the principal applicant was a career military officer and when he resigned, it was not for reasons relating to the conduct of the army. The principal applicant submitted that he would not need to disassociate himself as he was merely doing the work of a clerk and no personal involvement otherwise. Because of my agreement with the Board's conclusions, it was necessary for the principal applicant to have disassociated himself from the army at the earliest safe opportunity. I find that he did not do so. I would note that contrary to the Board's statement that the principal applicant never indicated that the letter's (the Vladimir Montesinos letter) contents bothered him, the principal applicant did state that he was shocked at its contents. This error by the Board does not change my viewpoint on the failure to disassociate himself.
[56] I am of the view that the Board did not commit any reviewable errors in the finding that the principal application should be excluded under Article 1F(a) of the Convention.
[57] Claims of the Female Applicant and Children
A review of the Board's decision shows that there were differences between the female
applicant's PIF, her testimony, the principal applicant's information and the port of entry interview. Because of these discrepancies, the Board found her story not to be credible with respect to her contact with DINCOTE. The Board gave the following reasons for not believing the female applicant's story:
1. She made no mention of DINCOTE accusing her husband of being part of a terrorist organization when she recounted the conversation she had with DINCOTE officers in March 2001. She stated she forgot it.
2. Her PIF stated three DINCOTE officers called on her while she said that one officer called on her in January 2001. When confronted with this, she said one officer called on her in January 2000 and three officers visited her in January 2001. Her narrative makes no mention of an officer going to her house in January 2000.
3. The PIF narrative refers to an assault in a DINCOTE office in March 2001, while her oral testimony makes no mention of this.
4. There was no reference at the port of entry to DINCOTE. Instead, the female applicant stated that after the shooting in 1996, there was only calls which threatened to do harm.
5. In the post-Fujimori era, DINCOTE was reorganized to focus more particularly on anti-terrorism.
[58] There remains the matter of the threatening phone calls made after the principal applicant's departure from Peru in 1999. The female applicant believes that these calls were from drug traffickers, however, the principal applicant stated that these phone calls ceased in 1995.
[59] I am of the view that the Board made no error with respect to the female applicant and her children's claims for refugee protection.
[60] I am of the view that the applicants' application for judicial review must be dismissed.
[61] Neither party wished to submit a serious question of general importance for my consideration.
ORDER
[62] IT IS ORDERED that the application for judicial review is dismissed.
"John A. O'Keefe"
J.F.C.
Ottawa, Ontario
February 25, 2005
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-4312-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: GUILFO ELMER VIVIANO ROCHA et al
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: October 4, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER OF O'KEEFE J.
APPEARANCES:
Marc Boissonneault
FOR APPLICANTS
David Tyndale
FOR RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Marc Boissonneault
Toronto, Ontario
FOR APPLICANTS
John H. Sims, Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
FOR RESPONDENT