Date: 20030612
Docket: T-973-02
Citation: 2003 FCT 739
CALGARY, Alberta, Thursday, the 12th day of June, 2003.
Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KELEN
BETWEEN:
CANXPRESS LTD.
Applicant
and
JUDITH REAGAN
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision dated May 29, 2002 of an adjudicator appointed pursuant to section 242 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 (the "Code"). The adjudicator found that the applicant had unjustly dismissed the respondent and awarded damages in lieu of notice in the amount of $12,613.50 without the deduction of taxes. The applicant seeks to have the finding of unjust dismissal quashed, or alternatively have the matter returned to the adjudicator to recalculate the award, taking into account the respondent's mitigation of her loss and the applicant's obligation to withhold tax deductions.
FACTS
Background
[2] The respondent commenced employment with CanXpress on January 26, 1998 as a long-haul truck driver. During her employment, the respondent frequently reported real or imagined events that were unconnected to the delivery of her loads to dispatch staff at CanXpress, such as her belief that she was being followed and spied upon. Two CanXpress representatives, Ms. Rindi Velker and Mr. Garnet Lang, met with the respondent on October 20, 2000 to discuss concerns the company had about her behaviour. Following the meeting she was given a letter written by Mr. Lang warning her that her conduct would "no longer be tolerated" and if it continued her employment could suspended or terminated.
[3] No further incidents were reported until February 2001, at which time she complained of a "set-up" traffic jam. Over the next few months the respondent sent CanXpress several reports related to harassment and name calling she received from individuals while on the road. She also complained about unsolicited help from the shippers at some of CanXpress' customers when she was backing her truck into the dock.
[4] On October 18, 2001, while delivering a load to Westbank Packers, the respondent told an employee at Westbank that she did not require assistance while backing up her truck. She conveyed her opinion in a disagreeable manner and a written complaint was sent by Westbank Packers to the applicant. As a result of this incident, CanXpress wrote a "warning" letter to the respondent on October 19, 2001 stating that her aggressive behaviour and poor customer service attitude was unacceptable. Because the respondent was out on the road, this letter was not communicated to her until November 6, 2001.
[5] In the interim, the respondent was involved in another incident. On October 26, 2001 she responded aggressively when an employee at Chiquita Bananas attempted to assist her in guiding her truck into the dock. A supervisor at Chiquita complained to CanXpress and the decision was made to terminate her employment. A "termination letter" was written on November 2, 2001, but it was not delivered to the respondent until she met with Mr. Alvin Goh on November 6, 2001. Mr. Goh provided her with the "warning letter" and the "termination letter" and verbally informed her that her employment had been terminated. The applicant did not provide the letters to the respondent at an earlier date because she was on the road with one of its trucks and the applicant was afraid of what she might do if informed of her termination.
The Respondent's Complaint
[6] Shortly after her dismissal, the respondent filed a complaint under subsection 240(1) of the Code and requested that the complaint be put before an adjudicator. A hearing was held in Calgary on May 15, 2002, at which time the adjudicator heard oral testimony from the respondent and three representatives of the applicant. The respondent was represented at the hearing by two individuals from Community Court Services in Calgary. The applicant chose not to hire a lawyer and was represented at the hearing by Ms. Velker. During the hearing, the respondent testified that she had found a new job within ten days of her dismissal from CanXpress, but no further information on the nature or duration of her later employment was presented by either party and the adjudicator did not inquire further into the matter.
[7] Following the hearing, the adjudicator contacted the respondent seeking further information regarding her remuneration while at CanXpress. She supplied the needed information in the form of her T4s and pay stubs. The applicant claims it was unaware of the adjudicator's request and did not receive the information supplied by the applicant until after the adjudicator's decision was released. Except for a handwritten sheet on which the respondent totalled the remuneration she received during her tenure at CanXpress, all of the documents she supplied to the adjudicator were produced by CanXpress.
The Adjudicator's Decision
[8] In a decision dated May 29, 2002, the adjudicator found the respondent was unjustly dismissed. He dealt with respondent's problems with CanXpress' dispatch staff and her difficulties with the company's customers separately. With respect to October 20, 2000 warning letter and the respondent's difficulties with CanXpress' dispatch staff, he stated at page 3 of his reasons:
After the October 20th. letter . . . and subsequent meeting there is no evidence the Appellant was told her employment would be terminated for continually communicating her real or imagined personal experiences while driving. Although, these communications were no doubt frustrating and time consuming for CanXpress in my view they did not justify her termination on November 6, 2001. Maybe, a lesser sanction would have been warranted. Although, very little was said about the matter it seems that if these "external concerns" were caused by some emotional difficulties. CanXpress should have made a better attempt to assist her. However, I gather that at the time CanXpress was not equipped to deal with such employee problems.
[9] The adjudicator then turned to the incidents related to the respondent's poor customer service. He reviewed the incidents at Westbank Packers and Chiquita Bananas and concluded at pages 4-5:
Although, I regard the Westbank Packers and Chitquita affairs as serious lapses on the part of the Appellant they did not merit the immediate termination of her employment. Some lesser disciplinary measure may have been appropriate, such as suspension or probation. Until the meeting of November 6 I believe these affairs were never reviewed with the Appellant. I am of the belief the Westbank Packers and Chiquita affairs should have been the subject of specific warning and were not addressed by the earlier discussions around October, 200 relating to the "external concerns".
[10] He also addressed the CanXpress' guidelines for employee conduct at page 5 of his decision:
I appreciate that attached to the CanXpress Driver's Application for Employment dated January 22, 1998 signed by Ms. Reagan was a list of Canxpress [sic] Guidelines. One item of these guidelines states that: "if there are any disagreements and/or arguments with the customer, direct your comments and opinions to dispatch (i.e., DO NOT express your negative opinions and arguments to the customer)." The same guideline to the Driver's Application for Employment indicates that: "Any violations will not be tolerated - first offence - there will be written notice to the driver - second offence - will be laid off for two weeks - third offence - termination". The termination letter of November 2, 2001 is not consistent with these guidelines.
[11] The adjudicator concluded that as CanXpress did not adequately warn the respondent about her conduct, she was improperly dismissed and was entitled to reasonable compensation in lieu of reasonable notice. He stated that in light of the respondent's conduct, it was appropriate to award her damages rather than order her reinstatement. Damages owing to the respondent were calculated based on her gross earnings for 1999, 2000 and 2001. The adjudicator determinated that the respondent earned an average of $840.90 per week over three years and awarded her four weeks wages for each year of her 3_ years of employment at CanXpress for a total award of $12,613.50. The adjudicator closed by stating that it was his understanding that the money "should be paid without deduction of tax."
ISSUES
[12] The applicant has raised five issues in this application. I propose to deal with them in the following order.
13. Did the adjudicator err in finding that the respondent had been unjustly dismissed?
14. Did the adjudicator err in how he calculated damages owing to the respondent in lieu of notice?
15. Did the adjudicator err by disregarding evidence that the applicant had mitigated her damages?
16. Did the adjudicator breach the duty of procedural fairness by failing to notify the applicant of the new information provided by the respondent?
17. Did the adjudicator improperly disregard paragraph 153(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. c. 1 (5th Supp.) as amended, when he ordered that the damages should be paid without deducting income tax?
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
[13] The respondent's complaint was brought under subsection 240(1) of the Code, which states:
Complaint to inspector for unjust dismissal
240. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and 242(3.1), any person
(a) who has completed twelve consecutive months of continuous employment by an employer, and
(b) who is not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement,
may make a complaint in writing to an inspector if the employee has been dismissed and considers the dismissal to be unjust.
Plainte
240. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (2) et 242(3.1), toute personne qui se croit injustement congédiée peut déposer une plainte écrite auprès d'un inspecteur si_:
a) d'une part, elle travaille sans interruption depuis au moins douze mois pour le même employeur;
b) d'autre part, elle ne fait pas partie d'un groupe d'employés régis par une convention collective.
[14] At the request of the respondent, the complaint was referred to an adjudicator appointed under section 242 of the Code:
Reference to adjudicator
242. (1) The Minister may, on receipt of a report pursuant to subsection 241(3), appoint any person that the Minister considers appropriate as an adjudicator to hear and adjudicate on the complaint in respect of which the report was made, and refer the complaint to the adjudicator along with any statement provided pursuant to subsection 241(1).
Renvoi à un arbitre
242. (1) Sur réception du rapport visé au paragraphe 241(3), le ministre peut désigner en qualité d'arbitre la personne qu'il juge qualifiée pour entendre et trancher l'affaire et lui transmettre la plainte ainsi que l'éventuelle déclaration de l'employeur sur les motifs du congédiement.
Powers of adjudicator
(2) An adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred under subsection (1)
(a) shall consider the complaint within such time as the Governor in Council may by regulation prescribe;
(b) shall determine the procedure to be followed, but shall give full opportunity to the parties to the complaint to present evidence and make submissions to the adjudicator and shall consider the information relating to the complaint; and
(c) has, in relation to any complaint before the adjudicator, the powers conferred on the Canada Industrial Relations Board, in relation to any proceeding before the Board, under paragraphs 16(a), (b) and (c).
Pouvoirs de l'arbitre
(2) Pour l'examen du cas dont il est saisi, l'arbitre_:
a) dispose du délai fixé par règlement du gouverneur en conseil;
b) fixe lui-même sa procédure, sous réserve de la double obligation de donner à chaque partie toute possibilité de lui présenter des éléments de preuve et des observations, d'une part, et de tenir compte de l'information contenue dans le dossier, d'autre part;
c) est investi des pouvoirs conférés au Conseil canadien des relations industrielles par les alinéas 16a), b) et c).
Decision of adjudicator
(3) Subject to subsection (3.1), an adjudicator to
whom a complaint has been referred under subsection (1) shall
(a) consider whether the dismissal of the
person who made the complaint was unjust
and render a decision thereon; and
(b) send a copy of the decision with the
reasons therefor to each party to the
complaint and to the Minister.
Décision de l'arbitre
(3) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3.1), l'arbitre_:
a) décide si le congédiement était injuste;
b) transmet une copie de sa décision, motifs à l'appui, à chaque partie ainsi qu'au ministre.
Limitation on complaints
(3.1) No complaint shall be considered by an adjudicator under subsection (3) in respect of a person where
(a) that person has been laid off because of
lack of work or because of the
discontinuance of a function; or
(b) a procedure of redress has been
provided elsewhere in or under this or any
other Act of Parliament.
Restriction
(3.1) L'arbitre ne peut procéder à l'instruction de la plainte dans l'un ou l'autre des cas suivants_:
a) le plaignant a été licencié en raison du manque de travail ou de la suppression d'un poste;
b) la présente loi ou une autre loi fédérale prévoit un autre recours.
Where unjust dismissal
(4) Where an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly
dismissed, the adjudicator may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to
(a) pay the person compensation not
exceeding the amount of money that is
equivalent to the remuneration that would,
but for the dismissal, have been paid by the
employer to the person;
(b) reinstate the person in his employ; and
(c) do any other like thing that it is equitable
to require the employer to do in order to
remedy or counteract any consequence of
the dismissal.
Cas de congédiement injuste
(4) S'il décide que le congédiement était injuste,
larbitre peut, par ordonnance, enjoindre à
l'employer:
a) de payer au plaignant une indemnité
équivalant, au maximu, au salaire qu'il
aurait normalement gagné s'il n'avait pas été
congédié;
b) de réintégrer le plaignant dans son
emploi;
c) de prendre toute autre mesure qu'il juge
équitable de lui imposer et de nature à
contrebalancer les effets du congédiement ou
à y remédier.
[15] Also relevant is paragraph 151(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act:
Withholding
153. (1) Every person paying at any time in a taxation year
(a) salary, wages or other remuneration, other than amounts described in subsection 212(5.1),
shall deduct or withhold from the payment the amount determined in accordance with prescribed rules and shall, at the prescribed time, remit that amount to the Receiver General on account of the payee's tax for the year under this Part or Part XI.3, as the case may be, and, where at that prescribed time the person is a prescribed person, the remittance shall be made to the account of the Receiver General at a designated financial institution.
Retenue
153. (1) Toute personne qui verse au cours d'une année d'imposition l'un des montants suivants:
a) un traitement, un salaire ou autre rémunération, à l'exception des sommes visées au paragraphe 212(5.1);
doit en déduire ou en retenir la somme fixée selon les modalités réglementaires et doit, au moment fixé par règlement, remettre cette somme au receveur général au titre de l'impôt du bénéficiaire ou du dépositaire pour l'année en vertu de la présente partie ou de la partie XI.3. Toutefois, lorsque la personne est visée par règlement à ce moment, la somme est versée au compte du receveur général dans une institution financière désignée.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[16] Decisions made by an arbitrator under the Code are protected by a privative clause found in section 243 of the Code:
Decisions not to be reviewed by court
243. (1) Every order of an adjudicator appointed under subsection 242(1) is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court.
No review by certiorari, etc.
(2) No order shall be made, process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain an adjudicator in any proceedings of the adjudicator under section 242.
Caractère définitif des décisions
243. (1) Les ordonnances de l'arbitre désigné en vertu du paragraphe 242(1) sont définitives et non susceptibles de recours judiciaires.
Interdiction de recours extraordinaires
(2) Il n'est admis aucun recours ou décision judiciaire - notamment par voie d'injonction, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de quo warranto - visant à contester, réviser, empêcher ou limiter l'action d'un arbitre exercée dans le cadre de l'article 242.
[17] Taking into account this privative clause and the deference customarily awarded to labour tribunals by the courts, it is apparent that the appropriate standard of review in this case is patent unreasonableness. Where the alleged errors concern questions of law, relate to a breach of procedural fairness, or deal with the jurisdiction of an adjudicator, then the applicable standard of
review is correctness. With respect to the applicable standard of review, see the following cases: Canada Post Corp. v. Pollard (1993), 109 D.L.R. (4th) 272 at pp. 280-284 (F.C.A.); and Aziz v. Telesat Canada (1995), 104 F.T.R. 267 at paras. 14-19.
[18] A brief discussion is needed here to clarify what counts as a jurisdictional error. In its Memorandum the applicant implied that the determination of whether the respondent's dismissal was unjust is a jurisdictional question reviewable using the standard of correctness. I read the
relevant provisions of the Code differently. All that needs to be established for jurisdiction is that the complainant "considers the dismissal to be unjust." Whether the dismissal was in fact unjust is a question within the expertise and jurisdiction of the adjudicator under subsection 242(3) of the Code: Aziz, supra at paras. 20-26; Kahnawake Shakotiia'takehnhas Community Services v. Miller (1997), 126 F.T.R. 219 at para. 19; Poitras v. Kehewin Cree Nation (2000), 3 C.C.E.L. (3d) 115; and Gauthier v. Bank of Canada (2000), 191 F.T.R. 219 at para. 41.
ANALYSIS
1. Did the adjudicator err in finding that the respondent had been unjustly dismissed?
[19] The applicant contends that the adjudicator committed an error of law by concluding that the respondent was unjustly dismissed because the applicant failed to follow its own guidelines. In support of its position, the applicant has relied upon Pratte J.'s decision in Bell Canada v. Hallé (1989), 99 N.R. 149, 29 C.C.E.L. 213 (F.C.A.). At paragraph 10, he stated that an employee's dismissal "cannot be regarded as unjust solely because the applicant did not follow the dismissal procedure described in its internal directives to the letter." In the same paragraph,
he went on to state an adjudicator's duty is to "make a judgment on whether the dismissal procedure used by the employer, taken by itself, was fair or unfair regardless of the procedure described in the directives".
[20] I disagree with the applicant's reading of the adjudicator's decision. In his reasons, the adjudicator first evaluated whether the dismissal procedure used by the employer was fair or unfair taken by itself. His discussed the steps taken by CanXpress in response to the respondent's problems with the company's dispatch staff and its customers. In both cases, he first determinated that CanXpress acted unjustly by not first discussing these problems with the respondent. Following that, the adjudicator then turned to the company's guidelines. This was done in a manner that bolstered his early conclusions. He did not find the respondent had been unjustly dismissed "solely because" the applicant did not follow its guidelines.
[21] Furthermore, the adjudicator's finding that the applicant failed to take the necessary steps to properly dismiss the respondent was not patently unreasonable. There are no grounds upon which the Court can interfere with the finding of unjust dismissal in view of the privative clause.
2. Did the adjudicator err in how he calculated damages owing to the respondent in lieu of notice?
[22] After finding that the respondent had been unjustly dismissed, the adjudicator calculated the damages owing to her based on a reasonable notice period and the average weekly wage she received while for CanXpress. The applicant argues the adjudicator erred by not considering what would probably have happened had the applicant acted appropriately and once again relies on Pratte J.'s decision in Hallé, supra, in which he stated at paragraph 11:
In the case of an unjust dismissal the adjudicator . . . may order the employer to pay the employee the salary he would ordinarily have earned if he had not been dismissed. In setting the amount of this salary, therefore, the adjudicator must consider what the employee would ordinarily have earned if the unjust dismissal had not occurred. This is fairly easy when the employee was dismissed for no reason. It is much more difficult when the only complaint made against the employer is that he acted too quickly, without giving the employee a sufficient opportunity to correct his shortcomings. In that case the adjudicator cannot arbitrarily assume that the employee would have avoided the dismissal if the employer had acted without undue haste. He must determine, in light of the evidence, what would probably have happened if the employer had acted as he ought to have done. [Emphasis added.]
[23] The applicant argues that the situation in the case at bar is similar to that in Hallé. Its interpretation of the adjudicator's reasons is that he acknowledged there was sufficient cause to dismiss the respondent, but held that fault lay with the applicant only because it did not give her fair warning. This interpretation is based on the adjudicator's finding that the incidents at Westbank Packers and Chiquita Bananas were "serious lapses" by the applicant, and his finding that restatement of the applicant's employment was not appropriate.
[24] Once again I do not agree with the applicant's interpretation of the adjudicator's decision. The applicant has overlooked the adjudicator's statements that the incidents at Westbank Packers and Chiquita Bananas did not merit immediate termination of the respondent's employment and that a "lesser disciplinary measure may have been appropriate, such as suspension or probation." Nor do I interpret the adjudicator's decision not to reinstate the respondent's employment as indicating that dismissal would have been warranted had the warning letter been given to the respondent on time. Unlike Hallé, which Pratte J. characterized at paragraph 10 as a situation where "though premature, the dismissal was not entirely groundless", the adjudicator's findings here were not based solely on the applicant's failure to give proper warning. The adjudicator not only faulted the applicant for failing to follow the proper procedure, but also held that dismissing the respondent after the incidents in question was not warranted.
3. Did the adjudicator err by disregarding evidence that the applicant had mitigated her damages?
[25] The applicant submits the adjudicator erred by disregarding the respondent's testimony that she had obtained new employment shortly after her dismissal from CanXpress. A transcript of the adjudication was not available to the Court, but it appears that the respondent did inform the adjudicator that she had found a new job ten days after her dismissal. As was mentioned above, the matter was not pursued by either of the parties or the adjudicator. The respondent contends that the applicant had an onus to raise the issue during the hearing and as it did not do so, the adjudicator did not commit an error by not considering the respondent's new employment.
[26] At common law, an obligation clearly lies with the employer to prove that a former employee failed to make reasonable efforts to find replacement work: Red Deer College v. Michaels (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 386 at pp. 390-391 (S.C.C.). Obviously, this is not necessary where the employee has mitigated her loss by finding new employment.
[27] The adjudicator in the case at bar should have taken the issue into account even though it was not actively pursued by CanXpress at the hearing. An adjudicator appointed under the Code can play a far-more active role than a judge in court in defining the issues and gathering the
information necessary to make a proper determination. He or she is not limited to considering only the evidence tendered by the parties. This can be seen in paragraph 242(2)(b), which grants
the adjudicator the flexibility to set the procedure to be followed during an adjudication. Paragraph 242(2)(c) also grants an adjudicator the right to exercise certain powers conferred upon the Canada Industrial Relations Board, which includes the following power in subsection 16(a):
Powers of Board
16. The Board has, in relation to any proceeding before it, power
(a) to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce such documents and things as the Board deems requisite to the full investigation and consideration of any matter within its jurisdiction that is before the Board in the proceeding;
[Emphasis added.]
Pouvoirs du Conseil
16. Le Conseil peut, dans le cadre de toute affaire dont il connaît_:
a) convoquer des témoins et les contraindre à comparaître et à déposer sous serment, oralement ou par écrit, ainsi qu'à produire les documents et piècesqu'il estime nécessaires pour mener à bien ses enquêtes et examens sur les questions de sa compétence;
[28] The investigative role of an adjudicator is particularly important when, as was the case here, one of the parties involved does not have legal representation. The adjudicator had a responsibility to canvas the issue of mitigation in order to determine what amount of damages would be needed to appropriately compensate the respondent for her loss. There is no evidence on the record that he did so. It is necessary to return the matter to the adjudicator for a re-assessment of the damages owing to the respondent to deduct her net income earned subsequent to her dismissal during the 15 week notice period.
4. Did the adjudicator breach the duty of procedural fairness by failing to notify the applicant of the new information provided by the respondent?
[29] The applicant submits the adjudicator breached the duty of procedural fairness by relying upon remuneration information obtained from the respondent without allowing the applicant an opportunity to respond or provide additional information. The respondent replies by pointing out that all of the information that she provided was already in the possession of the applicant and that CanXpress has not suggested that the documents were false, misleading or inappropriate in any way.
[30] It is apparent that the adjudicator breached procedural fairness by not providing CanXpress with the information provided by the respondent. It is a basic principle of law that a decision-maker not rely upon evidence received from one party without giving the other an opportunity to properly respond: Kane v. Board of Governors (University of British Columbia), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1105 at page 1113. Since the applicant states that the information provided by the respondent was accurate, the error is immaterial with respect to the need for a new hearing.
5. Did the adjudicator improperly disregard paragraph 153(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act when he ordered that the damages should be paid without deducting income tax?
[31] The applicant argues the damage award payable to the respondent will be considered employment income under the Income Tax Act and that the adjudicator erred by disregarding its obligation under paragraph 153(1)(a) of the Act to deduct any taxable payable from the award. The respondent contends that the award will be treated as the equivalent as a Superior Court judgment and that CanXpress will not face any tax exposure from paying the award. She also points out that CanXpress has not produced a tax opinion from the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency on the matter to justify its position.
[32] It appears that adjudicators either allow employers to withhold the appropriate amounts of income tax from damage awards made under the Code (e.g. Mayea v. Pegasus Express Inc., [2000] C.L.A.D. No. 153 at para. 32 (C.L.A. Adj.) (QL) and Woodlock v. Transx Ltd., [2001] C.L.A.D. No. 210 at para. 38 (C.L.A. Adj.) (QL)) or order the employee to indemnify the employer for any tax liability incurred as a result of the payment (e.g. Taylor v. Tiger Trucking & Logistics Corp. (Re Maddeaux), [2000] C.L.A.D. No. 214 at para. 14 (C.L.A. Ref.) (QL)).
[33] Neither party addressed this issue before the adjudicator and he did not discuss his reasoning for ordering the money to be paid without deducting any applicable taxes in the decision. The Income Tax Act is clear, and the appropriate course is to have this matter returned to the adjudicator so that he can order that the income tax be deducted from the gross income.
ORDER
THIS COURT HEREBY ORDERS THAT:
This application for judicial review be dismissed with respect to issue of unjust dismissal with costs to the respondent, and allowed with respect to the proper calculation of damages. The matter will be returned to the adjudicator for a re-assessment of the damage award taking into account the respondent's mitigation of her damages and the proper withholding of tax
deductions.
"Michael A. Kelen" ________________________________
J.F.C.C.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-973-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: CANXPRESS LTD. v. JUDITH REAGAN
PLACE OF HEARING: CALGARY, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: June 11, 2003
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER : KELEN, J.
DATED: June 12, 2003
APPEARANCES:
Ms. Michelle L. Colley FOR APPLICANT
Mr. Thomas W. Buglas FOR RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Stones Fontaine Carbert
Calgary, Alberta FOR APPLICANT
Buglas Law Office
Calgary, Alberta FOR RESPONDENT
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
Date: 20030612
Docket: T-973-02
BETWEEN:
CANXPRESS LTD.
Applicant
- and -
JUDITH REAGAN
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER