Ottawa, Ontario, January 31, 2006
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE LAYDEN-STEVENSON
BETWEEN:
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This matter turns on the interpretation of the transitional provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA). It is section 197 that is in issue.
[2] Mr. Carbonaro was ordered to be deported from Canada on March 31, 2000, because he was found to be inadmissible under paragraph 27(1)(d) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. I-2 (the former Act) due to criminality. On August 9, 2001, the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) granted a stay, on conditions, of his deportation order. The IRPA came into effect on June 28, 2002.
[3] In 2004, Mr. Carbonaro breached a condition of his stay and was convicted of another criminal offence. On August 23, 2004, the IAD determined that, by operation of law, Mr. Carbonaro's stay was cancelled and his appeal was terminated.
[4] Mr. Carbonaro contends that the IAD erred in its interpretation of section 197 of the IRPA. He asserts that because both section 64 and subsection 68(4) of the IRPA are incorporated into section 197, Parliament intended that, for the purpose of those caught by the transitional provisions, only those who have had terms of imprisonment of two years or more are barred from appealing to the IAD.
[5] The primary issue is whether section 197 of the IRPA should be construed so that the references to section 64 and subsection 68(4) therein are conjunctive. Mr. Carbonaro submits that such a construction is correct. When regard is had to the object, text and context of the provision, considered together, Mr. Carbonaro's interpretation of section 197, in my view, cannot be sustained. Consequently, for the reasons that follow, his application must be dismissed.
FACTS
[6] Mr. Carbonaro is a permanent resident of Canada and a citizen of Malta. He came to Canada with his parents in 1953 when he was four years of age. He has returned to Malta, only once, for a visit some 30 years ago. He has a son, a daughter and two grandchildren in Canada. He and his wife are separated. He is HIV positive, has Hepatitis B and C and receives a disability pension.
[7] The record indicates that between 1965 and 2000, Mr. Carbonaro was convicted of approximately 55 criminal offences comprised primarily of break and enter with intent, theft, fraud, driving while impaired, possession of narcotics and various failures to comply with probation orders. The sentences imposed ranged from fines, to suspended sentences with probation, to incarceration. The imprisonments covered periods from 10 days to two years less a day.
[8] Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) issued a warning to Mr. Carbonaro in November 1998, that any further criminal activity could result in him being deported. In January 2000, CIC initiated proceedings under section 27 of the former Act. A report was made, an inquiry was directed and an adjudicator found Mr. Carbonaro to be inadmissible and ordered him deported.
[9] Mr. Carbonaro appealed to the IAD. On May 28, 2001, the IAD determined that the deportation order was valid and in accordance with the law. However, it ordered that the execution of the deportation order be stayed and that Mr. Carbonaro be allowed to remain in Canada subject to a number of terms and conditions one of which was to "keep the peace and be of good behaviour and not commit further criminal offences".
[10] The case was scheduled for review by the IAD on April 9, 2004, or such earlier date as it considered necessary or advisable. On April 7, 2004, counsel to the Minister forwarded correspondence to the IAD informing it of Mr. Carbonaro's conviction, on January 3, 2003, of possession of property, of a value exceeding $5,000, obtained by crime, in contravention of section 354 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the Criminal Code). Mr. Carbonaro was sentenced to 90 days imprisonment. However, the offence is one for which a term of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years may be imposed: Criminal Code, subsection 355(a).
[11] The record also discloses that Mr. Carbonaro was convicted of five additional criminal offences between December 10, 2002 and July 24, 2003. Those convictions were before the IAD but appear to have played no part in its decision and will not be considered in my analysis.
[12] By correspondence dated July 23, 2004, the IAD notified Mr. Carbonaro that the Minister sought to terminate his appeal. It invited Mr. Carbonaro to file information or arguments as to why section 197 of the IRPA should not or did not apply to him. Mr. Carbonaro attests in his affidavit that he received the notice but he did not have a lawyer and was not eligible for legal aid. He did not respond to the notice. He received the IAD's decision on September 9, 2004.
THE DECISION
[13] The IAD identified the threshold question as: "whether the IRPA, section 197 may be applied to this appeal in which a stay of removal order was granted under the former Act".
[14] First, it determined that Mr. Carbonaro had been granted a stay under the former Act and that he had breached a condition of the stay. It then noted that for subsection 68(4) to apply, Mr. Carbonaro must have been found inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality or criminality and that he must also have committed another offence referred to in subsection 36(1) of the IRPA.
[15] The IAD referred to the transition provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations) to determine the meaning of serious criminality. It concluded that Mr. Carbonaro came within paragraph 320(5)(a) of the Regulations because he had been convicted of an offence and a term of more than six months had been imposed. Regarding subsection 36(1) of the IRPA, it noted that Mr. Carbonaro's conviction of possession of property obtained by crime was in relation to a jeep having a value of more than $5,000 and that the offence fell within the parameters of both paragraph 320(5)(a) of the Regulations and subsection 36(1) of the IRPA.
[16] Last, the IAD opined that for section 197 and subsection 68(4) to be engaged, the conviction had to have occurred after the coming into force of the IRPA, which was the case for Mr. Carbonaro.
[17] In the end, the IAD concluded that the requisite conditions for cancellation, by operation of law, of Mr. Carbonaro's stay and the termination of his appeal had been met.
ISSUE
[18] The only issue to be determined is the interpretation of section 197 of the IRPA and more specifically, whether the references to section 64 and subsection 68(4) contained within section 197 are conjunctive.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[19] In Medovarski v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 4 F.C.R. 48 (F.C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal was required to interpret section 196 of the transitional provisions of the IRPA. The Court stated that since the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, the standard of review of correctness is applicable: paragraph 18. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Medovarski v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005), 339 N.R. 1, 2005 SCC 51, did not specifically address the standard of review but it is implicit in its reasons that it regarded the applicable standard as that of correctness.
[20] In Singh v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FCA 417, the issue before the Federal Court of Appeal was the interpretation of section 197 of the IRPA and more particularly, the timing of the breach of a condition of a stay. In discussing its review of the Federal Court's decision, the Court of Appeal commented that the Federal Court, while not explicitly discussing the standard of review, had reviewed the tribunal's decision on a standard of correctness. The Court of Appeal stated "[t]hat was indeed the appropriate approach".
[21] The question to be determined in this matter, which turns on the interpretation of section 197 of the IRPA, is analogous to the issues arising in Medovarski and Singh. I find no basis upon which to distinguish the reasoning of the Courts in those decisions and, in my view, the standard of review, here, does not fall within the parameters of the admonition regarding a pragmatic and functional analysis articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal in Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General) 2005 FCA 404 at paragraphs 50 and 51. The purpose of the pragmatic and functional analysis is to determine the core issue of the proper degree of curial deference owed to administrative decision-makers by the Court: Sketchley at paragraph 48. I have no difficulty in concluding that the IAD, when interpreting the transitional provisions of the IRPA, is not entitled to curial deference and, in accordance with Medovarski and Singh, its interpretation must be correct.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[22] The text of the applicable statutory provisions from the IRPA and the former Act are attached to these reasons as Schedule "A". For ease of reference, the pertinent transitional provisions of the IRPA are reproduced here.
| Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Board.
193. Every application, proceeding or matter before the Adjudication Division under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section, in respect of which substantive evidence has been adduced but no decision has been made, shall be continued under this Act by the Immigration Division of the Board. ...
196. Despite section 192, an appeal made to the Immigration Appeal Division before the coming into force of this section shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act. 197. Despite section 192, if an appellant who has been granted a stay under the former Act breaches a condition of the stay, the appellant shall be subject to the provisions of section 64 and subsection 68(4) of this Act.
64.(1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality. (2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years ...
68.(4) If the Immigration Appeal Division has stayed a removal order against a permanent resident or a foreign national who was found inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality or criminality, and they are convicted of another offence referred to in subsection 36(1), the stay is cancelled by operation of law and the appeal is terminated. ...
36.(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for (a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed; (b) having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or (c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years. ...
Immigration Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227
320(5) A person who on the coming into force of this section had been determined to be inadmissible on the basis of paragraph 27(1)(d) of the former Act is (a) inadmissible under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act on grounds of serious criminality if the person was convicted of an offence and a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed or a term of imprisonment of 10 years or more could have been imposed; or ...
|
Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, L.C. 2001, ch. 27
192. S'il y a eu dépôt d'une demande d'appel à la Section d'appel de l'immigration, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, l'appel est continué sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section d'appel de l'immigration de la Commission.
193. Les demandes et procédures présentées ou introduites, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, devant la Section d'arbitrage sont, dès lors que des éléments de preuve de fond ont été présentés, mais pour lesquelles aucune décision n'a été prise, continuées sous le régime de la présente loi, mais par la Section de l'immigration de la Commission. [...]
196. Malgré l'article 192, il est mis fin à l'affaire portée en appel devant la Section d'appel de l'immigration si l'intéressé est, alors qu'il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi, visé par la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi.
197. Malgré l'article 192, l'intéressé qui fait l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi et qui n'a pas respecté les conditions du sursis, est assujetti à la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi, le paragraphe 68(4) lui étant par ailleurs applicable.
64.(1) L'appel ne peut être interjeté par le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée, ni par dans le cas de l'étranger, son répondant. (2) L'interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité vise l'infraction punie au Canada par un emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans. [...]
68.(4) Le sursis de la mesure de renvoi pour interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité ou criminalité est révoqué de plein droit si le résident permanent ou l'étranger est reconnu coupable d'une autre infraction mentionnée au paragraphe 36(1), l'appel étant dès lors classé. [...]
36.(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants : a) être déclaré coupable au Canada d'une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans ou d'une infraction à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est infligé; b) être déclaré coupable, à l'extérieur du Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans; c) commettre, à l'extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans. [...]
Règlement sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2002-227
320(5) La personne qui, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, avait été jugée être visée à l'alinéa 27(1)d) de l'ancienne loi : a) est interdite de territoire pour grande criminalité en vertu de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés si elle a été déclarée coupable d'une infraction pour laquelle une peine d'emprisonnement de plus de six mois a été infligée ou une peine d'emprisonnement de dix ans ou plus aurait pu être infligée; [...]
|
ANALYSIS
[23] To clarify the record, it should be mentioned that post-hearing submissions were received for the purpose of enabling counsel to consolidate their arguments regarding the proper interpretation of section 197 of the IRPA. Following the release of the Federal Court of Appeal Singh decision on December 9, 2005, counsel for the parties were contacted and given the option of providing additional submissions regarding Singh. Counsel availed themselves of that opportunity.
[24] Mr. Carbonaro's position is not complex and can be succinctly stated. Section 197 of the IRPA incorporates section 64 as well as subsection 68(4). He claims that the reference to section 64 evinces Parliament's intention to ban only those who have had terms of imprisonment for two years or more from appeals to the IAD.
[25] Any other interpretation, according to Mr. Carbonaro, would be absurd because a foreign national would not lose a right of appeal to the IAD if punished by a sentence of two years less a day, but a permanent resident of some 50 years would lose the right to continue an appeal despite never having been punished by such a sentence.
[26] Referring to Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Hyde (2005), 47 Imm. L.R. (3d) 194 (F.C), Mr. Carbonaro submits that the authority stands for the proposition that the word "and" when used in relation to section 64 and subsection 68(4) in section 197 is conjunctive. The incorporation of section 64 is to ensure that the higher threshold for "serious criminality" of at least two years is met. Since he has never been punished by a term of imprisonment of two years or more, Mr. Carbonaro argues that there is no basis upon which to suggest that the "serious criminality" provision of section 64 applies. It follows that his appeal to the IAD must be continued and the IAD erred in concluding otherwise.
[27] Regarding the Singh decision, Mr. Carbonaro claims that it supports his position because the Court of Appeal ruled that section 197 is retroactively applicable to certain individuals.
[28] It is common ground that Mr. Carbonaro breached a condition of his stay and that the breach falls squarely within subsection 68(4) of the IRPA.
[29] The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the principle that the words of a statute must be interpreted having regard to the object, text and context of the provision, considered together: Medovarski (paragraph 8).
[30] My task is made simpler because I have the benefit of the Supreme Court's analysis in Medovarski and that of the Federal Court of Appeal in Medovarski and Singh. For clarity, further references to "Medovarski" will be to the decision of the Supreme Court unless otherwise stated. It is my view that when regard is had to the noted authorities, which are binding upon me, the issue before me has already been determined.
[31] The objectives of the IRPA, in the context of immigration, are found in subsection 3(1) of the Act. Medovarski teaches that the objectives indicate an intent to prioritize security. The objective is achieved by denying entry to applicants with criminal records, by removing applicants with such records from Canada, and by requiring permanent residents to behave lawfully while in Canada. Collectively, the objectives and provisions of the IRPA concerned with permanent residents reveal a firm desire to deal with criminals and security threats less leniently than under the former Act: Medovarski (paragraph 12).
[32] Persons sentenced to more than six months in prison are inadmissible under paragraph 36(1)(a) and those sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more are denied the right to appeal their removal order because of section 64 (paragraph 11). The specific purpose of section 64 is to "efficiently remove criminals sentenced to prison terms over six months from the country" (paragraph 13).
[33] The IRPA deals expressly and in detail with the transition between it and the predecessor legislation: Medovarski (Federal Court of Appeal, paragraph 47). Transitional provisions are enacted for the purpose of dealing with those individuals who "fall between the cracks created by two pieces of legislation. They ensure that these individuals are not left in legal limbo, uncertain of their rights and with no applicable law": Medovarski (paragraph 17).
[34] Because statutory interpretation always entails a search for the intention of the legislator, where statutory purpose is relevant to a transitional provision, it should be considered: Medovarski (paragraph 15).
[35] The Supreme Court concluded that legislative purpose was relevant to the interpretation of section 196 of the IRPA and, in my opinion, it would be irrational to conclude that it is not equally relevant to section 197, a companion provision. Moreover, it is obvious from the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in Medovarski and Singh that sections 190 and 192 to 197 of the IRPA constitute a bundle of interrelated provisions dealing with criminality.
[36] Specifically, section 190 dictates that the IRPA applies to every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the IRPA comes into force. Section 192 provides an exception to section 190 for those who have filed a notice of appeal. Their appeals are to be continued under the former Act. Section 196 carves a specific exception out of section 192 by providing that appeals to the IAD filed before the coming into force of the section shall be discontinued if a stay has not been granted under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of the IRPA. Section 197 provides another exception to section 192. Section 197 captures those sheltered under section 192 who breach a condition of their stay. They are subject to section 64 and subsection 68(4) of the IRPA. Section 197 brings the IRPA back into play so that the appeal rights are governed by the IRPA: Singh (paragraphs 36, 37, 38); Medovarski (Federal Court of Appeal, paragraphs 49, 50, 51).
[37] In discussing sections 190, 192 and 197 of the IRPA, Mr. Justice Sexton, at paragraph 39 of Singh, stated:
Read in sequence, each of these three transitional provisions covers a smaller group of those with pending notices of appeal originally brought under the old Immigration Act. Section 190 mandates that the IRPA applies to all of those in this category. Section 192 carves out a group of these individuals to whom the IRPA does not apply. Finally, section 197 dictates that section 64 and subsection 68(4) of the IRPA apply to selected individuals in that section 192 group. Together, these provisions render the IRPA retrospectively applicable to individuals such as the appellant.
[38] Moreover, section 197 is intended to apply to all those granted a stay under the former Act who breach a condition of it regardless of when they do so: Singh (paragraph 34).
[39] It seems to me that section 197 cannot yield a purposive interpretation that is different from that found by the Supreme Court to exist for section 196, that is, to facilitate the removal of permanent residents who have engaged in serious criminality: Medovarski (paragraph 9).
[40] Mr. Carbonaro urges me to conclude that he has not engaged in serious criminality because he does not fall within the definition of "serious criminality" provided in subsection 64(2). That subsection defines serious criminality for purposes of an appeal to the IAD. In that sense, subsection 64(2) is analogous to subsection 70(5) of the former Act: Tran v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2004) 253 F.T.R. 214; 36 Imm. L.R. (3d) 147 (F.C.). However, Mr. Carbonaro has had an appeal to the IAD and it granted him a stay of the deportation order against him.
[41] In general, it is subsection 36(1) under the IRPA that defines serious criminality. In Mr. Carbonaro's case, he had been found to be inadmissible under paragraph 27(1)(d) of the former Act. Subsection 320(5) of the IRP Regulations provides that a person determined to be inadmissible under paragraph 27(1)(d) of the former Act is still inadmissible under IRPA on grounds of serious criminality if the person was convicted of an offence and a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed or a term of imprisonment of 10 years or more could have been imposed. Thus, under the transitional provision, Mr. Carbonaro is, by definition, inadmissible under IRPA because he was convicted of an offence and a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed.
[42] It is also important to remember that the granting of a stay under paragraph 73(1)(c) was merely a temporary measure and the IAD retained an ongoing supervisory jurisdiction. Its decision was not final and the appeal would only truly be disposed of when the appeal was allowed or dismissed: Medovarski (paragraph 37).
[43] I return now to Singh and the fact that section 197 of the IRPA is intended to apply to all those granted a stay under the former Act who breach a condition of it regardless of when they do so (paragraph 34). Mr. Justice Sexton explains that section 197 essentially sets out a threshold test. It defines whom among those with pending notices of appeal, that were originally brought under the former Act, are caught by subsection 68(4). Even upon finding that section 197 applies, the conditions in subsection 68(4) must still be met before it can serve to cancel the stay and terminate the appeal. After the stay was granted, a subsequent offence referred to in subsection 36(1) of the IRPA is required for subsection 68(4) to apply. Only if the conditions in section 197 are met do the conditions in subsection 68(4) ever become relevant in the legal analysis (paragraphs 30 and 31). It is clear from Singh that this is the approach to be taken when section 197 is brought into play and subsection 68(4) is the applicable provision. What approach is to be taken when section 64 is the applicable provision?
[44] It is true that in Medovarski, as Mr. Carbonaro contends, the Courts interpreted section 196 of the IRPA. However, in the Federal Court of Appeal, specific reference was made to the interpretation of section 197. At paragraph 42, when discussing statutory purpose, Mr. Justice Evans construed section 197 to assist in the interpretation of section 196. He stated:
This provision discontinues the appeal of a permanent resident to whom a stay was granted under IA, paragraph 73(1)(c) prior to June 28, 2002, and who breaches a condition imposed on the stay. In this event, section 197 applies and the appeal is discontinued if the person was convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, either before or after the grant of the stay. In these circumstances, the general policy of IRPA section 64 applies: persons who have committed a serious offence should not have a right of appeal to the IAD. Without section 197, the appeal would have been continued under the former Act because the IAD had granted a stay under IA, paragraph 73(1)(c).
[45] Taken together, as I understand them, these authorities, which are binding upon me, lead me to construe section 197 in the following manner. The section is triggered whenever an individual who has been granted a stay under the former Act breaches a condition of the stay. If that individual is one who was convicted of an offence for which a term of imprisonment of two years was imposed, either before or after the grant of the stay, the appeal is discontinued by virtue of section 64. The IAD is without jurisdiction.
[46] Section 64 may often dispose of the matter, but it will not always be so. Mr. Carbonaro was not convicted of an offence for which a term of imprisonment of two years was imposed. Nonetheless, he meets the threshold for section 197 and, by his own admission, he falls within the parameters of subsection 68(4) because he was convicted of an offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years. Therefore, by virtue of subsection 68(4), his stay is cancelled by operation of law and his appeal is terminated.
[47] To summarize, once the threshold in section 197 is met, the appeal of an individual who falls within either section 64 or subsection 68(4) will be terminated. Put another way, it is not necessary for both section 64 and subsection 68(4) to apply to the individual in question. The provisions, in my view, on the basis of the authorities to which I have referred, are not conjunctive. The word "and", as it is used in section 197 regarding section 64 and subsection 68(4), means that an individual who meets the threshold is subject to both section 64 and subsection 68(4) of the IRPA. Satisfaction of the conditions of either provision will result in the cancellation of the stay and the termination of the appeal.
[48] In relation to Hyde, I note that while Mr. Hyde had been granted a stay and had committed an offence after the imposition of the stay, the offence was not one that met the standard mandated by subsection 68(4). Thus, it cannot be said that the case is directly on point. To the extent that I diverge from my colleague on the question of whether section 197 should be construed so that the references to section 64 and subsection 68(4) are conjunctive, I do so with the greatest of respect.
[49] In addition, my sense is, when regard is had to the object, text and context, the purpose of the reference to section 64 was to grandfather in those individuals who, under IRPA, could not have obtained a stay of deportation. Those individuals, having obtained a stay under the former Act, would be permitted to remain in Canada, but with a proviso. They remain only if they do not breach a condition of the stay. For those individuals, who under IRPA would not be entitled to a stay at all, the breach need not be one that satisfies the conditions of subsection 68(4).
[50] The present matter illustrates the absurdity that could result if an individual could be deported only if he or she satisfied the conditions of both section 64 and subsection 68(4). Habitual criminals who have amassed innumerable convictions could not be removed upon the commission of subsequent offences, that otherwise meet the requirements of subsection 68(4), merely because none of the convictions antecedent to the stay attracted a sentence of two years. Surely, this could not have been Parliament's intent.
[51] A further absurdity results from Mr. Carbonaro's submission that a foreign national would not lose a right of appeal to the IAD, if punished by a sentence of two years less a day, but a permanent resident of some 50 years would lose the right to continue an appeal despite never having been punished by such a sentence. The absurdity arises because the scenario fails to recognize that Mr. Carbonaro has had an appeal. Moreover, the same argument could be made in reverse by those to whom section 64 applies. Those individuals, because they were punished by a sentence of two years, lose the benefit of their stay by reoffending despite the fact that the offence may not be one punishable by a term of 10 years, or be an offence for which six months of imprisonment was imposed.
[52] Section 197 applies exclusively to those who have been granted a stay and have breached a condition of it. All those who meet the threshold will receive equitable treatment. That, as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada, does not dictate an equitable outcome: Medovarski (paragraph 17). Mr. Carbonaro, during his 50 years in Canada, has not been a model of integrity. The concerns that he has with respect to his deportation fall to be addressed by way of application under section 25 (humanitarian and compassionate grounds) or section 112 (pre-removal risk assessment) of the IRPA.
[53] The principles regarding the interpretation of bilingual statutes have been reviewed in Medovarski (paragraphs 23-30). There is no need to compare the wording of the provision in one official language with the wording in the other official language unless ambiguity exists. I do not find that the provision is ambiguous. However, I will briefly look at the manner in which the provision is expressed in each of the official languages. The French version of section 197 states, with respect to section 64, "Bla restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi" which I interpret to mean "where it would bar an appeal in the normal course". In relation to subsection 68(4), the French version "lui étant par ailleurs applicable" is equivalent to "it is otherwise applicable to the appellant". Section 197 does not envisage the application of subsection 68(4) being contingent on that of section 64. Thus, the comparison of the English and the French versions reinforces my view that the two provisions may operate separately within section 197.
[54] I note that my colleague Madam Justice Snider was confronted with the same "conjunctive" argument, in reverse, in Bautista v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2006 FC 30. I say "in reverse" because Mr. Bautista met the section 197 threshold and he came within the parameters of section 64, but not those of subsection 68(4). Justice Snider rejected the argument that it was necessary to satisfy the provisions of both section 64 and subsection 68(4). My colleague and I have arrived at the same conclusion, albeit by somewhat different paths.
[55] In the result, I find that Mr. Carbonaro has met the threshold of section 197 because he was granted a stay under the former Act and he has breached a condition of that stay by virtue of having committed another offence. That offence, by his own admission, falls within subsection 68(4). Thus, by operation of law, his stay was cancelled and his appeal was terminated.
[56] Before concluding, I wish to comment briefly on the decision of the IAD. I have set out the specific details of the tribunal's reasoning in paragraphs 13 through 17 of these reasons. Although the IAD did not have the benefit of the Singh decision, it approached the threshold question with respect to section 197 as Singh instructs. The tribunal's interpretation of section 197 of the IRPA as articulated in its analysis is accurate, with one exception.
[57] The IAD concluded that for section 197 and subsection 68(4) to be engaged, the conviction had to have occurred after the coming into force of the IRPA. That statement is not accurate because Singh determined otherwise. In all other respects, its interpretation of section 197 of the IRPA is, in my view, correct. Consequently, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.
[58] The applicant has requested that I certify the following question:
What is the correct interpretation of the words in section 197 of the IRPA "shall be subject to the provisions of section 64 and subsection 68(4) of the Act"?
[59] The respondent opposes certification and argues that the question has been determined by Medovarski and Singh. While I am of the same mind, the matter is not free from doubt. There exists conflicting jurisprudence from this Court. Therefore, I agree that certification of a question is appropriate, but not necessarily as framed by Mr. Carbonaro. To properly reflect the argument and disposition in this matter, I will certify the question, modified, as follows:
Where the section 197 threshold of the IRPA has been met, must the provisions of both section 64 and subsection 68(4) be satisfied to cancel the stay and terminate the appeal to the IAD?
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the application for judicial review is dismissed.
The following question is certified:
Where the section 197 threshold of the IRPA has been met, must the provisions of both section 64 and subsection 68(4) be satisfied to cancel the stay and terminate the appeal to the IAD?
SCHEDULE "A"
to the
Reasons for order dated January 31, 2006
in
ROMEO CARBONARO
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
IMM-8360-04
| Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
3. (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are ... (c) to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian economy, in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all regions of Canada; ... (h) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society; (i) to promote international justice and security by fostering respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to persons who are criminals or security risks; ...
25. (1) The Minister shall, upon request of a foreign national who is inadmissible or who does not meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on the Minister's own initiative, examine the circumstances concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign national permanent resident status or an exemption from any applicable criteria or obligation of this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian and compassionate considerations relating to them, taking into account the best interests of a child directly affected, or by public policy considerations. ...
36. (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for (a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed; (b) having been convicted of an offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or (c) committing an act outside Canada that is an offence in the place where it was committed and that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years. ...
44. (1) An officer who is of the opinion that a permanent resident or a foreign national who is in Canada is inadmissible may prepare a report setting out the relevant facts, which report shall be transmitted to the Minister.
64. (1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality. (2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least two years. ... 68. (4) If the Immigration Appeal Division has stayed a removal order against a permanent resident or a foreign national who was found inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality or criminality, and they are convicted of another offence referred to in subsection 36(1), the stay is cancelled by operation of law and the appeal is terminated.
112. (1) A person in Canada, other than a person referred to in subsection 115(1), may, in accordance with the regulations, apply to the Minister for protection if they are subject to a removal order that is in force or are named in a certificate described in subsection 77(1).
(2) Despite subsection (1), a person may not apply for protection if (a) they are the subject of an authority to proceed issued under section 15 of the Extradition Act; (b) they have made a claim to refugee protection that has been determined under paragraph 101(1)(e) to be ineligible; (c) in the case of a person who has not left Canada since the application for protection was rejected, the prescribed period has not expired; or (d) in the case of a person who has left Canada since the removal order came into force, less than six months have passed since they left Canada after their claim to refugee protection was determined to be ineligible, abandoned, withdrawn or rejected, or their application for protection was rejected.
(3) Refugee protection may not result from an application for protection if the person (a) is determined to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights or organized criminality; (b) is determined to be inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality with respect to a conviction in Canada punished by a term of imprisonment of at least two years or with respect to a conviction outside Canada for an offence that, if committed in Canada, would constitute an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; (c) made a claim to refugee protection that was rejected on the basis of section F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention; or (d) is named in a certificate referred to in subsection 77(1).
113. Consideration of an application for protection shall be as follows: ... (d) in the case of an applicant described in subsection 112(3), consideration shall be on the basis of the factors set out in section 97 and (i) in the case of an applicant for protection who is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality, whether they are a danger to the public in Canada, or (ii) in the case of any other applicant, whether the application should be refused because of the nature and severity of acts committed by the applicant or because of the danger that the applicant constitutes to the security of Canada.
114. (1) A decision to allow the application for protection has (a) in the case of an applicant not described in subsection 112(3), the effect of conferring refugee protection; and (b) in the case of an applicant described in subsection 112(3), the effect of staying the removal order with respect to a country or place in respect of which the applicant was determined to be in need of protection. ...
190. Every application, proceeding or matter under the former Act that is pending or in progress immediately before the coming into force of this section shall be governed by this Act on that coming into force. ...
192. If a notice of appeal has been filed with the Immigration Appeal Division immediately before the coming into force of this section, the appeal shall be continued under the former Act by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Board.
196. Despite section 192, an appeal made to the Immigration Appeal Division before the coming into force of this section shall be discontinued if the appellant has not been granted a stay under the former Act and the appeal could not have been made because of section 64 of this Act.
197. Despite section 192, if an appellant who has been granted a stay under the former Act breaches a condition of the stay, the appellant shall be subject to the provisions of section 64 and subsection 68(4) of this Act.
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2
27. (1) An immigration officer or a peace officer shall forward a written report to the Deputy Minister setting out the details of any information in the possession of the immigration officer or peace officer indicating that a permanent resident is a person who ... (d) has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament, other than an offence designated as a contravention under the Contraventions Act, for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been, or five years or more may be, imposed; ... (3) Subject to subsection (3.1) and any order or direction of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, on receiving a report pursuant to subsection (1) or (2), shall, if the Deputy Minister considers it appropriate to do so in the circumstances, forward a copy of that report to a senior immigration officer and may ... (b) in any case, direct that an inquiry be held. ... (6) A senior immigration officer shall cause an inquiry to be held concerning a person as soon as is reasonably practicable where the senior immigration officer receives a direction made pursuant to paragraph (3)(b).
29. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), an inquiry by an adjudicator shall be conducted in public, and shall be held in the presence of the person with respect to whom the inquiry is to be held wherever practicable, unless the person consents in writing to the inquiry being conducted without a hearing and in the person's absence. ...
30. Every person with respect to whom an inquiry is to be held shall be informed of the person's right to obtain the services of a barrister or solicitor or other counsel and to be represented by any such counsel at the inquiry and shall be given a reasonable opportunity, if the person so desires, to obtain such counsel at the person's own expense.
31. (1) An adjudicator shall give a decision as soon as possible after an inquiry has been completed. (2) Where the decision of an adjudicator results in the making of a removal order or conditional removal order against a person, the adjudicator shall inform the person of the basis on which the order was made.
32. (1) Where an adjudicator decides that a person who is the subject of an inquiry is a person described in subsection 14(1) or a person who has a right to remain in Canada, the adjudicator shall let that person come into Canada or remain in Canada, as the case may be. ...
70. (1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), where a removal order or conditional removal order is made against a permanent resident or against a person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident permit issued to that person pursuant to the regulations, that person may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds, namely, (a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact; and (b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada. ... (4) A person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made may appeal to the Appeal Division on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact, or mixed law and fact, where the person is (a) a person, other than a person described in subsection (5), with respect to whom a certificate referred to in subsection 40(1) has been issued; or (b) a person, other than a person described in subsection (3.1), who has been determined by an adjudicator to be a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(e), (f), (g), (j) or (l).
(5) No appeal may be made to the Appeal Division by a person described in subsection (1) or paragraph (2)(a) or (b) against whom a deportation order or conditional deportation order is made where the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a danger to the public in Canada and the person has been determined by an adjudicator to be (a) a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(c), (c.1), (c.2) or (d); (b) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(a.1); or (c) a person described in paragraph 27(1)(d) who has been convicted of an offence under any Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more may be imposed.
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Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés, L.C. 2001, ch. 27
3. (1) En matière d'immigration, la présente loi a pour objet : [...] c) de favoriser le développement économique et la prospérité du Canada et de faire en sorte que toutes les régions puissent bénéficier des avantages économiques découlant de l'immigration; [...] h) de protéger la santé des Canadiens et de garantir leur sécurité; i) de promouvoir, à l'échelle internationale, la justice et la sécurité par le respect des droits de la personne et l'interdiction de territoire aux personnes qui sont des criminels ou constituent un danger pour la sécurité; [...]
25. (1) Le ministre doit, sur demande d'un étranger interdit de territoire ou qui ne se conforme pas à la présente loi, et peut, de sa propre initiative, étudier le cas de cet étranger et peut lui octroyer le statut de résident permanent ou lever tout ou partie des critères et obligations applicables, s'il estime que des circonstances d'ordre humanitaire relatives à l'étranger - compte tenu de l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant directement touché - ou l'intérêt public le justifient. [...]
36. (1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité les faits suivants : a) être déclaré coupable au Canada d'une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans ou d'une infraction à une loi fédérale pour laquelle un emprisonnement de plus de six mois est infligé; b) être déclaré coupable, à l'extérieur du Canada, d'une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans; c) commettre, à l'extérieur du Canada, une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans. [...]
44. (1) S'il estime que le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui se trouve au Canada est interdit de territoire, l'agent peut établir un rapport circonstancié, qu'il transmet au ministre.
64. (1) L'appel ne peut être interjeté par le résident permanent ou l'étranger qui est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux, grande criminalité ou criminalité organisée, ni par dans le cas de l'étranger, son répondant. (2) L'interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité vise l'infraction punie au Canada par un emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans. [...]
68. (4) Le sursis de la mesure de renvoi pour interdiction de territoire pour grande criminalité ou criminalité est révoqué de plein droit si le résident permanent ou l'étranger est reconnu coupable d'une autre infraction mentionnée au paragraphe 36(1), l'appel étant dès lors classé.
112. (1) La personne se trouvant au Canada et qui n'est pas visée au paragraphe 115(1) peut, conformément aux règlements, demander la protection au ministre si elle est visée par une mesure de renvoi ayant pris effet ou nommée au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1).
(2) Elle n'est pas admise à demander la protection dans les cas suivants : a) elle est visée par un arrêté introductif d'instance pris au titre de l'article 15 de la Loi sur l'extradition; b) sa demande d'asile a été jugée irrecevable au titre de l'alinéa 101(1)e); c) si elle n'a pas quitté le Canada après le rejet de sa demande de protection, le délai prévu par règlement n'a pas expiré; d) dans le cas contraire, six mois ne se sont pas écoulés depuis son départ consécutif soit au rejet de sa demande d'asile ou de protection, soit à un prononcé d'irrecevabilité, de désistement ou de retrait de sa demande d'asile.
(3) L'asile ne peut être conféré au demandeur dans les cas suivants : a) il est interdit de territoire pour raison de sécurité ou pour atteinte aux droits humains ou internationaux ou criminalité organisée; b) il est interdit de territoire pour grande criminalité pour déclaration de culpabilité au Canada punie par un emprisonnement d'au moins deux ans ou pour toute déclaration de culpabilité à l'extérieur du Canada pour une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une infraction à une loi fédérale punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal d'au moins dix ans; c) il a été débouté de sa demande d'asile au titre de la section F de l'article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés; d) il est nommé au certificat visé au paragraphe 77(1).
113. Il est disposé de la demande comme il suit : [...] d) s'agissant du demandeur visé au paragraphe 112(3), sur la base des éléments mentionnés à l'article 97 et, d'autre part : (i) soit du fait que le demandeur interdit de territoire pour grande criminalité constitue un danger pour le public au Canada, (ii) soit, dans le cas de tout autre demandeur, du fait que la demande devrait être rejetée en raison de la nature et de la gravité de ses actes passés ou du danger qu'il constitue pour la sécurité du Canada.
114. (1) La décision accordant la demande de protection a pour effet de conférer l'asile au demandeur; toutefois, elle a pour effet, s'agissant de celui visé au paragraphe 112(3), de surseoir, pour le pays ou le lieu en cause, à la mesure de renvoi le visant. [...]
190. La présente loi s'applique, dès l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, aux demandes et procédures présentées ou instruites, ainsi qu'aux autres questions soulevées, dans le cadre de l'ancienne loi avant son entrée en vigueur et pour lesquelles aucune décision n'a été prise. [...]
192. S'il y a eu dépôt d'une demande d'appel à la Section d'appel de l'immigration, à l'entrée en vigueur du présent article, l'appel est continué sous le régime de l'ancienne loi, par la Section d'appel de l'immigration de la Commission.
196. Malgré l'article 192, il est mis fin à l'affaire portée en appel devant la Section d'appel de l'immigration si l'intéressé est, alors qu'il ne fait pas l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi, visé par la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi.
197. Malgré l'article 192, l'intéressé qui fait l'objet d'un sursis au titre de l'ancienne loi et qui n'a pas respecté les conditions du sursis, est assujetti à la restriction du droit d'appel prévue par l'article 64 de la présente loi, le paragraphe 68(4) lui étant par ailleurs applicable.
Loi sur l'immigration, L.R.C. 1985, ch. I-2
27.(1) L'agent d'immigration ou l'agent de la paix doit faire part au sous- ministre, dans un rapport écrit et circonstancié, de renseignements concernant un résident permanent et indiquant que celui-ci, selon le cas [...] d) a été déclaré coupable d'une infraction prévue par une loi fédéra le, autre qu'une infraction qualifiée de contravention en vertu de la Loi sur les contraventions : (i) soit pour laquelle une peine d'emprisonnement de plus de six mois a été imposée, (ii) soit qui peut être punissable d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à cinq ans; [...] (3) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3.1) et des arrêtés ou instructions du ministre, le sous-ministre, s'il l'estime justifié dans les circonstances, transmet à un agent principal un exemplaire du rapport visé aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) et : [...] b) dans tous les cas, le sous-ministre peut ordonner à l'agent principal de faire tenir une enquête. [...] (6) L'agent principal est tenu de faire procéder à une enquête, dès que les circonstances le permettent, lorsqu'il en reçoit l'ordre conformément à l'alinéa (3)b).
29. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (2) et (3), l'arbitre mène l'enquête en public et, dans la mesure du possible, en présence de l'intéressé, sauf si celui-ci consent par écrit à ce que l'enquête se tienne sans audition et en son absence. [...]
30. L'intéressé doit être informé qu'il a le droit de se faire représenter par un avocat ou un autre conseiller et se voir accorder la possibilité de le choisir, à ses frais.
31. (1) L'arbitre rend sa décision le plus tôt possible après la fin de l'enquête. (2) L'arbitre informe l'intéressé des motifs de la mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel qu'il prend à son endroit.
32. (1) S'il conclut que l'intéressé se trouve dans l'une des situations visées au paragraphe 14(1) ou a le droit de demeurer au Canada, l'arbitre le laisse entrer ou demeurer au Canada. [...]
70. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), les résidents permanents et les titulaires de permis de retour en cours de validité et conformes aux règlements peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel d'une mesure de renvoi ou de renvoi conditionnel en invoquant les moyens suivants : a) question de droit, de fait ou mixte; b) le fait que, eu égard aux circonstances particulières de l'espèce, ils ne devraient pas être renvoyés du Canada. [...]
(4) Les moyens d'appel sont limités aux questions de droit, de fait ou mixtes dans le cas d'appels relatifs à une mesure d'expulsion ou d'expulsion conditionnelle interjetés par les personnes, visées au paragraphe (1) ou aux alinéas (2)a) ou b), qui, selon le cas : a) ont fait l'objet de l'attestation prévue au paragraphe 40(1), sauf si elles sont visées au paragraphe (5); b) appartiennent, selon la décision d'un arbitre, à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)e), f), g), j) ou l), sauf si elles sont visées au paragraphe (3.1).
(5) Ne peuvent faire appel devant la section d'appel les personnes, visées au paragraphe (1) ou aux alinéas (2)a) ou b), qui, selon la décision d'un arbitre : a) appartiennent à l'une des catégories non admissibles visées aux alinéas 19(1)c), c.1), c.2) ou d) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada; b) relèvent du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)a.1) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada; c) relèvent, pour toute infraction punissable aux termes d'une loi fédérale d'un emprisonnement maximal égal ou supérieur à dix ans, du cas visé à l'alinéa 27(1)d) et, selon le ministre, constituent un danger pour le public au Canada. |
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-8360-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: ROMEO CARBONARO
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: October 11, 2005
Further Submissions: November 7, 21, 2005
January 16, 2006
REASONS FOR ORDER AND: LAYDEN-STEVENSON J.
ORDER
APPEARANCES:
| Linda Martschenko
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| Marianne Zoric |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Linda Martschenko Barrister and Solicitor Windsor, Ontario
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| John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada |