Date: 19990922
Docket: IMM-3607-98
BETWEEN:
ARKADIY BYKOV
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
TEITELBAUM, J:
[1] On July 2, 1998, the Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) handed down a decision wherein the Board decided the applicant is not a Convention refugee.
[2] The applicant filed an application for leave and for judicial review of the Board"s decision. The application for leave was allowed.
[3] The facts, as found by the Board are:
| ...monsieur Arkadiy BYKOV. Citoyen russe, il allègue craindre la persécution en raison de sa nationalité tchouvache. |
| Le revendicateur aurait été l"objet de moqueries et d"insultes lors de son service militaire. Battu et privé de sa croix de chrétien orthodoxe, il aurait alors décidé de déserter l"armée en août 1991. Il se serait caché dans le nord de la Russie, puis serait revenu chez ses parents en janvier 1992. Il aurait payé 3 000 dollars au commissaire militaire local pour le couvrir. |
| Il a, par la suite, voyagé en Allemagne, en Belgique, aux Pays-Bas, au Luxembourg, en Italie et en Slovénie pour accompagner ses amis qui achetaient des voitures. |
| En juillet 1996, il obtient un visa américain. À la mi-décembre 1996, quatre militaires lui auraient exigé 5 000 dollars pour le laisser vivre en paix. Ne pouvant payer ce montant, il aurait été battu en janvier 1997. La même année, il voyage en Espagne. Fin février 1997, il aurait décidé de quitter la Russie. Il passe un mois et demi aux Pays-Bas, puis part pour les États-Unis avant de venir réclamer la protection du Canada. |
[4] The Board refused to accept the refugee claim of the applicant by reason of the fact that the applicant lacked credibility. The Board gave very detailed reasons for its belief as to why the applicant lacked credibility.
| Le témoignage du revendicateur manque de crédibilité. Cette absence de crédibilité touche autant à l"identité de ses présumés persécuteurs qu"à la crainte subjective du revendicateur. |
| En effet, lors de l"audience du 24 avril 1998, le revendicateur n"a pu établir à la satisfaction du tribunal l"identité de ses présumés persécuteurs dans l"armée. Il a parlé de " communistes du gouvernement et de personnes ", alors qu"en réponse à la question 37 de son Formulaire de renseignements personnels (FRP), il cite un capitaine et deux hommes qui l"auraient battu. |
| Confronté à cette imprécision, le revendicateur a jdéclaré qu"il ne pouvait pas " expliquer ça en russe ". Le tribunal croit que le revendicateur refuse de s"expliquer sur un point majeur de sa revendication et, de ce fait, il ne s"acquitte pas du fardeau de la preuve qui lui incombe. |
| La preuve documentaire au dossier montre que la situation des recrues dans l"armée russe est très dure. Dans le cas d"espèce, le revendicateur y a échappé en désertant. Il a, par la suite, vécu librement pendant plus de cinq ans dans son pays. Losqu"arrive l"incident de la mi-décembre 1996, où on lui exige de payer 5 000 $, il avait déjà un visa pour les États-Unis depuis quatre mois. |
| En s"appuyant sur le taux élevé de criminalité en Russie, tel que l"indique la preuve documentaire au dossier, le tribunal estime qu"il est raisonnable de croire que cet incident aurait pu être une tentative d"extorsion. |
[5] The Board, as well, is of the view that the applicant was unable to show a reasonable concern of persecution because of his nationality. The Board states:
| Par ailleurs, le tribunal ne croit pas que le revendicateur a une crainte raisonnable de persécution dans son pays de citoyenneté en raison de sa nationalité. Il est raisonnable de penser qu"il craindrait une poursuite judiciaire pour désertion. Cependant, il n"a pu produire devant le tribunal un exemplaire de la Loi d"application générale en vertu de laquelle il serait condamné pour désertion. |
| Le manque de crédibilité touche aussi à sa crainte subjective. En effet, alors que le revendicateur prétend être recherché pour désertion, plusieurs visas dans son passeport montrent qu"il est sorti du pays et a voyagé à l"étranger à plusieurs reprises et est rentré librement en Russie. |
| Le tribunal croit qu"une telle liberté de mouvement ne correspond pas au comportment d"une personne raisonnable, recherchée et craignant être interpellée à tout moment. En conséquence, le tribunal n"accorde aucune valeur probante à l"avis de recherche émis en date du 22 août 1994 par le Ministère de la Défense de l"URSS (sic) et présenté en preuve. |
| En outre, avant de venir au Canada le revendicateur est allé dans plusieurs pays signataires de la Convention, notamment l"Espagne, l"Allemagne, l"Italie, la Belgique, le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas non pas pour fuir des présumés persécuteurs, mais pour affaires. Bien plus, il a vécu un mois et demi aux Pays-Bas sans revendiquer le statut de réfugié. |
| Interrogé par le tribunal sur le défaut à revendiquer, il a déclaré qu"il comptait: " aller ailleurs ". Et à propos de son long séjour hollandais, il dit que: "les Tchouvaches lui ont conseillé d"aller seulement au Canada ". Le tribunal ne croit pas que la première préoccupation d"une personne présumée persécutée est de faire des affaires et de ne pas chercher la protection d"un pays susceptible d"entendre sa cause. |
| Le délai à quitter le pays est aussi, dans le cas d"espèce, un indice d"absence de crainte subjective. En effet, le revendicateur a reçu un visa américain en juillet 1996, il ne quitte la Russie que neuf mois plus tard. |
| Interrogé au sujet du délai à partir, il a déclaré qu"il: " restait chez lui à la maison croyant que tout allait s"arranger ". Le tribunal croit que cette attitude n"est pas raisonnablement celle d"une personne craignant d"être arrêtée par les représentants d"une armée qui l"aurait persécuté. |
| À l"imprécision sur un aspect fondamental du témoignage s"ajoute l"absence de crainte subjective (sortie et retour volontaire dans le pays présumé de persécution, défaut de revendiquer dans plusieurs pays signataires de la Convention et délai à quitter le pays de persécution). |
[6] It is trite law that the issue of credibility rests to be decided with the Board and unless the Board"s decision on credibility is unreasonable, the Court should not interfere.
[7] The main submission, the only submission of any merit made by counsel for the applicant is one relating to the use of an interpreter who was unable to translate from French to Tchouvache, which, according to the applicant is his "nationalité, groupe ethnique ou tribu" (box 9, page 9, Tribunal Record). As is stated, the applicant is a Russian citizen. On page 11 of the applicant"s Personal Information Form (PIF), box 40, to the question "Avez-vous besoin des services d"un interprète dans vos démarches auprès de la section du status de refuge? ", the applicant said yes and he asks for an interpreter in "Russe (Tchouvache).
[8] It is most important to note that the interpreter who translated the French PIF, found on pages 8 to 19 of the Tribunal Record, translated same from French to Russian and not from French to Tchouvache (see page 19 of Tribunal Record).
[9] In her written submissions, counsel for the applicant sets out the following as the issues to be determined in the present judicial review:
| Au soutien de notre demande de contrôle judiciaire, nous soumettons les deux motifs suivants: |
| (1) La décision sur le manque de crédibilité est injuste puisque le tribunal a refusé de fournir un interprète tchouvache au demandeur. |
| (2) Le tribunal n"avait pas raison de miner la crédibilité en raison du fait que le demandeur a voyagé pour affaires à plusieurs reprises à l"extérieur de son pays pour ensuite y revenir. |
[10] With regard to the second issue. I am satisfied that there is no merit to same. It is obvious from a reading of the decision of the Board that its conclusion is most reasonable. The evidence before the Board was that the applicant, without any fear, was able to travel freely to Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy and to Slovenia. Surely, it is reasonable for the Board to conclude that if the applicant was able to travel to all of the above countries and to return to Russia, there is no basis to believe that the applicant has an objective and subjective fear of persecution in Russia.
[11] With regard to the issue of the Tchouvache interpreter, counsel for the applicant submits that because the Board refused to provide a Tchouvache interpreter, the applicant was unable to properly express himself and was thus unable to properly explain why he has both a subjective and objective fear of persecution.
[12] What are the obligations of the Board to provide an interpreter? In the case of Quoc Dung Tran v. Her Majesty the Queen [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, involving a criminal matter, it is stated at pages 952 and 953 under the title Held:
| The right of an accused who does not understand or speak the language of the proceedings to obtain the assistance of an interpreter ensures that a person charged with a criminal offence hears the case against him or her and is given a full opportunity to answer it. This right is also intimately related to our basic notions of justice, including the appearance of fairness, and to our society"s claim to be multicultural, expressed in part through s. 27 of the Charter . The magnitude of these interests favours a purposive and liberal interpretation and a principled application of the right to interpreter assistance under s. 14 of the Charter. The principle underlying all of the interests protected by the right to interpreter assistance under s. 14 is that of linguistic understanding. |
| In determining whether there has in fact been a breach of s. 14, it must be clear that the accused did not understand or speak the language being used in court and was thus actually in need of interpreter assistance. Where an interpreter was appointed and it is the quality of the interpretation provided that is being challenged, it is necessary to determine whether there has been a departure or deviation from what is considered adequate interpretation. While the interpretation provided need not be perfect, it must be continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous. The question should always be whether there is a possibility that the accused may not have understood a part of the proceedings by virtue of his or her difficulty with the language being used in court. No every deviation from the protected standard of interpretation will constitute a violation of s. 14 of the Charter: the claimant of the right must establish that the lapse in interpretation was in respect of the proceedings themselves, thereby involving the vital interests of the accused, and was not merely in respect of some collateral or extrinsic matter. In determining whether the alleged deviation in interpretation was part of an occurrence which actually served in some way to "advance the case", one must consider whether there was an unfolding or development in the proceeding with respect to a point of procedure, evid3ence and/or law. Since s. 14 guarantees the right to interpreter assistance without qualification, it would be wrong to introduce into the assessment of whether the right has been beached any consideration of whether or not the accused actually suffered prejudice when being denied his or s. 14 rights. The Charter in effect proclaims that being denied proper interpretation while the case is being advanced is in itself prejudicial and is a violation of s. 14. |
[13] It must always be understood that what the Supreme Court states in the Tran case specifically speaks of interpreter services relating to criminal cases. On page 961 of the decision, Chief Justice Lamer states:
| At the outset, I would like to make it very clear that the discussion of s. 14 of the Charter which follows relates specifically to the right of an accused in criminal proceedings, and must not be taken as necessarily having any broader application. In other words, I leave open for future consideration the possibility that different rules may have to be developed and applied to other situations which properly arise under s. 14 of the Charter - for instance, where the proceedings in question are civil or administrative in nature. |
[14] In discussing the need for an interpreter, the Chief Justice states, always relating to criminal matters, at pages 979, 980 and 981:
| First, it must be clear that the accused was actually in need of interpreter assistance - i.e., that he or she did not understand or speak the language being used in court. Although the ultimate burden of proof in establishing the required level of need rests, of course, on the party asserting that he or she has suffered a violation of his or her s. 14 right, it is important to appreciate that the right to interpreter assistance is not one which must necessarily have been invoked or asserted in order to be enjoyed. As part of their control over their own proceedings, courts have an independent responsibility to ensure that those who re not conversation in the language being use din court understand and are understood. Accordingly, unless the issue of interpretation is only being raised for the first time on appeal and/or there is some question as to whether the right is being asserted in bad faith, establishing "need" will not normally be an onerous step. |
| Second, the claimant of the right must show, assuming it is not a case of a complete denial of an interpreter but one involving some alleged deficiency in the interpretation actually provided, that there has been a departure from the basic, constitutionally guaranteed standard of interpretation. For the purposes of his appeal, I define this standard as one of continuity, precision, impartiality, competency and contemporaneousness. |
| Third, the claimant must establish that the alleged lapse in interpretation occurred in the course of the proceedings themselves when a vial interest of the accused was involved - i.e., while the case was being advanced - rather than at some point or stage which was extrinsic or collateral to the advancement of the case. |
| The onus with respect to these three steps for establishing a reach of s. 14 of the Charter falls on the party asserting the violation and the standard of proof is one of balance of probabilities. Once a court is satisfied that the first three requirements have been met, a violation of s. 14 will have been made out unless the Crown is able to prove, again on a balance of probabilities, that there was a valid and effective waiver of the right which accounts for the lapse in (or lack of) interpretation shown to have occurred. |
| It is to describing in greater detail the various components of this proposed framework of analysis for s. 14 of the Charter that I now turn. |
| (i) The Need for an Interpreter |
| The first step in the analysis as to whether a breach of s. 14 of the Charter has in fact occurred requires consideration of the need for interpreter assistance. That is, the claimant of the right must demonstrate that he or she satisfies (or satisfied) the conditions precedent to entitlement to the right. Section 14 of the Charter states clearly that, to benefit from the right, an accused must "not understand or speak the language in which the proceedings are conducted". |
| While the right to interpreter assistance is not an automatic or absolute one, it stands to reason, particularly with the elevation of the right to the level of a constitutional norm, that courts should be generous and open-minded when assessing an accused"s need for a interpreter. As a general rule, courts should appoint an interpreter when either of the following occurs: |
| (1) it becomes apparent to the judge that an accused is, for language reasons, having difficulty expressing him or herself or understanding the proceedings and that the assistance of an interpreter would be helpful; or |
| (2) an accused (or counsel for the accused) requests the services of an interpreter and the judge is f the opinion that the request is justified. |
[15] A very significant case involving an immigration matter where the issue is the same as the one before me, that is, "The principal issue to be determined on this application is whether the Board erred in law by failing to ensure that the interpretation provided for the applicant at his hearing conformed to the principles of fundamental justice and the requirements of section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)" is Sandro Nahun Flores Banegas v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration , IMM-2642-96, June 30, 1997, F.C.T.D.
[16] In this decision, McGillis J. states, as to the principles to be applied, at pages 3, 4 and 5:
| In determining whether the principles of fundamental justice or the section 14 Charter right to the assistance of an interpreter were breached, reference must be made to the jurisprudence. In Tung v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1991), 124 N.R. 388 (F.C.A.), Stone, J.A. provided the following guidance at page 392 of the decision: |
| "In my opinion, the appellant was entitled, through the interpreter, to tell the story of his fear in his own language as well he might have done had he been able to communicate to the Board in the English language. Natural justice demanded no less. Manifestly, however he was unable to do so upon points of key importance to his claim because of the poor quality of the translation. I have no doubt that this circumstance prejudiced the appellant in the proceedings to review important aspects of the Board"s decision on a record which is plainly deficient." |
| In the decision Tran v. Her Majesty the Queen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, the Supreme Court of Canada enunciated the principles applicable in the criminal law context to the right to interpreter assistance guaranteed by section 14 of the Charter. Lamer, C.J., writing for the Court, expressly indicated at page 8 of the judgment that: |
| ... the discussion of section 14 of the Charter which follows relates specifically to the right of an accused in criminal proceedings, and must not be taken as necessarily having any broader application. In other words, I leave open for future consideration the possibility that different rules may have to be developed and applied to other situations which properly arise under s. 14 of the Charter -- for instance, where the proceedings in question are civil or administrative in nature. |
| Despite his caveat that the analysis applied specifically to criminal proceedings, Lamer, C.J. nevertheless discussed in broad terms the purposes served by the section 14 Charter right to the assistance of an interpreter. In particular, he noted at page 977 of the judgment that: |
| ...the underlying principle behind all of the interests protected by the right to interpreter assistance under section 14 is that of linguistic understanding. The centrality of this principle is evident not only from the general jurisprudence dealing with interpreters, but also more directly from the language of s. 14 itself, which refers to "not understand[ing] or speak[ing] the language in which the proceedings are conducted". The level of understanding protected by s. 14 will, therefore, necessarily be high. Indeed, it has been suggested that a party must have the same basic opportunity to understand and be understood as if he or she were conversant in the language of the court. For example, in the immigration case, Tung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 124 N.R. 388 (F.C.A.), Stone J.A. stated at page 392: |
| "In my opinion, the appellant was entitled, through the interpreter, to tell the story of his fear in his own language as well he might have done had he been able to communicate to the Board in the English language. Natural justice demanded no less. |
| Although the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the analysis in Tung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), supra, concerning the requisite level of linguistic understanding, it rejected, for the purposes of the criminal law, the requirement that prejudice must also be established. In that regard, Lamer, C.J. stated at page 995 that the denial of " .. proper interpretation while the case is being advanced is in itself prejudicial and is a violation of section 14." In the immigration context, the jurisprudence following from the decision in Tung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) , supra, has required an applicant to establish that he has suffered prejudice by virtue of the problems arising from the interpretation. [See Mosa v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, April 19, 1993, Court file A-992-92 (F.C.A.).] |
| Counsel for the applicant submitted that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada, in Tran v. Her Majesty the Queen, supra for criminal law proceedings ought to be extended to apply in the immigration context, particularly with respect to hearings conducted before the Board. |
| Given the facts of the present case, it is unnecessary for me to decide that interesting question. If I were to apply the prejudice test in Tung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), supra, I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence in the record that the applicant has suffered no prejudice by virtue of the interpretation provided to him. In particular, none of the alleged errors in interpretation affected in any manner the various inconsistencies in the applicant"s evidence which gave rise to the adverse finding of credibility. Alternatively, if I were to adopt the more expansive approach in Tran v. Her Majesty the Queen , supra, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant was denied proper interpretation. During the course of his hearing, the applicant indicated that he understood the interpreter, gave responsive answers to the questions posed and made no objection either personally or though his counsel, to the quality of the interpretation. More importantly, the applicant did not state in his affidavit that he did not understand the proceedings. With respect to the evidence of Ms. Hobrough, it is important to recognize that the vast majority of the examples which she gave to support her conclusion that the interpretation was not competent were trivial in nature. In Tran v. Her Majesty the Queen, supra, Lamer, C.J., noted at page 985 that " ... [w]hile the standard of interpretation under s. 14 will be high, it should not be one of perfection." Furthermore, in discussing the criteria to be applied in assessing the interpretation, Lamer, C.J. stated the following at page 987 with respect to precision: |
| However, it is important to keep in mind that interpretation is an inherently human endeavour which often takes place in less than circumstances. Therefore it would not be realistic or sensible to require even a constitutionally guaranteed standard of interpretation to be one of perfection. As Steele explains, at page 242: |
| "Even the best interpretation is not "perfect", in that the interpreter can never convey the evidence with a sense of nuance identical to the original speech. For that reason, the courts have cautioned that interpreted evidence should not be examined microscopically for inconsistencies. The benefit of a doubt should be given to the witness." |
| In this respect, it may be helpful to note the conceptual distinction that exists between "interpretation", which is primarily concerned with the spoken word, and "translation", which is primarily concerned with the written word. In light of the fact that interpretation involves a process of mediation between two people which must occur on the spot with little opportunity for reflection, it follows that the standard for interpretation will end to be lower than it might be for translation, where the source is a written text, where reaction time is usually greater and where conceptual differences which sometimes exist between languages can be more fully accommodated and accounted for. |
| [17] I am in total agreement with the above statement of Madam Justice McGillis. |
| []18] There is no doubt that the applicant did ask, formally, two days before the hearing, for a Tchouvache interpreter because, as he states in a letter to the Board dated April 22, 1998: |
| Je suis la nouvelle procureure du revendicateur mentionné en rubrique, tel que vous pourrez le constater au mandat ci-joint. La présente lettre vise à vous demander une remise de l"audition de cette personne, qui doit avoir lieu le vendredi 24 avril 1998 en après-midi. |
| En effet, j"ai constaté que mon client ne comprend pas suffisamment le russe pour faire son audition en russe. Sa langue maternelle est le"tchouvache". Il m"a expliqué qu"il avait procédé au processus accéléré il y a quelque temps, et qu"il avait eu excessivement de problèmes à comprendre l"interprète madame Yvette Amdani, et que son ancienne avocate Me Carole Vézina lui avait dit qu"il n"y avait aucun interprète tchouvache à Montréal. |
| Pour faire respecter les droits fondamentaux de mon client je me dois de vous demander de remettre l"audition jusqu"à ce qu"un interprète tchouvache ait été obtenu par vous. J"attends de vos nouvelles le plus tôt possible et vous prie d"agréer, madame, monsieur, l"expression de mes sentiments distingués. |
| [19] As I have stated, this letter is dated two days before the scheduled hearing and only asks for a Tchouvache interpreter because the applicant "ne comprend pas suffisamment le russe pour faire son audition en russe". |
| [20] Clearly, this means, and it is apparent from a reading of the transcript, that the applicant does understand Russian. This is also apparent, as I have stated, from the fact that the applicant completed his PIF with a Russian interpreter. |
Page: 12
[21] I am satisfied, after reading the transcript, particularly pages 298 to 320, that the applicant understood when he wanted to understand and did not appear to understand when he wanted to be evasive.
[22] I am in agreement with counsel for the applicant that the Board should attempt to provide an interpreter in the language of the applicant. This does not mean that the Board is obligated to provide an interpreter with the exact dialect of the applicant. The applicant is Russian and clearly understands Russian. He had at least 10 years of Russian education. He travelled for business reasons and appears to have managed well. The Board offered to proceed in a manner that if the applicant said he could not understand to explain what is being asked.
| [23] I fail to see any prejudice caused in this case. |
[24] The applicant was asked to explain his alleged fears of persecution. Because of the facts, the Board correctly concluded he was not a Convention refugee.
| [25] The application for judicial review is denied. |
| [26] There was no question submitted for certification. |
"Max M. Teitelbaum"
J.F.C.C.
Ottawa, Ontario
September 22, 1999