Date: 19991220
Docket: T-2763-92
BETWEEN:
DAVINDER SINGH KHAPER,
Plaintiff,
- and -
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
IN RIGHT OF CANADA,
Defendant.
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
BLAIS, J.
| [1] This is a motion by the Plaintiff for an Order to convert this action to an application for judicial review pursuant to Federal Court Rules 53, 55, 56 and 57, and for an Order granting extension of time pursuant to Federal Court Rules 3 and 8 to file an application for judicial review. |
THE FACTS:
| [2] The Plaintiff commenced this action under the Federal Court Act, section 17 by way of a declaration dated November 9th, 1992, arising out of a resignation from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) on June 17th, 1992, and a refusal by the RCMP to allow the withdrawal of the resignation dated, July 24th, 1992. |
| [3] On April 29th, 1999 after disclosure and exchange of documents and discoveries, the trial of this matter was ordered by the Federal Court Trial Division. |
| [4] In his Reasons for Order of October 29, 1999 Prothonotary Hargrave concluded : |
| ...the declaration is without a reasonable cause of action and as such, will stand as struck out 30 days from now, or on the first day of trial, whichever is the earlier, unless the Court allows it to be reconstituted as an application for judicial review. This grace period will allow the Plaintiff time to bring on his motion to convert this action to a judicial review application and for any necessary time extension. |
| [5] The Moving party wishes to seek judicial review of two decisions made by the RCMP. The decisions are: |
| a) to seek his resignation on or about June 12, 1992 (perfected June 17, 1992). |
| b) to refuse, on or about July 24th, 1992 his application to withdraw the resignation of June 17th, 1992. |
MOVING PARTY"S ARGUMENTS:
| [6] The Moving party suggests that the fact that a wrong originating document (declaration) was used instead of the judicial review (application) does not set aside the proceeding. |
| [7] The Moving party suggests that the correct characterization of the situation at bar is an irregularity and does not render the proceeding void. Consequently it is open for the Court to address and correct the situation. It is important for the rules of procedure to be interpreted and applied in a just determination of proceedings on the merits. |
| [8] The Moving party submits that the evidence and issues remain the same and the Responding party will not be prejudiced by a conversion from a declaration to an application for judicial review. |
| [9] The decisions made by RCMP management clearly fall within the scope of section 18 of the Federal Court Act. It is open for the Court to grant an extension of time and order the conversion of this proceeding from a declaration to an application for judicial review. |
| [10] Finally, the Moving party suggests that the only issue in this action is whether or not the resignation was "voluntarily" obtained by management of the RCMP in accordance with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations , subsection 30(1). The Moving party refers to the Federal Court Rules 3, 8, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60. |
THE RESPONDING PARTY"S ARGUMENTS:
| [11] The Responding party submits that the Court does not have the power to convert this action to a judicial review. Rules 3, 55 and 56 of the Federal Court Rules do not grant jurisdiction to the Court to convert. |
| [12] Rule 57 states : |
57. Wrong originating document -- An originating document shall not be set aside only on the ground that a different originating document should have been used.
57. Non-annulation de l"acte introductif d"instance -- La Cour n"annule pas un acte introductif d"instance au seul motif que l"instance aurait dû être introduite par un autre acte introductif d"instance.
| The Responding party submits that the Moving party has failed to comply with section 18.1 of the Federal Court Act, which governs applications for judicial review. A failure to comply with the Act is not an "irregularity" which can be excused under a Rule which governs irregularities under the Rules . |
| [1] The Responding party refers to Rule 1(2) that provides: |
1(2) Inconsistency with Act - In the event of any
inconsistency between these Rules and an Act of Parliament or a regulation made thereunder, that Act or regulation prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.
1(2) Dispositions incompatibles - Les dispositions de toute loi fédérale ou de ses textes d"application l"emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles des présentes règles.
| The Responding party suggests that the Rules which were enacted pursuant to section 46 of the Act, cannot be applied so as to override an Act of Parliament. The Responding party suggests that Rule 57 does not allow the conversion of an action to an application for judicial review. |
| [2] The Responding party also relies on the maxim of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which applies to exclude the possibility of converting an action to an application for judicial review. |
| [3] The Responding party also acknowledged that there was a decision rendered allowing the conversion from an action to a judicial review in McLean v. Her Majesty The Queen, [1999] F.C.J. No. 400, (March 26, 1999), T-2509-90 (F.C.T.D.) by Justice Lutfy. However, the Responding party submits that the McLean decision should be distinguished from the present case on the basis first, that the conversion was made on the Court"s own initiative without the benefit of argument by counsel and therefore the Court did not have the aforementioned legal issues brought to its attention, and second, the action had been commenced within the applicable time limit for filing an application for judicial review, unlike the present case. |
| [4] Finally, the Responding party suggests that the Moving party is out of time to bring an application for judicial review and that the Moving party cannot meet the criteria established in Grewal v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 2 F.C. 263, in order to succeed on an application to extend the time limit for an application for judicial review. Regarding the existence of an arguable case, the Responding party submits that the Moving party has not met that criteria and that there is no evidence before the Court of a decision by the RCMP to seek his resignation on or about June 12, 1992. Indeed, Inspector Brezovski in his affidavit denies that any such decision was made. |
| [5] As to the decision of the RCMP to refuse the Moving party"s application to withdraw his resignation, the Responding party submits that, under subsection 30(2) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations , the RCMP had no authority to allow the resignation to be withdrawn after acceptance: |
| 30(2) A resignation may be withdrawn prior to acceptance thereof by the Commissioner with the written approval of the member"s appropriate officer. |
(2) La démission d'un membre peut, avec l'approbation écrite de l'officier compétent, être retirée avant d'être acceptée par le Commissaire. |
| The Responding party suggests that the Moving party has not pleaded any grounds for judicial review, nor has he submitted any evidence substantiating a ground of review. |
| [6] The Responding party also submits that there was no error made by the RCMP. |
| [7] The Responding party notes that Rule 302 provides that an application for judicial review shall be limited to a single order in respect of which relief is sought. The Moving party is not entitled to bring a single application in respect of two decisions, without leave of the Court, which was not sought. |
| [8] The Responding party concludes by saying that the Moving party does not have an arguable case for judicial review. |
ANALYSIS:
| [9] Subsection 18.4(2) of the Federal Court Act expressly provides that: |
18.4(2) Exception - The Trial Division may, if it considers it appropriate, direct that an application for judicial review be treated and proceeded with as an action.
18.4(2) Exception - La Section de première instance peut, si elle I"estime indiqué, ordonner qu"une demande de contrôle judiciaire soit instruite comme s"il s"agissait d"une action.
| It is clear from that subsection that the Court can convert an application for judicial review to an action. However, the Act is silent as to whether an action can be converted to an application for judicial review. |
| [10] Subsections 18(1), (2) and section 18.1 of the Act state : |
| 18. (1) Subject to section 28, the Trial Division has exclusive original jurisdiction (a) to issue an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any federal board, commission or other tribunal; and (b) to hear and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature of relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal board, commission or other tribunal. 18(2) Extraordinary remedies, members of Canadian Forces (2) The Trial Division has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine every application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition or writ of mandamus in relation to any member of the Canadian Forces serving outside Canada. 18.1 (1) An application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought. 18.1(2) Time limitation (2) An application for judicial review in respect of a decision or order of a federal board, commission or other tribunal shall be made within thirty days after the time the decision or order was first communicated by the federal board, commission or other tribunal to the office of the Deputy Attorney General of Canada or to the party directly affected thereby, or within such further time as a judge of the Trial Division may, either before or after the expiration of those thirty days, fix or allow. 18.1(3) Powers of Trial Division (3) On an application for judicial review, the Trial Division may (a) order a federal board, commission or other tribunal to do any act or thing it has unlawfully failed or refused to do or has unreasonably delayed in doing; or (b) declare invalid or unlawful, or quash, set aside or set aside and refer back for determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be appropriate, prohibit or restrain, a decision, order, act or proceeding of a federal board, commission or other tribunal. 18.1(4) Grounds of review (4) The Trial Division may grant relief under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the federal board, commission or other tribunal (a) acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or other procedure that it was required by law to observe; (c) erred in law in making a decision or an order, whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; (d) based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it; (e) acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or (f) acted in any other way that was contrary to law. 18.1(5) Defect in form or technical irregularity (5) Where the sole ground for relief established on an application for judicial review is a defect in form or a technical irregularity, the Trial Division may (a) refuse the relief if it finds that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred; and (b) in the case of a defect in form or a technical irregularity in a decision or order, make an order validating the decision or order, to have effect from such time and on such terms as it considers appropriate. |
| 18. (1) Sous réserve de l'article 28, la Section de première instance a compétence exclusive, en première instance, pour_: a) décerner une injonction, un bref de certiorari, de mandamus, de prohibition ou de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement déclaratoire contre tout office fédéral; b) connaître de toute demande de réparation de la nature visée par l'alinéa a), et notamment de toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada afin d'obtenir réparation de la part d'un office fédéral. 18(2) Recours extraordinaires_: Forces canadiennes (2) La Section de première instance a compétence exclusive, en première instance, dans le cas des demandes suivantes visant un membre des Forces canadiennes en poste à l'étranger_: bref d'habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de mandamus. 18.1 (1) Une demande de contrôle judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général du Canada ou par quiconque est directement touché par l'objet de la demande. 18.1(2) Délai de présentation (2) Les demandes de contrôle judiciaire sont à présenter dans les trente jours qui suivent la première communication, par l'office fédéral, de sa décision ou de son ordonnance au bureau du sous-procureur général du Canada ou à la partie concernée, ou dans le délai supplémentaire qu'un juge de la Section de première instance peut, avant ou après l'expiration de ces trente jours, fixer ou accorder. 18.1(3) Pouvoirs de la Section de première instance (3) Sur présentation d'une demande de contrôle judiciaire, la Section de première instance peut_: a) ordonner à l'office fédéral en cause d'accomplir tout acte qu'il a illégalement omis ou refusé d'accomplir ou dont il a retardé l'exécution de manière déraisonnable; b) déclarer nul ou illégal, ou annuler, ou infirmer et renvoyer pour jugement conformément aux instructions qu'elle estime appropriées, ou prohiber ou encore restreindre toute décision, ordonnance, procédure ou tout autre acte de l'office fédéral. 18.1(4) Motifs (4) Les mesures prévues au paragraphe (3) sont prises par la Section de première instance si elle est convaincue que l'office fédéral, selon le cas_: a) a agi sans compétence, outrepassé celle-ci ou refusé de l'exercer; b) n'a pas observé un principe de justice naturelle ou d'équité procédurale ou toute autre procédure qu'il était légalement tenu de respecter; c) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance entachée d'une erreur de droit, que celle-ci soit manifeste ou non au vu du dossier; d) a rendu une décision ou une ordonnance fondée sur une conclusion de fait erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des éléments dont il dispose; e) a agi ou omis d'agir en raison d'une fraude ou de faux témoignages; f) a agi de toute autre façon contraire à la loi. 18.1(5) Vice de forme (5) La Section de première instance peut rejeter toute demande de contrôle judiciaire fondée uniquement sur un vice de forme si elle estime qu'en l'occurrence le vice n'entraîne aucun dommage important ni déni de justice et, le cas échéant, valider la décision ou l'ordonnance entachée du vice et donner effet à celle-ci selon les modalités de temps et autres qu'elle estime indiquées. |
| It is clear from those sections that the remedy sought by the Moving party may be obtained only on an application for judicial review made under section 18.1 of the Act. |
| [11] Rule 57 provides that an originating document shall not be set aside only on the ground that a different originating document should have been used. Justice Lutfy in McLean used the new Rule 57 in such a way that it allowed the Court to convert an action to an application for judicial review. |
| [12] In my view, Rule 57 can be applied to convert an action to a judicial review application. The Moving party should have filed an application for judicial review instead of an action. This irregularity can be remedied. |
| [13] That being said, the Moving party did not convince the Court that an extension of time should be allowed. |
| [14] The Moving party must obtain a extension of time since the 30-day limitation period expired. |
| [15] According to Grewal, the Moving party must demonstrate an intention, formulated within the time limit, to take proceedings; the existence of an arguable case; the cause and actual length of the delay; and whether there was prejudice caused by the delay. The Moving party failed to demonstrate the existence of an arguable case. |
| [16] The Moving party still suggests that there is a decision by the RCMP to seek his resignation on or about June 12, 1992, referring to a possible intervention by the commanding officer advising Inspector Brezovski at the time, despite the lack of evidence to support this claim. Furthermore, that assertion is strongly denied through an affidavit by Inspector Brezovski. |
| [17] The Moving party also suggested that the RCMP made an error in refusing his application to withdraw his resignation. However, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, clearly set out that the withdrawal of the resignation after acceptance is not possible. |
| [18] In conclusion, even though this Court has jurisdiction to convert an action into a judicial review application, the Moving party did not meet the test for an extension of time, set by the jurisprudence. |
| [19] For those reasons this application is dismissed with costs. |
Pierre Blais
Judge
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
DECEMBER 20, 1999