Ottawa, Ontario, February 17, 2006
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Harrington
BETWEEN:
and
OF CANADA
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
I. OVERVIEW
[1] This case is about a decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission to dismiss a complaint rather than to refer it to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.
[2] Michel Tremblay has multiple sclerosis, a fact known by Health Canada when they hired him in December 2001 for a one year term in their Therapeutic Products Directorate.
[3] The year was tension-filled. In May 2002, he filed a harassment grievance against his supervisor, the Product Information Division Manager. That grievance was settled following mediation. In June 2002, he filed a harassment complaint against his acting supervisor alleging that he had harassed him and criticized his work performance without accommodating his disability. Health Canada retained the services of an outside investigator who found in Mr. Tremblay's favour. An assistant deputy minister informed him that she accepted the conclusions of the report and that appropriate corrective measures would be implemented.
[4] In April 2003, after his term with Health Canadaended, he filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission. He alleged that Health Canada had failed to accommodate his disability, treated him in an adverse differential manner, refused to continue to employ him because of his disability, engaged in a pattern of harassment on the basis of his disability and deprived him of opportunities of employment, the whole contrary to the Canadian Human Rights Act. To some extent, he revisited his two earlier harassment grievances.
[5] The Commission appointed an outsider, Rod Grainger, to investigate. Mr. Tremblay complained to both Mr. Grainger and to his manager about the manner in which he was conducting the investigation. He then came to learn that Mr. Grainger had previously been retained by Health Canadato carry out an investigation of allegations of discriminatory behaviour on its part. He called for Mr. Grainger's removal on the basis of conflict of interest and apparent bias. The Commission refused.
[6] Mr. Grainger completed his investigation and recommended that the complaint be dismissed because all accommodations recommended by medical authorities were provided, incidents of adverse differential treatment and harassment were settled by mediation, corrective measures were adopted to deal with the incident which led to the June grievance and because the evidence did not show that Mr. Tremblay was entitled to continued employment beyond the one-year contract, or that Health Canada had a policy or practice of depriving disabled employees of employment opportunities.
[7] The Commission decided to follow Mr. Grainger's recommendations and dismissed the complaint, citing section 44(3)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. In the context of this case, this means that the Commission was of the view that further inquiry was not warranted.
[8] This is a judicial review of that decision. In his notice of application, Mr. Tremblay alleges that: a) the Commission erred in deciding that the appointment of Mr. Grainger as the investigator did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias and did not warrant the appointment of a new investigator; b) the Commission erred in law, inappropriately exercised its jurisdiction or based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact made in a perverse and capricious manner without regard to the material before it which constituted conclusive evidence of previous harassment and adverse differential treatment in the workplace; c) based its decision on a patently unreasonable finding of fact in that Mr. Grainger failed to investigate obviously crucial evidence and unreasonably ignored relevant facts.
II. PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUES
[9] As is customary, the Commission was called upon to produce the material relating to its decision. However, it produced nothing relating to Mr. Tremblay's allegation of conflict of interest and bias against Mr. Grainger, because that material was not before those members of the Commission who made the decision to dismiss his complaint.
[10] Mr. Tremblay applied for and obtained an order for production of that material (2005 FC 339, [2005] F.C.J. No. 339 (QL)). The issue was not what was before the decision-makers, but rather what should have been before them. As Mr. Justice Létourneau said in Arthur v. Canada(Attorney General) 2001 FCA 223, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1091 (QL) at para. 8:
"...An allegation of bias, especially actual and not simply apprehended bias, against a tribunal is a serious allegation. It challenges the integrity of the tribunal and of its members who participated in the impugned decision. It cannot be done lightly. It cannot rest on mere suspicion, pure conjecture, insinuations or mere impressions of an applicant or his counsel. It must be supported by material evidence demonstrating conduct that derogates from the standard. It is often useful, and even necessary, in doing so, to resort to evidence extrinsic to the case. That is why such evidence is admissible in derogation of the principle that an application for judicial review must bear on the matter as it came before the court or tribunal." [Emphasis added]
[11] This in turn led the Commission to seek and obtain intervener status on this judicial review.
III. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
[12] As this case raises issues of natural justice and the standard of judicial review to be applied to a discretionary decision, I consider the path has been brightly lit by the decision of the Supreme Court in Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, a case which covered the same issues, although in a different context.
[13] The order of business there established by Mr. Justice Binnie, as modified to meet this case, is as follows:
a) Examine the legislative scheme of the Canadian Human Rights Act in general, and section 44 in particular;
b) Isolate the issues pertaining to natural justice and procedural fairness;
c) Determine the degree of judicial deference the Commission is entitled to receive in the exercise of its discretionary power.
[14] He said at paragraph 102: "The content of procedural fairness goes to the manner in which the Minister went about making his decision, whereas the standard of review is applied to the end product of his deliberations." He went on to point out that the requirements of procedural fairness and the standard of review often overlap.
IV. PURPOSE OF THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
[15] The Canadian Human Rights Act is intended to give effect, with respect to matters within Parliament's jurisdiction, to the principle that all individuals should have the opportunity to live the lives they wish, unhindered by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted. A number of discriminatory practices are identified including the refusal to employ or to continue to employ or to differentiate adversely in relation to an employee on a prohibited ground of discrimination (section 7) or to pursue a policy or practice that deprives or tends to deprive an individual from employment opportunities. (Section 10)
[16] The Commission has a multi-faceted jurisdiction. It is a policy-maker, an educator and a liaison body. This is an indication that it is entitled to deference. When it comes to discriminatory practices, it may even initiate a complaint on its own motion. That is not the case here.
[17] Any individual, such as Mr. Tremblay, may file a complaint that a person or organization is or has engaged in a discriminatory practice. In accordance with Part III of the Act, currently sections 39 and following, the Commission must first decide whether or not to investigate. It may choose not investigate if it considers the complainant ought to exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise reasonably available, if the complaint could more appropriately be dealt with under another act of Parliament, if the complaint is beyond its jurisdiction, if it is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith, or not timely. The Commission decided to investigate. It appointed one investigator, and then, apparently for administrative convenience, appointed Mr. Grainger.
[18] "[H]aving regard to all the circumstances of the complaint" the Commission will either dismiss it if satisfied that an inquiry is not warranted or refer it to the Tribunal if satisfied that an inquiry is warranted.
[19] The Commission's role in considering complaints of discriminatory practices is well known. The point of embarkation is Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l'Acadie v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879, ("S.E.P.Q.A."). The scheme of the Act was dealt with at some length by Sopinka J. In that case, as in this, the Commission investigated a complaint and then decided not to refer it to the Tribunal. It was held that in such circumstances the Commission had to determine whether there was a reasonable foundation in the evidence for proceeding to the next stage. The Commission was not required to comply with the formal rules of natural justice but was required to act with procedural fairness. The Commission's failure in that case to give reasons was not a ground for review as the basis of its conclusion was to be found in the report of its investigators which had been made available to the parties who, therefore, were fully apprised of the reasons for the Commission's decision.
V. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND NATURAL JUSTICE
[20] In line with C.U.P.E., supra, the next step is to isolate the acts or omissions relevant to procedural fairness, the Commission's refusal to replace Mr. Grainger. His investigation dealt with a great number of issues. During the hearing on judicial review, the following were emphasized:
a) The mediated settlement should be re-opened because it was never implemented;
b) Mr. Grainger's investigation of Mr. Tremblay's complaint against his acting supervisor in June 2002 was wholly inadequate, when compared with Health Canada's own internal investigation;
c) Automobile parking for the disabled;
d) Protective corners on furniture and other devices within Mr. Tremblay's office should he suffer from an epileptic seizure while on the job;
e) His computer needs.
[21] Although interwoven with these points, the assertions of apprehended bias on Mr. Grainger's part are threefold:
a) His investigative methodology was inappropriate and did not accommodate Mr. Tremblay's needs;
b) He had a previous connection with Health Canada;
c) The results of his investigation, that is to say his report, demonstrate he did not carry out his duties in a neutral competent manner.
[22] As noted in C.U.P.E., procedural fairness is beyond the normal scope of the functional and pragmatic approach to judicial review as summarized in such cases as Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 and Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247. This distinction was specifically applied to decisions of the Canadian Human Rights Commission by the Federal Court of Appeal in Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General) 2005 FCA 404, [2005] F.C.J. No. 2056 (QL). Mr. Justice Linden said at paragraph 53:
¶ 53 CUPE directs a court, when reviewing a decision challenged on the grounds of procedural fairness, to isolate any act or omission relevant to procedural fairness (at para. 100). This procedural fairness element is reviewed as a question of law. No deference is due. The decision-maker has either complied with the content of the duty of fairness appropriate for the particular circumstances, or has breached this duty.
[23] As to the standard against which an investigator should be measured to determine conflict of interest, or bias, the Commission points out that the proper approach is to determine whether the investigator has a "closed mind". In Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland(Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623, the Supreme Court described the closed mind as "... a mind so closed that any submissions would be futile". (paragraph 34).
[24] This standard is lower than a "reasonable apprehension of bias" which is applied to those who carry out purely judicial functions.
[25] Nevertheless, in this particular case I consider it more appropriate to apply the reasonable apprehension of bias test. I say this because in refusing to remove Mr. Grainger, Sherri Helgason, director of the Investigation Branch of the Commission, specifically used that term in her letter to Mr. Tremblay's solicitor, and thus may have created a legitimate expectation on his part that that was that standard against which Mr. Grainger had been measured, rather than a lesser standard. The evidence shows that the Commission has a number of employee investigators and "contract investigators" at any given time. Managers within the Commission assign files to contract investigators to expedite the completion of investigations. It was on this basis that Mr. Grainger was selected. At the time he was appointed to investigate Mr. Tremblay's complaint, he had worked as a contract investigator for the Commission for nearly 10 years, and had completed over 100 investigations.
[26] The evidence is that Mr. Grainger called Mr. Tremblay to determine the best method by which he could respond to his questions with respect to the complaint. Mr. Tremblay first indicated that email would be most convenient. Mr. Grainger sent him a number of questions.
[27] Mr. Tremblay then complained that there were too many questions and that many were "incorrect". According to Mr. Grainger's note to file, Mr. Tremblay said that the questions assumed a lot and that his disability was not being accommodated. The questions lacked logic, they were biased in favour of Health Canada, and they made no sense.
[28] To quote part of Mr. Grainger's note to file:
"He said that he wanted to work at the questions with me. I told him that I was not prepared to do that. I told him that, as the investigator, I ask the questions and he provides the answers. I told him that he has the right to refuse to answer. To say that the question is wrong or irrelevant, or whatever he feels. He then said that this would make it look as if he was uncooperative.
...
We ended the conversation by me saying that I reserved the right to ask questions, (even ones that he thinks are irrelevant, as he interjected) and that, if he is not happy with this, he should call Mr. Kolk. I asked him to do his best with the questions, letting me know which ones he is not prepared to address, for whatever reason, and I would meet him to ask him the remaining questions."
[29] Mr. Tremblay then telephoned Mr. Kolk, the file manager, to complain about Mr. Grainger. From Mr. Kolk's memo to file regarding " Telephone Conversation with Complainant" we read:
"C complained to me that the Investigator is rude. I asked how. C said that the Investigator has posed him 49 questions. C said the Investigator's questions are incorrect.
C said he does not want to answer almost all of the questions because they are incorrect. I asked C how a question can be incorrect. I asked if he means they are irrelevant or inappropriate. C said incorrect.
C said the Investigator refuses to accommodate his disability. I asked C how. C was unable to explain how the Investigator is not accommodating his disability.
...
I explained that complainants cannot cho[o]se their Investigators. I asked C to send me a letter explaining why he wants his complaint reassigned to another Investigator. C questioned whether I fairly consider his request. I asked C to put his in writing with an explanation for respond, in writing, to those questions he wanted to answer.
C respondent that now he understood. It was all now clear to him. He hung up the telephone."
[30] Any reasonable person reading the questions Mr. Grainger put to Mr. Tremblay, as well as follow-up questions, would consider they were eminently appropriate. For instance, seven questions dealt with Mr. Tremblay's complaint that he had not been assigned a disabled parking space. He was asked how far the open parking space, which he used, was from the building, and how far away from the building was the dedicated parking space he was later assigned.
[31] Mr. Tremblay's answer to these questions was: "I require access to the premises and parking administration "Parking Authority" data." Mr. Grainger was not asking for a report from a land surveyor.
[32] Another complaint was that a secretary spoke to him about using too much paper. Health Canada had the sensible policy of using both sides of pages. Apparently since Health Canada was aware of a need to accommodate Mr. Tremblay's vision, it should have realized that double sided paper was not conducive to his disability needs. The secretary should have anticipated his needs. According to Mr. Tremblay, "[t]he secretary was aware that I had special needs. Her actions serve to highlight the Product Information Division's inability and resistance to accept the presence of a special needs employee."
[33] The questions were eminently fair, and reasonable. The answers were not. In his answers to the first 49 questions, Mr. Tremblay cited Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 six times. For instance, as part of his answer to "Did you ever provide the respondent with medical evidence that you are subject to epileptic seizures?" he said:
"...The efficient and effective search for accommodation should be a cooperative process. Health Canada failed in its legal obligation to facilitate the search for acceptable accommodations as required by the Central Okanagan School District v. Renaud, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970. The Supreme Court of Canada placed the primary onus for devising and implementing accommodations on the employer. The efficient search for accommodations in this case foundered primarily because Health Canada did not take the necessary steps to discern specifics about my situation. As Line 1000 has coached me not to focus on my disability during employment interviews, I did not offer any information I was not asked to give." [Emphasis added]
[34] Mr. Tremblay violated one of the basic tenets of natural justice "NEMO JUDEX IN PARTE SUA" (no one may judge his own case). He wanted to answer his own questions.
[35] The Renaud case was very much different on its facts. Because of his religious beliefs, Mr. Renaud would not work Friday evenings. His need was obvious. The primary onus was on his employer to accommodate him. However in this case, Mr. Tremblay's needs were not obvious, at least to Health Canada. As his needs, or at least demands, were made known he was accommodated. Mr. Tremblay, perhaps because of the advice offered by Line 1000, his agency, did not volunteer how his condition might manifest itself in the workplace.
[36] Turning now to Mr. Grainger's previous involvement with Health Canada, the modern statement as to reasonable apprehension of bias was made by Mr. Justice de Grandpré in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369. He said:
"...the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically--and having thought the matter through--conclude.
...
I can see no real difference between the expressions found in the decided cases, be they 'reasonable apprehension of bias', 'reasonable suspicion of bias, or 'real likelihood of bias'. The grounds for this apprehension must, however, be substantial and I entirely agree with the Federal Court of Appeal which refused to accept the suggestion that the test be related to the "very sensitive or scrupulous conscience"
This is the proper approach which, of course, must be adjusted to the facts of the case. The question of bias in a member of a court of justice cannot be examined in the same light as that in a member of an administrative tribunal entrusted by statute with an administrative discretion exercised in the light of its experience and of that of its technical advisers."
Although he was in dissent on the merits of that case, his words have been constantly repeated by Courts ever since.
[37] The evidence is that Mr. Grainger had one contract for Health Canada five years earlier. A Dr. Cris Basudde, a visible minority scientist at the Bureau of Veterinary Drugs, filed a complaint of incidents which he considered were violations of Health Canada's obligation to provide him with a workplace free of harassment. The Commission investigated. During the same time frame Health Canada conducted a parallel investigation of its own using an independent investigator not otherwise associated with it. That investigator was Mr. Grainger. That matter ultimately worked its way to this Court by way of judicial review (Basudde v. Canada(Attorney General) 2002 FCT 782, (2002) 222 F.T.R. 155, [2002] F.C.J. No. 1047 (QL)). Mr. Justice Beaudry mentions Mr. Grainger, and it is this case, among others, which was cited by Mr. Tremblay's solicitor when he asked that Mr. Grainger be removed from the investigation. The Commission's investigator recommended that the complaint be dismissed, which it was. Mr. Grainger's report to Health Canada was also to the effect that the evidence did not support the complaint. Mr. Justice Beaudry held that the case was arguably one in which the Commission's investigation did not give adequate consideration to Dr. Basudde's claims. Judicial review was allowed and the matter referred back to the Commission for a new inquiry by another investigator. It must be emphasized that it was not Mr. Grainger's report which was under review, and that the investigation involved different people in another section of Health Canada.
[38] I agree with Ms. Helgason, director of the Commission's Investigative Branch, when she informed Mr. Tremblay's counsel that the Commission was satisfied that there was no conflict of interest. She said: "I fail to see how conducting one independent internal investigation can lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias against Mr. Grainger."
[39] Although circumstances may dictate a reasonable cooling off period, some say three years, some say five years, before a judge hears a case involving his or her old firm, or former clients, Mr. Grainger was never an employee of Health Canada. He was hired on a contract, on a one time basis, to carry out an independent investigation. His work, like the work of all investigators be they employees or hired on a contract bases, was supervised. There is no evidence whatsoever to support the proposition that he wanted to curry favour with Health Canada. Indeed, the Commission's investigation into Mr. Tremblay's complaint revealed that he had no intention of working for Health Canada in the future, as he already had quite enough on his plate. No fair minded person looking at the matter objectively could possibly be apprehensive about Mr. Grainger's impartiality. The evidence shows that he carried out his duties, and made his report and recommendations with an open mind.
[40] Finally, can bias be inferred from Mr. Grainger's work product, his final report? An investigation should be neutral, and thorough. Mr. Justice Nadon had this to say in Slattery v. Canada(Human Rights Commission), [1994] 2 F.C. 574 at paragraphs 55 and 56:
" ¶ 55 In determining the degree of thoroughness of investigation required to be in accordance with the rules of procedural fairness, one must be mindful of the interests that are being balanced: the complainant's and respondent's interests in procedural fairness and the CHRC's interests in maintaining a workable and administratively effective system. Indeed, the following words from Mr. Justice Tarnopolsky's treatise Discrimination and the Law (Don Mills: De Boo, 1985), at page 131 seem to be equally applicable with regard to the determination of the requisite thoroughness of investigation:
|
|
With the crushing case loads facing Commissions, and with the increasing complexity of the legal and factual issues involved in many of the complaints, it would be an administrative nightmare to hold a full oral hearing before dismissing any complaint which the investigation has indicated is unfounded. On the other hand, Commission [Commissions] should not be assessing credibility in making these decisions, and they must be conscious of the simple fact that the dismissal of most complaints cuts off all avenues of legal redress for the harm which the person alleges. |
|
¶ 56 Deference must be given to administrative decision-makers to assess the probative value of evidence and to decide to further investigate or not to further investigate accordingly. It should only be where unreasonable omissions are made, for example where an investigator failed to investigate obviously crucial evidence, that judicial review is warranted. Such an approach is consistent with the deference allotted to fact-finding activities of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal by the Supreme Court in the case of Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554."
The appeal therefrom was dismissed, see [1996] F.C.J. No. 385 (QL).
[41] Shoddy work, or a failure to interview key witnesses, may well evidence a breach of procedural fairness (Grover v. Canada(National Research Council) 2001 FCT 687, (2001) 206 F.T.R. 207).
[42] Since procedural fairness is so often intertwined with the standard of review, I consider it more convenient to contemplate this issue in that context.
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[43] The standard of review applicable to a decision of the Commission to dismiss a complaint may be reasonableness simpliciter or patent unreasonableness, depending on the mixture of fact and law which may be involved. The Court of Appeal recognized this variance in Sketchley, supra, at paragraphs 38 through 47. In most cases which do not raise issues of procedural fairness, the result will be the same whether the standard of review is patent unreasonableness, or reasonableness simpliciter. I will begin with the standard of reasonableness simpliciter, which is more favourable to Mr. Tremblay.
[44] Unlike Slattery, supra and Grover, supra, Mr. Grainger did not miss obvious points or fail to interview any obvious witness. He reported on 16 allegations, analyzed them, and then recommended that the Commission dismiss the complaint. Since the Commission gave no additional reasons, Mr. Grainger's report stands as its reasons (S.E.P.Q.A., supra and Sketchley, supra).
[45] The evidence, which may not be perfect because Mr. Tremblay often refused to name names or give particulars, demonstrates that although Health Canada did not have preternatural wisdom and did not immediately anticipate his every demand, each and every one was ultimately satisfied. Although he thought his mediated settlement should be reopened because Health Canada did not honour it, he gave no specifics. A disabled parking spot was always available. The dispute related more to the fact that dedicated parking spots, disabled or not, were only available against payment of a fee. That policy was changed. His office was fitted out with protective padding, even though he would not tell the employer where such padding was available. It was not unreasonable for Health Canada to assume he might have some knowledge. His demands for a special computer were met, notwithstanding lack of clear cut evidence as to his needs.
[46] He filed a grievance about the fact that his acting supervisor had berated him. Health Canada's outside investigator found the allegation to be well-founded. The supervisor in question was reprimanded. All this was covered by Mr. Grainger who had had the benefit of reading the report and had no need to repeat it. Although the supervisor may have been insensitive, and in fact neither he or other Health Canada officials had special training in how to deal with Mr. Tremblay, he was not the devil incarnate. Mr. Grainger is criticized because he reported that the supervisor in question had supported Mr. Tremblay's requests with respect to disabled parking. That was a fact, not a slanting of evidence.
[47] In his supporting affidavit, Mr. Tremblay says:
"I believe that the Investigator's report misapprehended the essential facts of my case and also made inappropriate conclusions based upon its factual findings. In particular, I believe that it was inappropriate for the investigator to recognize that my supervisor ... had harassed me, but failed to consider whether this harassment constituted discrimination. The allegation is at the heart of my human rights complaint."
[48] Mr. Tremblay was hired for a one year term, and it is outright speculation for him to suggest that his employment was not continued because of his disability.
[49] The Commission had the discretion to dismiss the complaint or to refer it to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. It dismissed the complaint because there was no point in going further. Although in retrospect there may have been a failure to communicate, a failure for which Mr. Tremblay must take his share of the blame, his needs were accommodated. One of the duties of the Commission is to discourage and reduce discriminatory practice by persuasion (Section 27(1)(h)). It also has the power to appoint a conciliator (Section 47). What would have been the point of referring the matter to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal? Perhaps it would have declared that the harassment acknowledged by Health Canada was based on Mr. Tremblay's disability, perhaps not. It has limited jurisdiction, in its discretion, to award damages for pain and suffering, capped at $20,000, a discretion it may or may not have exercised.
[50] The problems had been remedied, and so it was eminently reasonable for the Commission to dismiss the complaint. A further inquiry was simply not warranted, and so the application for judicial review will be dismissed.
[51] The respondent shall have its costs. The Commission as intervener took no position with respect to the order sought. Although its intervention was most useful, there shall be no order as to costs for or against it.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: the application for judicial review of the decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission dated 6 October 2004 dismissing the complaint is dismissed with costs.
"Sean Harrington"
FEDERAL COURT
NAME OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-1958-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: MICHEL TREMBLAY v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: January 31, 2006
REASONS FOR ORDER: Harrington J.
APPEARANCES:
| Yavar Hameed
|
|
| Richard Casanova
|
|
| Philippe Dufresne |
FOR THE INTERVENER THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Yavar Hameed Barrister & Solicitor Ottawa (Ontario)
|
|
| John H. Sims, Q.C. Deputy Attorney General of Canada
|
|
| Philippe Dufresne Ottawa (Ontario) |
FOR THE INTERVENER THE CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION |