Date: 20041108
Docket: T-650-03
Ottawa, Ontario, November 8, 2004
Present: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE LAYDEN-STEVENSON
BETWEEN:
ROBERT WAYNE VELEY
Applicant
and
MICHAEL PROVAN in his capacity
as Warden of Fenbrook Institution
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] These reasons are released concurrently with the reasons in Christopher Leach, 2004 FC 1570, a companion case. The disposition is the same and for the same reasons. The facts are similar but not identical. Both matters relate to involuntary transfers from one correctional institution to another and involve decisions requiring inmates to attend for sexual assessment and potentially - depending on the results of the assessment - sexual treatment. Both matters revolve around provisions in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (CCRA), the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620 (the Regulations), the Standard Operating Practices 700-04 (SOP) as well as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).
FACTS
[2] Distilled, the facts are that Mr. Veley is serving a life sentence after being convicted of the second degree murder of a prostitute. Mr. Veley had engaged the woman's services, struck her several times in the head with a tire iron, and threw her naked body out of his vehicle. The victim subsequently died of exposure. Mr. Veley had previously been charged with the sexual assault of an ex-girlfriend. The Crown withdrew the sexual assault charge after Mr. Veley was convicted of murder.
[3] Upon admission to a federal institution, Mr. Veley, like all inmates, went through an assessment process. A correctional plan was completed for him in which it was stated that he "may have issues with his attitude towards sexuality".
[4] In June, 1999, Mr. Veley - at his request - was transferred to Fenbrook Institution. The transfer was granted because, at the time, he had a rating of low for institutional adjustment. He subsequently requested a transfer to Beaver Creek Institution, a minimum security facility. To be transferred to Beaver Creek, his offender security level had to be reduced from medium to minimum.
[5] On August 23, 2001, the Acting Warden of Fenbrook refused to reduce Mr. Veley's security level. The official stated that there was a contradiction between the recommendations of the case management team and the unit management board regarding the reduction of the security level. The unit management board identified potential "unaddressed issues of a sexual nature" and, until this was clarified, an assessment of moderate public safety risk rating was appropriate. This resulted in an offender security level of medium and Mr. Veley's transfer to Beaver Creek Institution was therefore denied.
[6] To address the potential "issues of a sexual nature", Mr. Veley was transferred to the regional treatment centre in Ontario for a sex offender assessment pursuant to the SOP. Mr. Veley originally signed a consent to participate in the assessment but, after he was transferred, he refused to participate. He was returned to Fenbrook Institution on March 14, 2002.
[7] The case management officer completed a correctional plan progress report for Mr. Veley after his return to Fenbrook. Based on Mr. Veley's continued refusal to participate in the sex offender assessment, and on his displayed behaviour on the issue - rigid thinking, intimidation, aggression, defensiveness and extreme stubbornness - Mr. Veley was considered an untreated sex offender. His institutional adjustment rating was increased from low to moderate with the result that he no longer met the conditions for remaining at Fenbrook. An involuntary transfer to Joyceville Institution was recommended.
[8] Mr. Veley was given a notice of involuntary transfer on May 29, 2002. The notice stressed the importance of assessing the degree of sexual offending for the purposes of developing a successful reintegration plan. Mr. Veley rebutted the transfer.
[9] On June 3, 2002, after considering the rebuttal, the Acting Warden of Fenbrook Institution approved Mr. Veley's involuntary transfer to Joyceville. The approval was based on the ground that Mr. Veley no longer met the security level required to remain at Fenbrook due to his status as an untreated sex offender. Mr. Veley was notified that the transfer decision could be appealed to the second level of the inmate grievance procedure but no appeal was taken.
[10] After applying for and obtaining an extension of time from the Federal Court, Mr. Veley filed an application and an amended application for judicial review seeking review of the involuntary transfer decision and the decision that Mr. Veley undergo sexual behaviour assessment and, possibly, treatment. The grounds relied upon for the requested relief in the amended application are as follows:
1. The decision maker breached the duty to act fairly in that it used allegations and inferences of sexual abuse rather than evidence. The allegations and inferences have never been tested in a Court of law and the applicant had no way to rebut other than make a mere denial.
2. The decision maker erred in law and breached the applicant's rights under section 7, 9, 11(d) and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by inferring the applicant's guilt of a criminal offence for which he has never been tried or convicted and in presuming the applicant guilty of a criminal offence for which he has never been tried or convicted and requiring specialized sex offender assessment and treatment.
3. The decision maker based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made or accepted in a perverse or capricious manner and without regard for the material before it.
4. The decision maker acted on false evidence that for the purposes for which it was used was the equivalent of perjured evidence.
5. Such further and other grounds as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court permit.
[11] Subsequently, Mr. Veley filed a Notice of Constitutional Question pursuant to section 57 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as am. Among other things, he provided notice of his intention "to question the constitutional validity, applicability or effect of paragraph 37 of the Standard Operating Procedure 700-04 of the Correctional Service of Canada and in particular the words 'whether or not the latter resulted in conviction'". Regarding remedy, he stated that he "seeks a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter striking out words of SOP 700-04 quoted above and declaring that the Applicant's transfer was made not in accordance with Canadian law". The Notice was directed to the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorneys General of each of the provinces and territories.
[12] Before the hearing, registry, at my request, provided counsel for both parties with my direction that counsel be prepared to address the principles delineated in Giesbrecht v. Canada (1998), 148 F.T.R. 81, 10 Admin. L.R. (3d) 246 (F.C.T.D.) (Giesbrecht); Condo v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 239 F.T.R. 158, 301 N.R. 355 (F.C.A.) (Condo); and Anderson v. Canada (Operations Officer, Fourth Maritime Operations Group) (1996), 141 D.L.R. (4th) 54, 205 N.R. 350 (F.C.A.) (Anderson). Anderson stands for the proposition that judicial review will not be granted if there is an adequate alternative remedy that has not been exhausted. Giesbrecht applies Anderson in the corrections context and specifically to circumstances involving the involuntary transfer of an inmate. Mr. Justice Rothstein, then of the trial division, determined that it is premature to launch an application for judicial review before the grievance process provided for in the CCRA and Regulations is exhausted. Judicial review is only appropriate after a final decision is rendered in the grievance process. Condo confirms the principles articulated in Giesbrecht.
[13] At the hearing, I first heard argument with respect to whether judicial review was available to Mr. Veley given that he had not exhausted the grievance process provided for in the CCRA and the Regulations. I reserved my decision and also heard the submissions relative to the judicial review application in the event that I should determine that judicial review is available to Mr. Veley. I have determined that it is not.
THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[14] The grievance process is governed by sections 90 and 91 of the CCRA. Those provisions are set out below. The procedure set out in the Regulations is detailed and the provisions in that regard are attached to these reasons as Schedule "A". For ease of reference, paragraph 37 of the SOP and section 24 of the Charter are also reproduced below.
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Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c.20
90. There shall be a procedure for fairly and expeditiously resolving offenders' grievances on matters within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, and the procedure shall operate in accordance with the regulations made under paragraph 96(u). 91. Every offender shall have complete access to the offender grievance procedure without negative consequences.
Standard Operating Practices (SOPs) 700-04- Issued under the authority of the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada 2003-08-29
37 The following offenders shall be referred for specialized sex offender assessment:
* Offenders whose current offence is a sexual offence; * Offenders who have a history of sexual offences; * Offenders whose current or past offences involved sexual offences, whether or not the latter resulted in conviction.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II no. 44](the Charter)
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. |
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Loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition, L.C. 1992, ch. 20
90. Est établie, conformément aux règlements d'application de l'alinéa 96u), une procédure de règlement juste et expéditif des griefs des délinquants sur des questions relevant du commissaire. 91. Tout délinquant doit, sans crainte de représailles, avoir libre accès à la procédure de règlement des griefs.
Instructions permanentes (IP) (700-04) Publiées en vertu de l'autorité de la commissaire du Service correctionnel du Canada 2003-08-29
37 Les délinquants sexuels suivants doivent y être aiguillés pour y subir une évaluation :
* Les délinquants qui purgent actuellement une peine pour une infraction sexuelle; * Les délinquants qui ont des antécédents d'infractions sexuelles; * Les délinquants dont l'infraction à l'origine de la peine actuelle ou les antécédents criminels comportent des infractions sexuelles, que ces infractions aient donné lieu à des condamnations ou non.
Annexe B de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, partie I, Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, ch. 11 (R.-U) [L.R.C., 1985, Appendice II n ° 44](la Charte)
24. (1) Toute personne, victime de violation ou de négation des droits ou libertés qui lui sont garantis par la présente charte, peut s'adresser à un tribunal compétent pour obtenir la réparation que le tribunal estime convenable et juste eu égard aux circonstances.
(2) Lorsque, dans une instance visée au paragraphe (1), le tribunal a conclu que des éléments de preuve ont été obtenus dans des conditions qui portent atteinte aux droits ou libertés garantis par la présente charte, ces éléments de preuve sont écartés s'il est établi, eu égard aux circonstances, que leur utilisation est susceptible de déconsidérer l'administration de la justice. |
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THE ARGUMENT
[15] The respondent, predictably, argues that the principles enunciated in Giesbrecht, Condo and Anderson apply and that I should find that the application for judicial review is premature. The respondent maintains that an applicant should not be permitted to "bypass the process and short track the case and come to the court".
[16] The applicant had some difficulty addressing the issue of adequate alternative remedy without straying into the merits. In essence, Mr. Veley argues that the application should not be dismissed on the basis of adequate alternative remedy. In his view, the matter is not just a case of a simple transfer. Mr. Veley wants to look head on at what is a breach of his constitutional rights. He submits that while it is correct to say that the grievance procedure is available to challenge the transfer, the third level grievance decision maker - the Commissioner - is not a court of competent jurisdiction. In this respect, Mr. Veley refers to and relies on Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75 wherein it was determined that the National Parole Board, not being a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of subsection 24(1) of the Charter, could not grant a remedy under subsection 24(2). From there, he asserts that constitutional remedies are not available under the grievance process and therefore the grievance process does not provide him with an adequate alternative remedy.
[17] Mr. Veley refers to De Luca v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 231 F.T.R. 8 (T.D.) and contends that it is a breach of the Charter to treat an inmate as if he has been convicted when he has never been convicted. He further asserts that in Coscia v. Canada (Attorney General) 2004 FC 1004, the reasoning in De Luca was expanded and it is specifically stated [in Coscia] that the reasoning is not confined to the facts that existed in De Luca.
[18] The applicant submits that he is a "lifer" and will be on supervision for the remainder of his life. He was convicted of homicide with respect to a female, but had no prior sexual conviction. While not challenging any aspect of the legislative provisions that enable the National Parole Board to have regard to his refusal to undergo sexual assessment, the question today, he says, is whether it is constitutional to empower CSC to force inmates into assessment and treatment. If so, it must be accomplished by legislative provisions rather than by operating directives. This constitutional issue cannot be addressed by the grievance procedure because it would become unwieldy. There is no requirement for representation by counsel and the inmates have limited education and skill. Moreover, asks Mr. Veley, who in CSC could say that the SOP is not constitutional?
[19] The bottom line, according to Mr. Veley, is that these things have to be challenged. When the case is clear and the SOP is the basis of an involuntary transfer, it must be examined. Yes, the Commissioner could reverse the decision but there is a constitutional wrong here that must be remedied. It is clear that paragraph 37 has been applied. Mr. Veley says that he has stepped forward and advanced a constitutional case that should be decided by the court.
ANALYSIS
[20] At the outset, I refer to my comments in Worthington v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2004 FC 1546 at paragraph 24:
The mere existence of a constitutional question does not mean that the court is obliged to determine it. It is an established practice in Canadian law that, if a judge can decide a case without dealing with a constitutional issue, he or she should do so: R.J. Sharpe, K.E. Swinton and K. Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at p. 97 [...]
[21] It is important not to lose sight of the substance of Mr. Veley's request. It is the involuntary transfer, apparently based on his refusal to undergo sexual assessment, that is in issue. That decision is attacked on the basis of various alleged Charter breaches although, during the hearing, the argument centred only on section 9. In my view, the remedy sought under subsection 24(1) constitutes a proposed method for addressing the ills that, according to Mr. Veley, exist.
[22] The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada reveals a consistent tendency to lean toward judicial deference for the arbitration and grievance processes and correlative restrictions on the rights of parties to proceed with parallel or overlapping litigation in the courts. Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 and Martin v. Workers' Compensation Board of Nova Scotia and Attorney General of Nova Scotia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 are but two examples.
[23] I do not find that the De Luca and Coscia decisions assist Mr. Veley. Both concern decisions of the Appeal Division of the National Parole Board. De Luca involved an issue of statutory interpretation and contravention of a specific section of the CCRA. In Coscia, the court's concern was that a term, susceptible of different meanings, was being used without any indication to the inmate as to its meaning. Both dealt with situations where an inmate was about to be released. Here, at the end of the day, the concern is the involuntary transfer including the reasons underlying it.
[24] The involuntary transfer of an inmate has consistently been determined by the jurisprudence of this court to be an administrative decision: Acorn v. Canada (Attorney General) 2004 FC 1438 at para. 7. Moreover, an involuntary transfer has also been determined to be a decision that must be addressed by way of grievance and that process must be exhausted before an inmate seeks judicial review. While Mr. Veley may be correct - and I make no determination in this regard - that the Commissioner is not a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a remedy under subsection 24(1) of the Charter, that, in my opinion, does not relieve Mr. Veley of his obligation to exhaust the grievance process.
[25] It is open to him to assert his Charter rights within the grievance process. Indeed he did so at the first level of the grievance process (applicant's record, volume 2, tab S). Even if the Commissioner cannot formally declare that the words "unless the offender admits" be read in, or the words "whether convicted or not" be read out of paragraph 37 of the SOP, the Commissioner is competent, and indeed obliged, to entertain and determine any or all of the allegations of Charter breaches raised by Mr. Veley. If the impugned provision is determined to violate the Charter, the Commissioner is duty bound not to apply the provision: Weber, supra.
[26] In Froom v. Canada (Minister of Justice) 2004 FCA 352, the Federal Court of Appeal stated at paragraph 12:
It is well established that the Federal Court has the discretion to decline its judicial review jurisdiction if the applicant has available an adequate alternative remedy: Fast v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2001) 288 N.R. 8, (2001) 41 Admin. L.R. (3d) 200 (F.C.A.); Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui Indian Band, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3. In considering whether to decline jurisdiction, the test is whether the alternative remedy is adequate, not whether it is perfect [...]
[27] In Anderson, Mr. Justice Stone was not satisfied that the cost and stress of pursuing the complaint up the chain of command justified the court's interference with the grievance process. I am of the same mind regarding Mr. Veley's submission that the grievance process would become unwieldy due to the lack of a requirement for representation by counsel.
[28] In my view, the grievance process set out in the CCRA and the Regulations does afford an adequate alternative remedy. This is so because it is possible for Mr. Veley to address the substance of the alleged breaches of the Charter within that process. Potential success is available without resort to subsection 24(1) of the Charter. In other words, success is not solely dependent upon relief under subsection 24(1) and, judicial review from a final decision in the grievance process remains available to Mr. Veley.
[29] Consequently, the application for judicial review should be dismissed. I note that my colleague, Mr. Justice Mosley, recently arrived at the same conclusion in Patterson v. Bath Institute 2004 FC 1373. Counsel for the respondent has confirmed that Mr. Veley's grievance will be entertained on the issues raised in this application. In the exercise of my discretion, I decline to award costs.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT the application for judicial review is dismissed.
« Carolyn A. Layden-Stevenson »
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-66-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: ROBERT WAYNE VELEY
v.
MICHAEL PROVAN
in his capacity as Warden of
Fenbrook Institution
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO
DATE OF HEARING: OCTOBER 13, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER : The Honourable Madam Justice Layden-Stevenson
APPEARANCES:
MR.JOHN HILL FOR APPLICANT
MS.KATHERINE HUCAL FOR RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
MR.JOHN HILL FOR APPLICANT
Toronto, Ontario
MORRIS ROSENBERG FOR RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Toronto, Ontario
SCHEDULE "A"
to the
Reasons for order dated November 8, 2004
in
ROBERT WAYNE VELEY
and
MICHAEL PROVAN in his capacity
as Warden of Fenbrook Institution
T-650-03
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
| Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620
74. (1) Where an offender is dissatisfied with an action or a decision by a staff member, the offender may submit a written complaint, preferably in the form provided by the Service, to the supervisor of that staff member.
(2) Where a complaint is submitted pursuant to subsection (1), every effort shall be made by staff members and the offender to resolve the matter informally through discussion.
(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a supervisor shall review a complaint and give the offender a copy of the supervisor's decision as soon as practicable after the offender submits the complaint.
(4) A supervisor may refuse to review a complaint submitted pursuant to subsection (1) where, in the opinion of the supervisor, the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith.(5) Where a supervisor refuses to review a complaint pursuant to subsection (4), the supervisor shall give the offender a copy of the supervisor's decision, including the reasons for the decision, as soon as practicable after the offender submits the complaint.
75. Where a supervisor refuses to review a complaint pursuant to subsection 74(4) or where an offender is not satisfied with the decision of a supervisor referred to in subsection 74(3), the offender may submit a written grievance, preferably in the form provided by the Service, (a) to the institutional head or to the director of the parole district, as the case may be; or (b) where the institutional head or director is the subject of the grievance, to the head of the region.
76. (1) The institutional head, director of the parole district or head of the region, as the case may be, shall review a grievance to determine whether the subject-matter of the grievance falls within the jurisdiction of the Service.
(2) Where the subject-matter of a grievance does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Service, the person who is reviewing the grievance pursuant to subsection (1) shall advise the offender in writing and inform the offender of any other means of redress available.
77. (1) In the case of an inmate's grievance, where there is an inmate grievance committee in the penitentiary, the institutional head may refer the grievance to that committee.
(2) An inmate grievance committee shall submit its recommendations respecting an inmate's grievance to the institutional head as soon as practicable after the grievance is referred to the committee.
(3) The institutional head shall give the inmate a copy of the institutional head's decision as soon as practicable after receiving the recommendations of the inmate grievance committee.
78. The person who is reviewing a grievance pursuant to section 75 shall give the offender a copy of the person's decision as soon as practicable after the offender submits the grievance.
79. (1) Where the institutional head makes a decision respecting an inmate's grievance, the inmate may request that the institutional head refer the inmate's grievance to an outside review board, and the institutional head shall refer the grievance to an outside review board.
(2) The outside review board shall submit its recommendations to the institutional head as soon as practicable after the grievance is referred to the board.
(3) The institutional head shall give the inmate a copy of the institutional head's decision as soon as practicable after receiving the recommendations of the outside review board.
80. (1) Where an offender is not satisfied with a decision of the institutional head or director of the parole district respecting the offender's grievance, the offender may appeal the decision to the head of the region. (2) Where an offender is not satisfied with the decision of the head of the region respecting the offender's grievance, the offender may appeal the decision to the Commissioner.
(3) The head of the region or the Commissioner, as the case may be, shall give the offender a copy of the head of the region's or Commissioner's decision, including the reasons for the decision, as soon as practicable after the offender submits an appeal.
81. (1) Where an offender decides to pursue a legal remedy for the offender's complaint or grievance in addition to the complaint and grievance procedure referred to in these Regulations, the review of the complaint or grievance pursuant to these Regulations shall be deferred until a decision on the alternate remedy is rendered or the offender decides to abandon the alternate remedy.
(2) Where the review of a complaint or grievance is deferred pursuant to subsection (1), the person who is reviewing the complaint or grievance shall give the offender written notice of the decision to defer the review.
82. In reviewing an offender's complaint or grievance, the person reviewing the complaint or grievance shall take into consideration (a) any efforts made by staff members and the offender to resolve the complaint or grievance, and any recommendations resulting therefrom; (b) any recommendations made by an inmate grievance committee or outside review board; and (c) any decision made respecting an alternate remedy referred to in subsection 81(1).
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Règlement sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition DORS/92-620
74. (1) Lorsqu'il est insatisfait d'une action ou d'une décision de l'agent, le délinquant peut présenter une plainte au supérieur de cet agent, par écrit et de préférence sur une formule fournie par le Service.
(2) Les agents et le délinquant qui a présenté une plainte conformément au paragraphe (1) doivent prendre toutes les mesures utiles pour régler la question de façon informelle.
(3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), le supérieur doit examiner la plainte et fournir copie de sa décision au délinquant aussitôt que possible après que celui-ci a présenté sa plainte.
(4) Le supérieur peut refuser d'examiner une plainte présentée conformément au paragraphe (1) si, à son avis, la plainte est futile ou vexatoire ou n'est pas faite de bonne foi. (5) Lorsque, conformément au paragraphe (4), le supérieur refuse d'examiner une plainte, il doit fournir au délinquant une copie de sa décision motivée aussitôt que possible après que celui-ci a présenté sa plainte.
75. Lorsque, conformément au paragraphe 74(4), le supérieur refuse d'examiner la plainte ou que la décision visée au paragraphe 74(3) ne satisfait pas le délinquant, celui-ci peut présenter un grief, par écrit et de préférence sur une formule fournie par le Service : a) soit au directeur du pénitencier ou au directeur de district des libérations conditionnelles, selon le cas; b) soit, si c'est le directeur du pénitencier ou le directeur de district des libérations conditionnelles qui est mis en cause, au responsable de la région.
76. (1) Le directeur du pénitencier, le directeur de district des libérations conditionnelles ou le responsable de la région, selon le cas, doit examiner le grief afin de déterminer s'il relève de la compétence du Service.
(2) Lorsque le grief porte sur un sujet qui ne relève pas de la compétence du Service, la personne qui a examiné le grief conformément au paragraphe (1) doit en informer le délinquant par écrit et lui indiquer les autres recours possibles.
77. (1) Dans le cas d'un grief présenté par le détenu, lorsqu'il existe un comité d'examen des griefs des détenus dans le pénitencier, le directeur du pénitencier peut transmettre le grief à ce comité.
(2) Le comité d'examen des griefs des détenus doit présenter au directeur ses recommandations au sujet du grief du détenu aussitôt que possible après en avoir été saisi.
(3) Le directeur du pénitencier doit remettre au détenu une copie de sa décision aussitôt que possible après avoir reçu les recommandations du comité d'examen des griefs des détenus.
78. La personne qui examine un grief selon l'article 75 doit remettre copie de sa décision au délinquant aussitôt que possible après que le détenu a présenté le grief.
79. (1) Lorsque le directeur du pénitencier rend une décision concernant le grief du détenu, celui-ci peut demander que le directeur transmette son grief à un comité externe d'examen des griefs, et le directeur doit accéder à cette demande.
(2) Le comité externe d'examen des griefs doit présenter au directeur du pénitencier ses recommandations au sujet du grief du détenu aussitôt que possible après en avoir été saisi.
(3) Le directeur du pénitencier doit remettre au détenu une copie de sa décision aussitôt que possible après avoir reçu les recommandations du comité externe d'examen des griefs.
80. (1) Lorsque le délinquant est insatisfait de la décision rendue au sujet de son grief par le directeur du pénitencier ou par le directeur de district des libérations conditionnelles, il peut en appeler au responsable de la région.
(2) Lorsque le délinquant est insatisfait de la décision rendue au sujet de son grief par le responsable de la région, il peut en appeler au commissaire.
(3) Le responsable de la région ou le commissaire, selon le cas, doit transmettre au délinquant copie de sa décision motivée aussitôt que possible après que le délinquant a interjeté appel.
81. (1) Lorsque le délinquant décide de prendre un recours judiciaire concernant sa plainte ou son grief, en plus de présenter une plainte ou un grief selon la procédure prévue dans le présent règlement, l'examen de la plainte ou du grief conformément au présent règlement est suspendu jusqu'à ce qu'une décision ait été rendue dans le recours judiciaire ou que le détenu s'en désiste.
(2) Lorsque l'examen de la plainte ou au grief est suspendu conformément au paragraphe (1), la personne chargée de cet examen doit en informer le délinquant par écrit.
82. Lors de l'examen de la plainte ou du grief, la personne chargée de cet examen doit tenir compte : a) des mesures prises par les agents et le délinquant pour régler la question sur laquelle porte la plainte ou le grief et des recommandations en découlant; b) des recommandations faites par le comité d'examen des griefs des détenus et par le comité externe d'examen des griefs; c) de toute décision rendue dans le recours judiciaire visé au paragraphe 81(1). |