Date: 19991005 Docket: IMM-980-97
BETWEEN:
KASSONGO TUNDA (Alias KIZUZI DIBAYULA)
Applicant
AND
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
TEITELBAUM. J:
[1] On June 11, 1999, I issued an Order dismissing the judicial review application of the applicant. I had stated to counsel at the end of the hearing that I would allow them to file a question or questions for my consideration as to certification.
[2] Counsel for the applicant has asked that the following question be certified:
"Le Gouverneur Général du Canada et les juges de la Cour suprême du Canada agissant à titre de gouverneur général suppléant sont-ils liés par une convention constitutionnelle leur interdisant de refuser de donner la sanction royale de leur propre chef et cette convention constitutionnelle at-elle préséance sur le texte de l'article 55 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867qui stipule que cette sanction est "subject to the Provisions of this Act and to Her Maiestv's Instructions" ou au contraire commettent-ils une erreur révisable en droit en sanctionnant un texte qui est incompatible à cette stipulation?"
Section 83(1) of the Immigration Act R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2 states:
83. (1) A judgment of the Federal Court - Trial Division on an application for judicial review with respect to any decision or order made, or any matter arising, under this Act or the rules or regulations thereunder may be appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal only if the Federal Court - Trial Division has at the time of rendering judgment certified that a serious question of general importance is involved and has stated that question.
83. (1) Le jugement de la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale rendu sur une demande de contrôle judiciaire relative à une décision ou ordonnance rendue, une mesure prise ou toute question soulevée dans le cadre de la présente loi ou de ses textes d'application - règlements ou règles - ne peut être porté en appel devant la Cour d'appel fédérale que si la Section de première instance certifie dans son jugement que l'affaire soulève une question grave de portée générale et énonce celle-ci.
[4] The criteria to be applied for certification of a question are articulated in
Liyanagamage v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (1994), 176 N.R. 4,
(F.C.A.) as follows:
"In order to be certified pursuant to subsection 83(1), a question must be one which, in the opinion of the motions judge, transcends the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation and contemplates issues of broad significance or general application [...] but it is also be one that is determinative of the appeal. The certification process contemplated by section 83(1) of the Immigration Act is neither to be equated with the reference process established by section 18.3 of the Federal Court Act, nor is it to be used as a tool to obtain from the Court of Appeal declaratory judgments on fine questions which need not be decided in order to dispose of a particular case."
[5] In my view, the conferral of the powers of the Governor General on judges of the Supreme Court, particularly that of Royal Assent, raises a theoretical constitutional question with respect to the wording and intention of sections 14 and 55 of the Constitution Act 1867, and Part VII and Part VIII of the Letters Patent 1947.
[6] Section 14 of the Constitution Act 1867 states:
14. It shall be lawful for the Queen, if Her Majesty thinks fit, to authorize the Governor General from Time to Time to appoint any Person or any Persons jointly or severally to be his Deputy or Deputies within any Part or Parts of Canada, and in that Capacity to exercise during the Pleasure of the Governor General such of the Powers, Authorities, and Functions of the Governor General as the Governor General deems it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them, subject to any Limitations or Directions expressed or given by the Queen; but the Appointment of such a Deputy or Deputies shall not affect the Exercise by the Governor General himself of any Power, Authority, or Function.
14. Il sera loisible à la Reine, si Sa Majesté le juge à propos, d'autoriser le gouverneur-général à nommer, de temps à autre, une ou plusieurs personnes, conjointement ou séparément, pour agir comme son ou ses députés dans aucune partie ou parties du Canada, pour, en cette capacité, exercer, durant le plaisir du gouverneur-général, les pouvoirs, attributions et fonctions du gouverneur-général, que le gouverneur-général jugera à propos ou nécessaire de lui ou leur assigner, sujet aux restrictions ou instructions formulées ou communiquées par la Reine; mais la nomination de tel député ou députés ne pourra empêcher le gouverneur-général lui-même d'exercer les pouvoirs, attributions ou fonctions qui lui sont conférées.
[7] Section 55 of the Constitution Act 1867 states:
55. Where a Bill passed by the Houses of the Parliament is presented to the Governor General for the Queen's Assent, he shall declare, according to his Discretion, but subject to the Provisions of this Act and to Her Majesty's Instructions, either that he assents thereto in the Queen's Name, or that he withholds the Queen's Assent, or that he reserves the Bill for the Signification of the Queen's Pleasure.
55. Lorsqu'un bill voté par les chambres du parlement sera présenté au gouverneur-général pour la sanction de la Reine, le gouverneur-général devra déclarer à sa discrétion, mais sujet aux dispositions de la présente loi et aux instructions de Sa Majesté, ou qu'il le sanctionne au nom de la Reine, ou qu'il refuse cette sanction, ou qu'il réserve le bill pour la signification du bon plaisir de la Reine.
[8] The question raised by the applicant is whether legislation which has been
given Royal Assent by a judge of the Supreme Court is valid, and what oath must be sworn by judges exercising this function. This is a matter of broad significance
and general importance as Supreme Court judges are frequently conferred these powers.
[9] Contrary to the submission of the respondent, there is a direct impact on the present litigation. The applicant seeks judicial review of an Exclusion Order pursuant to subsection 23(4) of the Immigration Act. This legislation was given Royal Assent by Sopinka J. The applicant submits the Exclusion Order issued pursuant to subsection 24(3) of the Immigration Act is invalid as the legislation is ultra vires.
[10] I have briefly discussed the theoretical arguments surrounding this question. However, it is the practicalities which I believe to be of more importance. With the increasingly broad legislative function that has fallen upon the Supreme Court since the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, judicial independence is all the more sacred. The request that this question be certified brings to the forefront the perception that the independence of the judiciary is compromised by judges performing the functions of the Governor General. Whether real or perceived, the effect could be damning for the judiciary.
[11] For the above stated reasons, the following question is certified:
"Pursuant to sections 14 and 55 of the Constitution Act 1867 can the Governor General appoint judges of the Supreme Court to act on his behalf and confer his Powers, Authorities and Functions onto them, including that of Royal Assent?"
"Max M. Teitelbaum"
J.F.C.C.
Ottawa, OntarioOctober 5, 1999
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF SOLICITORS AND SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD
COURT FILE NO.: IMM-980-97
STYLE OF CAUSE: KOSSONGO TUNDA (Alias KIZUZI DIBAYULA) v. MCI
PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Québec
DATE OF HEARING: 9 Decmebre, 1998 and 17 May, 1999
REASONS FOR ORDER OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE TEITELBAUM DATED: 5 October, 1999
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Michel Le Brun FOR THE APPLICANT
Ms. Jocelyne Murphy FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS ON THE RECORD:
Mr. Michel Le Brun FOR THE APPLICANT Montréal, Québec
Mr. Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT Deputy Attorney General of Canada