Date: 20010126
Docket: T-730-00
Ottawa, Ontario, January 26, 2001
Before: Pinard J.
Between:
SERGE LEMAY INC.
Plaintiff
- and -
JEAN-PATRICK DEMANGEON
Defendant
ORDER
The application for judicial review is allowed. The decision given on March 21, 2000 by Marc Poulin, an adjudicator appointed in accordance with the provisions of Division XIV, Part III of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, as amended, is quashed. The matter is referred back to another adjudicator to be again considered and decided in accordance with the
reasons accompanying this Order, in particular by imposing on the defendant-complainant the burden of proving his dismissal by the plaintiff. Costs are awarded to the plaintiff.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L. Trad. a.
Date: 20010126
Docket: T-730-00
Between:
SERGE LEMAY INC.
Plaintiff
- and -
JEAN-PATRICK DEMANGEON
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD J.
[1] The instant application for judicial review is asking the Court to set aside the decision by Marc Poulin, an adjudicator appointed in accordance with the provisions of division XIV, Part III of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 as amended ("the Code") on March 21, 2000 following a complaint of disguised and unfair dismissal filed by the defendant Jean-Patrick Demangeon against the plaintiff Serge Lemay Inc. The gist of that complaint reads in part as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
- Layoff of three weeks for unverifiable reasons . . .
- The employer had for some weeks created tension by various discriminatory actions.
- At the end of the three-week layoff the S.L.J. company sent me a record of employment indicating a voluntary departure, when I had never filed any letter of resignation.
- Moreover, according to facts which I learned of I am not the first person against whom S.L.J. has taken such action in order to get rid of drivers who have some seniority . . .
[2] The relevant provisions of this Division XIV of the Code are the following:
| 240. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and 242(3.1), any person (1) who has completed twelve consecutive months of continuous employment by an employer, and (b) who is not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement, may make a complaint in writing to an inspector if the employee has been dismissed and considers the dismissal to be unjust. (2) Subject to subsection (3), a complaint under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the person making the complaint was dismissed. (3) The Minister may extend the period of time referred to in subsection (2) where the Minister is satisfied that a complaint was made in that period to a government official who had no authority to deal with the complaint but that the person making the complaint believed the official had that authority. |
240. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (2) et 242(3.1), toute personne qui se croit injustement congédiée peut déposer une plainte écrite auprès d'un inspecteur si: a) d'une part, elle travaille sans interruption depuis au moins douze mois pour le même employeur; b) d'autre part, elle ne fait pas partie d'un groupe d'employés régis par une convention collective. (2) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3), la plainte doit être déposée dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours qui suivent la date du congédiement. (3) Le ministre peut proroger le délai fixé au paragraphe (2) dans les cas où il est convaincu que l'intéressé a déposé sa plainte à temps mais auprès d'un fonctionnaire qu'il croyait, à tort, habilité à la recevoir. |
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| 241. (1) Where an employer dismisses a person described in subsection 240(1), the person who was dismissed or any inspector may make a request in writing to the employer to provide a written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal, and any employer who receives such a request shall provide the person who made the request with such a statement within fifteen days after the request is made. (2) On receipt of a complaint made under subsection 240(1), an inspector shall endeavour to assist the parties to the complaint to settle the complaint or cause another inspector to do so. (3) Where a complaint is not settled under subsection (2) within such period as the inspector endeavouring to assist the parties pursuant to that subsection considers to be reasonable in the circumstances, the inspector shall, on the written request of the person who made the complaint that the complaint be referred to an adjudicator under subsection 242(1), (a) report to the Minister that the endeavour to assist the parties to settle the complaint has not succeeded; and (b) deliver to the Minister the complaint made under subsection 240(1), any written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal provided pursuant to subsection (1) and any other statements or documents the inspector has that relate to the complaint. |
241. (1) La personne congédiée visée au paragraphe 240(1) ou tout inspecteur peut demander par écrit à l'employeur de lui faire connaître les motifs du congédiement; le cas échéant, l'employeur est tenu de lui fournir une déclaration écrite à cet effet dans les quinze jours qui suivent la demande. (2) Dès réception de la plainte, l'inspecteur s'efforce de concilier les parties ou confie cette tâche à un autre inspecteur. (3) Si la conciliation n'aboutit pas dans un délai qu'il estime raisonnable en l'occurrence, l'inspecteur, sur demande écrite du plaignant à l'effet de saisir un arbitre du cas: a) fait rapport au ministre de l'échec de son intervention; b) transmet au ministre la plainte, l'éventuelle déclaration de l'employeur sur les motifs du congédiement et tous autres déclarations ou documents relatifs à la plainte. |
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| 242. (1) The Minister may, on receipt of a report pursuant to subsection 241(3), appoint any person that the Minister considers appropriate as an adjudicator to hear and adjudicate on the complaint in respect of which the report was made, and refer the complaint to the adjudicator along with any statement provided pursuant to subsection 241(1). (2) An adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred under subsection (1) (a) shall consider the complaint within such time as the Governor in Council may by regulation prescribe; (b) shall determine the procedure to be followed, but shall give full opportunity to the parties to the complaint to present evidence and make submissions to the adjudicator and shall consider the information relating to the complaint; and (c) has, in relation to any complaint before the adjudicator, the powers conferred on the Canada Industrial Relations Board, in relation to any proceeding before the Board, under paragraphs 16(a), (b) and (c). (3) Subject to subsection (3.1), an adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred under subsection (1) shall (a) consider whether the dismissal of the person who made the complaint was unjust and render a decision thereon; and (b) send a copy of the decision with the reasons therefor to each party to the complaint and to the Minister. (3.1) No complaint shall be considered by an adjudicator under subsection (3) in respect of a person where (a) that person has been laid off because of lack of work or because of the discontinuance of a function; or (b) a procedure for redress has been provided elsewhere in or under this or any other Act of Parliament. (4) Where an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, the adjudicator may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal. |
242. (1) Sur réception du rapport visé au paragraphe 241(3), le ministre peut désigner en qualité d'arbitre la personne qu'il juge qualifiée pour entendre et trancher l'affaire et lui transmettre la plainte ainsi que l'éventuelle déclaration de l'employeur sur les motifs du congédiement. (2) Pour l'examen du cas dont il est saisi, l'arbitre : a) dispose du délai fixé par règlement du gouverneur en conseil; b) fixe lui-même sa procédure, sous réserve de la double obligation de donner à chaque partie toute possibilité de lui présenter des éléments de preuve et des observations, d'une part, et de tenir compte de l'information contenue dans le dossier, d'autre part; c) est investi des pouvoirs conférés au Conseil canadien des relations industrielles par les alinéas 16a), b) et c). (3) Sous réserve du paragraphe (3.1), l'arbitre : a) décide si le congédiement était injuste; b) transmet une copie de sa décision, motifs à l'appui, à chaque partie ainsi qu'au ministre. (3.1) L'arbitre ne peut procéder à l'instruction de la plainte dans l'un ou l'autre des cas suivants : a) le plaignant a été licencié en raison du manque de travail ou de la suppression d'un poste; b) la présente loi ou une autre loi fédérale prévoit un autre recours. (4) S'il décide que le congédiement était injuste, l'arbitre peut, par ordonnance, enjoindre à l'employeur : a) de payer au plaignant une indemnité équivalant, au maximum, au salaire qu'il aurait normalement gagné s'il n'avait pas été congédié; b) de réintégrer le plaignant dans son emploi; c) de prendre toute autre mesure qu'il juge équitable de lui imposer et de nature à contrebalancer les effets du congédiement ou à y remédier. |
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| 243. (1) Every order of an adjudicator appointed under subsection 242(1) is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court. (2) No order shall be made, process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain an adjudicator in any proceedings of the adjudicator under section 242. |
243. (1) Les ordonnances de l'arbitre désigné en vertu du paragraphe 242(1) sont définitives et non susceptibles de recours judiciaires. (2) Il n'est admis aucun recours ou décision judiciaire -- notamment par voie d'injonction, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de quo warranto -- visant à contester, réviser, empêcher ou limiter l'action d'un arbitre exercée dans le cadre de l'article 242. |
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[3] The conclusions of the disputed decision read as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
FOR THESE REASONS the adjudicator
DECLARES that Jean-Patrick Demangeon did not resign on October 14, 1998;
DECLARES that the employer dismissed him unfairly on October 14, 1998;
ORDERS the employer to reinstate him in his duties as a driver with all his rights and privileges within seven days of receipt of this decision;
ORDERS the employer to pay him within 30 days of receipt of this decision as compensation the equivalent of the salary which he lost by his dismissal, for the period from November 15, 1998 to the date of his reinstatement;
RESERVES his jurisdiction on the quantum of the compensation, if necessary.
[4] This case first of all raises the question of the adjudicator's jurisdiction to decide whether the dismissal alleged by the defendant was unfair.
[5] At the start of the hearing before the adjudicator the plaintiff, as a preliminary objection, challenged the former's jurisdiction, alleging that the defendant had not been dismissed but had actually resigned. At the start of his decision the adjudicator wrote the following in this regard:
[TRANSLATION]
However, he raised a preliminary objection. He challenged the adjudicator's jurisdiction, alleging that the complainant was not dismissed but actually resigned. At the start of the second day of the hearing he asked the adjudicator to rule on his preliminary objection before proceeding to the merits.
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the adjudicator decided to take the objection under reserve and hear the evidence on the merits. Knowledge of this evidence on the circumstances of the case as a whole will enable him to make a better ruling on the employer's objection.
[6] The adjudicator properly decided to hear all the evidence on the merits before deciding the question of his jurisdiction. He did so in accordance with s. 242(2)(b) of the Code, which indicates that an adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred "shall determine the procedure to be followed, but shall give full opportunity to the parties to the complaint to present evidence and make submissions to the adjudicator and shall consider the information relating to the complaint".
[7] However, after having thus heard all the evidence the adjudicator began the wording of the actual reasons for his final decision as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
REASONS AND DECISION
In the instant case the adjudicator must first rule on the preliminary objection by the employer and determine whether Jean-Patrick Demangeon resigned on October 14, 1998. If so, I should decline jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint. If not, I should decide whether the employer dismissed him unfairly, that is without just and sufficient cause.
According to precedent, in such circumstances it is for the employer to prove that the complainant resigned. If he does not, he must show just and sufficient cause for dismissing him. The burden of proof is upon him.
(My emphasis.)
[8] In my opinion, the adjudicator was wrong to impose on the plaintiff the burden of showing that the defendant had resigned. The fact that the question of the adjudicator's jurisdiction was raised by a preliminary objection made by the plaintiff does not thereby shift the burden of proof which the law imposes on the complainant-defendant of proving the existence of a dismissal, including if necessary the absence of a resignation. It is only when a person who claims to have been unfairly dismissed presents evidence of dismissal that the employer then has the burden of showing that the dismissal was fair. The standard of judicial review of the adjudicator's decision on his jurisdiction is the absence of error. On these propositions, we need only refer to Lemieux v. Canada (Labour Affairs Officer, Human Resources Development), [1998] 4 F.C. 65, in which the Federal Court of Appeal per Décary J.A. summarized the state of the applicable law as follows, at para. [47]:
That conclusion seems to me to be consistent with the decisions of this Court, which have held (a) that one of the essential prerequisites for an adjudicator's consideration of an unjust dismissal complaint is that the complainant prove that he or she was dismissed; (b) that the adjudicator has the authority to dispose of that question; and (c) that the standard for review of the adjudicator's decision is absence of error. (See Sagkeeng Education Authority Inc. v. Guimond, [1996] 1 F.C. 387 (T.D.), at page 395; Canada Post Corporation v. Pollard, supra, paragraph 43; Eskasoni School Board and Eskasoni Band Council v. MacIsaac et al., supra, paragraph 42; Srougi v. Lufthansa German Airlines, supra, paragraph 26; and Sedpex, Inc. v. Canada (Adjudicator appointed under the Canada Labour Code), [1989] 2 F.C. 289 (T.D.). See also Beothuk Data Systems Ltd., Seawatch Division v. Dean, [1996] 1 F.C. 451 (T.D.); revd by [1998] 1 F.C. 433 (C.A.); and Canadian Airlines International Ltd. v. Husain, [1998] F.C.J. No. 607 (C.A.) (QL).)
(My emphasis.)
[9] Accordingly, in the case at bar the adjudicator erred by clearly imposing on the plaintiff, as he did, the burden of proving the defendant's alleged resignation, thereby exempting the latter from the full burden of proving his dismissal. This error of law is sufficiently serious to vitiate the fundamentals of the analysis of the evidence by the adjudicator and so is a sufficient basis for quashing his decision.
[10] The adjudicator's decision is accordingly quashed and the matter referred back to another adjudicator to be again considered and decided in accordance with these reasons, in particular by imposing on the complainant-defendant the burden of proving his dismissal by the plaintiff. Costs are awarded to the plaintiff.
YVON PINARD
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
January 26, 2001
Certified true translation
Suzanne M. Gauthier, LL.L. Trad. a.
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
COURT No.: T-730-00
STYLE OF CAUSE: Serge Lemay Inc. v. Jean-Patrick Demangeon
PLACE OF HEARING: Québec, Quebec
DATE OF HEARING: January 20, 2001
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: Pinard J.
DATED: January 20, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Benoit Turcotte FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Richard Gauthier FOR THE DEFENDANT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Therrien, Turcotte FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Montréal, Quebec
Trudel, Nadeau FOR THE DEFENDANT
Montréal, Quebec